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Introduction
We are pleased to bring together many of the papers presented at the Michigan Tech World
War I symposium, Armistice & Aftermath. They provide various examples of how WWI
affected the heartland, both during and after the war – a topic often missed in general
histories, at least in the United States. American stories of WWI are relatively scarce in
relation to general American military history, where the Civil War and WWII dominate,
and in relation to WWI histories, which are dominated by the European combat experience.
It is understandable that other countries have more robust histories and analyses of the
Great War, mainly because it was so proportionally more devastating to their generation
that fought: it is estimated that of the 15–19 million deaths in the war (and about 23 million
wounded military personnel), France and Germany lost 4.25% and 3.8% of their entire
population to deaths in the war, respectively, and two to three time more casualties who
survived the war, while some other countries like the Ottoman Empire and Serbia lost 13–
18% of their population; the U.S. suffered 117,000 deaths, or 0.13% of our population at
the time.
This collection is not about the battlefield experiences of American troops in France, but
about the hometowns, the families, wives, mothers, children, and society that was left
behind while our boys (and girls: we must not forget the “Hello Girls”) were “over there”,
and the effects of their return to the U.S. There are some stories that are not told in this
collection, unfortunately, like the Red Summer of 1919, the violent backlash against
returning African-American soldiers who were expecting more civil rights upon their
return. Instead they met over two dozen riots against them across the country with hundreds
killed. Instead, this volume looks at a view of how the war affected the homefront during
1918–19 and then during the roaring ‘20s that is seldom considered.
We would like to thank all the speakers who were able said to contribute their papers, but
also want to thank the speakers who were not able to because their papers are out for review
elsewhere or otherwise committed. Our thanks also go out to the WW1CC Committee
members and student helpers, for helping to make this symposium a reality.
Financial support was provided by the Michigan Humanities Council,† Michigan Tech’s
Institutional Equity and the Center for Diversity and Inclusion, and with support from the
Carnegie Museum in Houghton and Finlandia University in Hancock, as well as the
Departments of Humanities and Social Sciences here at Michigan Tech.
Patty Sotirin and Steve Walton
Houghton, MI, Dec. 2018

—— ww1cc.mtu.edu ——
†
WW1CC is made possible in part by a grant from the Michigan Humanities Council, an affiliate of the National
Endowment for the Humanities. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this program do
not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities or the Michigan Humanities Council.
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T

he Armistice that ended the “Great War” remains a marker of hope, change, sacrifice,
and struggle. In commemorating this marker, the Symposium features diverse
reflections on the cultural, political, and technological experiences and legacies of WWI.

friday, september 28
1:00—4:00 PM Registration and exhibits open at Michigan Tech, Carnegie Museum, Finnish

American Heritage Center, and conference hotel. Exhibits open:
Dug In: Experiential WWI Trench, Michigan Tech (41 & MacInnes)

Town and Gown in the Great War: A Look Back at the Copper Country and Michigan Tech During World
War I, Van Pelt & Opie Library, Michigan Tech
World War I & the Copper Country Home Front, Van Pelt & Opie Library, Michigan Tech
Reflections on Technologies of Warfare, Immersive Studio, EERC 510, Michigan Tech
Shell-shocked: Footage and Sounds of the Front, Rozsa Gallery Lobby, Michigan Tech
American and French Propaganda Posters, Rozsa Gallery, Michigan Tech
Soldier Stories: The U.P. in World War I, Carnegie Museum of the Keweenaw, Houghton
Copper Country Voices of Dissent in the Great War, Finnish American Heritage Center,
Finlandia University, Hancock
4:00—5:30 PM “Local Theaters, Propaganda and WWI,” Sue Collins (Michigan Tech University) Orpheum Theater,
Studio Pizza appetizers. Shuttle available to this talk and back to Tech campus. Contact Symposium
office, Datolite Room #100 Memorial Union or email ww1cc@mtu.edu
5:00—6:00 PM Shuttle from Orpheum Theater to Rozsa
Box supper available in Rozsa Lobby
6:00—7:00 PM “Europe, America, and the World: An Outdoor Concert,” Michigan Tech Wind Symphony, Walker
lawn, Michigan Tech (inside in case of inclement weather; check signs in Rozsa Lobby)
7:30—8:30 PM Keynote Address: Dr. John Morrow Jr., “African American Experience in WWI and Aftermath,” Rozsa
Lobby, Michigan Tech
8:30—9:30 PM Shuttle from Rozsa Lobby to conference hotel Copper Crown Hancock

saturday, september 29
8:00—9:00 AM Coffee and muffins, Alumni Room, Memorial Union
8:45 AM Welcome, Symposium Committee

9:00—10:00 AM

Session 1a Ballroom B2-3

Session 1b Ballroom A1

Contestations over Loyalties
and Identities

The Art and Legacy of WWI
Propaganda

Conflicted Loyalties: Austro-Hungarian Immigrants in
Michigan and the Great War — Robert Goodrich
(Northern Michigan University)
A Tale of Two Princips: Contested Memory and National
Identity in the Former Yugoslavia — Christina Morus
(Stockton University) and Gordon Coonfield (Villanova
University)

The Sights and Sounds of WWI Propaganda Posters —
Jessy Ohl (The University of Alabama)
A Heartland Artist as Prisoner: The End Of Guy Brown
Wiser's Air War — Doug Lantry (National Museum of the
U.S. Air Force)

Population, the Lessons of War, and the Promise of
Peace — Kathleen Tobin (Purdue University Northwest)

Propaganda as Public Relations Antecedent: The
Complex Legacy of the Creel Commission —
Christopher McCollough (Columbus State University)

Chair: Patty Sotirin

Chair: Sue Collins

10:15—11:15 AM

Session 2a Ballroom B2-3

Session 2b Ballroom A1

bringing it home to the midwest

depicting war in the arts

Oshkosh on the Home Front: Activities and Attitudes
During World War I — Amy Fels (University of WisconsinMilwaukee)

An American Abroad: Perceptions of Americans in
Buchan's WWI Thriller, Greenmantle — Peter Faziani
(Indiana University of Pensylvania and Jackson College,
Michigan)

'Lest We Forget': Remembering World War I in
Wisconsin, 1919-1945 — Leslie Bellais (University of
Wisconsin-Madison)

“Pour la France ! Pour ma famille !”: Haunting War
Legacies in Rouaud’s Champs d’honneurs -- Dany Jacob
(Michigan Tech)

Patriotic Acts of Copper Country Children in the Great War
Art and Activisim in Abel Gance's Film, J'accuse:
— Seth Dahl (Finlandia University)
Revisiting Anti-war Sentiment in French Art and Society
Chair: Steven Walton
a Century Later — Ramon Fonkoue (Michigan Tech)
Chair: Ramon Fonkoue

11:30 AM—1:00 PM
Lunch buffet and Keynote: Dr. Lynn Dumenil, “Women and the Great War“
Memorial Union Ballroom A2

1:15—2:15 PM

Session 3a Ballroom B2-3

Session 3b Ballroom A1

shifts in technology and law

exhibiting war

Electrical Communications Impacts During the Great War
and Impacts on the Interwar Period — Martha Sloan
(Michigan Tech)

‘Your Duty on Display’: The Allied War Exhibition in
Chicago, the State Council of Defense, and the Role of
the State in Defining American Identity — Josh Fulton
(Northern Illinois University)

American Chemical Companies: World War I and Beyond
— Jason Szilagyi (Central Michigan University)
Impact of the First World War on India — Imrana Begum
(NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi,
Pakistan)
Chair: Diane Shoos

2:30—3:30 PM

The Allied Exhibitionary Forces: From Encouragement to
Commemoration of WWI — Steven Walton (Michigan
Tech)
WWI Propaganda Poster Fluidity — Sarah Price (The
University of Alabama)
Chair: Steven Walton

Session 4a Ballroom B2-3

Session 4b Ballroom A1

taking the long view

gender and the great war

The Great War and Modern Homosexuality: Transatlantic
Crossings — Chet DeFonso (Northern Michigan University)

Recalling the Trenches from the Club Window:
Contrasting Perspectives in Dorothy Sayers and P.G.
Wodehouse — Laura Fiss (Michigan Tech)

Henry Ford‘s Dearborn Independent: A Reflection of
Post-WWI Rise of Anti-Semitism in America — Catherine
Wadle (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg, Germany)
World War One & Africa: Contesting History, Nation, and
Identity in ‘Western Togoland’ — G. Edzordzi Agbozo
(Michigan Tech)
‘The War Has Ended; the Doors Are Open Again’: Baha‘l
Western-Women Pilgrimage to the Holy Land After the
Great War — Shay Rozen (Avshlom Institute)

Men, Military, and the Law: An Examination of
Conscription During World War I and Its Legal
Challenges — Victoria Stewart (Northwest Florida State
College University)
‘This Mad Brute’: Postwar Male Violence and the
Pathological Public Sphere — Rebecca Frost
(Keweenaw Bay Ojibwa Community College)
Chair: Patty Sotirin

3:45—7:00 PM

Shuttles available between Michigan Tech and Hancock. Please check in the Symposium office, Datolite Room #100 or
email ww1cc@mtu.edu
Exhibits open at Michigan Tech, Carnegie Museum, and Finlandia University
Dinner on your own -- see the list of area restaurants in the Symposium folder

7:30—9:00 PM
“Copper Country at the Silver Screen in 1918”
Charlie Chaplin’s silent film, Shoulder Arms (1918) with live musical accompaniment by
organist Jay Warren (Chicago) Four-Minute Man performance
Participation in all Symposium events is FREE and open to the public.

For registration, information, meal tickets, and tours, visit the Symposium office, Memorial Union 106.
hours Friday, 1:00—4:00 PM, Saturday 8:00am-5:00pm
All presenters will receive a box supper on Friday evening and a buffet lunch (WWI recipes) on Saturday. These are
available for a nominal cost to non-presenting participants.
Armistice and Aftermath Proceedings are available at the Michigan Tech Creative Commons: www.mtu.edu/library

State Continuing Education Clock Hours (SCECH) are available
Three tracks: one on Friday and two on Saturday
Please register in the Symposium office, Datolite #100, MUB
Please complete the Michigan Humanities Council Heritage Grants Program Audience Survey

credits
Symposium Coordinators: Patty Sotirin and Steve Walton
Assistant: Kikelomo Omonojo
Symposium Committee: Sue Collins, Stefka Hristova, Patty Sotirin, Steve Walton

Institutional Equity
Diversity and Inclusion

KEYNOTE PRESENTATIONS
Dr. John Morrow, Jr.

African American Experience in WWI and Aftermath
FRIDAY Sept. 28, 7:30-8:30pm, Rozsa Center
The First World War occurred at the height of white supremacy,
segregation, and lynching and race riots in the United States. Yet the
wartime years appeared to offer African Americans the occasion to
escape the oppression they suffered in the South for better jobs and
living conditions in the North and West. African Americans further
viewed the war as an opportunity to fight for their country again, as
they had in all its previous wars, in order to prove to white Americans
that they merited equal citizenship rights. When African Americans
consequently participated in the war effort on the home and fighting
fronts, how did white Americans respond to their efforts? Ultimately,
how did the war affect race relations and the conditions of African
American life in the postwar United States?
Dr. John H. Morrow, Jr. is Franklin Professor of History at The University of Georgia. He has authored
seven books on war and air power, imperialism, and African American experiences including (with
Jeffrey T. Sammons), Harlem’s Rattlers and the Great War: The Undaunted 369th Regiment and the
African American Quest for Equality.

Dr. Lynn Dumenil

World War I and Representations of the Modern American Woman
SATURDAY Sept. 29, Noon-1:00pm, Memorial Union Ballroom
A focus on popular culture images of women in World War I reveals that
conventional notions of womanhood persisted suggests the continuing power
of expectations about women's traditional roles in the family. The attention
given to "modern" women's war service and heroic activism offered dramatic
evidence of boundary crossing women. But the media's fascination with the
novelty of women at war undoubtedly led it to exaggerate the degree to which
American women challenged gender conventions and helps us to understand
why many observers believed – inaccurately – that the war would prove
transformative in reshaping women's lives.
Dr. Lynn Dumenil is the Robert Glass Cleland Professor of American History, Emerita, at Occidental
College. She has authored four books on American history including The Second Line of Defense:
American Women and World War I (University of North Carolina Press, 2017). Her current project is
The Women Behind the Men Behind the Gun: Working Women in World War II (Bedford, 2018).
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Conflicted Loyalties:
Austro-Hungarian Immigrants in Michigan and the Great War
Robert Goodrich
Northern Michigan University
On 1 July 1918, US Army PFC Mario Ruconich of 2nd Division, 23rd Infantry Regiment, Company
L was killed by German machine gun fire near the village of Vaux, France. He had volunteered
for the US Army in January 1917, mustering at the Columbus Barracks in Ohio, where he listed
his home as Michigan. His military service record listed his nationality as “Austrian.”1
Ruconich, though, had disappeared from the records in 1914. He had been a sailor, drawn from a
nearby island to the booming industrial port of Trieste on the Adriatic in Austrian Istria. There, he
served as a crewmember aboard the passenger steamship Argentina of the Austro-American Line,
making runs from Trieste to North America. He was apparently a crewmember when the Argentina
arrived in New York on 16 July 1914 with only 291 passengers. War fever had gripped Europe,
and the crossing was the last for the Austro-American Line. Indeed, a British blockade, conversion
of passenger ships to wartime use, and the rise of submarine warfare brought passenger service
from the Central Powers and thus Austro-Hungarian immigration to a virtual halt. And when the
Argentina eventually returned to Trieste, however, Ruconich was not on board.2 The next time he
appears on any known historical document came with his military induction. In effect, he was one
of the last immigrants to the United States from Austria-Hungary.
Of course, this leaves open the question of how Ruconich made it to Michigan. As a young man
seeing the writing on the wall for the coming war, he may simply have jumped ship and entered
the US illegally (there is no record for him at Ellis Island), which was not hard for crew members,
who generally were allowed shore leave. From there, he could have made his way to Michigan
along with other Istrians looking for work, perhaps on the ships of the Great Lakes. As for joining
the military, we have no idea of his motives, either. Certainly by 1917 the prospect of returning to
Istria and inevitable conscription there could not have been appealing, but there was no draft in
the US until later that year, and the US was still neutral when he joined. No other record exists,
however, between his service in the Austrian merchant marine on the Argentina and his enlistment
in the US military. The case of Mario Ruconich exemplifies how difficult documentation of an
immigrant history in Michigan can be, especially given the transitional nature of many immigrants’
tenure in Michigan and the chaos of Central Europe after 1914. Ruconich left no discernible mark
1

For the family history, I am grateful for the personal correspondence with Renzo Rocconi, great nephew
of Mario Ruconich, now living in Venice. Part of the story is available on-line: http://www.worldwar1.
com/itafront/rocconi.htm, accessed October 2012.

2

The Argentina found no further use as a passenger ship. However, it next saw service in April 1918, when
it was requisitioned as a hospital ship (Spitalschiff VI) for evacuating the wounded from the Albanian
front.
1A1–1

PAPER 1A1 – ROBERT GOODRICH
in Michigan, the state he listed as home in 1917. We find no further connection with
Michigan from his family, either.
Yet does that make his story irrelevant for Michigan and our questions about World War One? Far
from it. In fact, his story illuminates critical aspects of Austro-Hungarians and their relationship
to Michigan. His life offers a picture of how random some events are that led immigrants to
Michigan. The broader Ruconich family history also sheds light onto roads travelled by those who
did not come to Michigan but came from the same background as those who did. And Ruconich,
as a fallen US veteran and an Austro-Hungarian who listed Michigan as his home, explains
questions about Austro-Hungarian identity and loyalty in Michigan during the Great War. But to
understand, we have to step back into a now vanished and largely forgotten world of nonnationalist identity.

Understanding the Austro-Hungarian Empire
For modern political sensibilities, Ruconich’s homeland is not easy to label, let alone define. He
was from Istria, now part of Croatia, previously Yugoslavia until the 1990s, before that Italy until
after World War II, and before that until 1918 part of the Austrian crownland of the Austrian
Littoral in the Cisleithanian part of Austria-Hungary. And Austria-Hungary was not even the name
of the state that provided his citizenship. Its official name is so long that no one ever used it: “The
Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council and the Lands of the Holy Hungarian
Crown of St. Stephen.” Despite its cumbersome nomenclature, and equally formidable
bureaucracy, this hereditary, overarching entity had existed for six hundred years (in one form or
another) under the same ruling family – the Habsburg dynasty – and was the largest land empire
in Europe outside of Russia.3
In this complex multi-national empire, there was no single national majority. Neither Germans nor
Hungarians were the largest group, and the more numerous Slavs were divided between half a
dozen different groups—Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians, Serbs, and Croats. Though German
was the lingua franca of trade and bureaucracy and Roman Catholicism enjoyed the favor of the
court, no single language or religion united the empire. In fact, the Habsburgs actively encouraged
various groups to move and settle freely within their lands, leading to some of the most
demographically diverse regions in Europe.
Among the lands that belonged to Austria-Hungary were Austria and Hungary, but also all of what
are now the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also
included significant portions of what is now Poland (Galicia), Romania (Transyvalnia), Serbia

3

Numerous histories of Austria-Hungary exist, but the complexity of the empire has daunted most
historians from tackling it as a unified whole. The language requirements alone all but mandate a team
effort. Nonetheless, for significant reappraisals of the empire see, Pieter M. Judson, The Habsburg
Empire: A New History (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2016); or Mark Cornwall, ed., The Last Years of
Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe, 2nd Ed. (Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press, 2002); or R.J.W. Evans, Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Central
Europe c. 1683-1867 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); for the dated seminal work on politics
and diplomacy see, A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918: A History of the Austrian
Empire and Austria-Hungary, 2nd Ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1964).
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(Banat), and Ukraine (Bukowina), and lesser parts of Italy (Trieste and South Tyrol) and
Montenegro. A large number of Jews, especially Hasidic Orthodox Jews, and Roma and
Sinti came from those lands. These groups often went under names we rarely encounter today:
Rusyns, Oberlander, Bohemians, Swabians, and many more.
Today, however, who identifies as Austro-Hungarian? Who hangs a picture of honor of Emperor
Franz Josef on their living room wall or hoists the Black and Yellow flag of the House of Habsburg
on August 18th to celebrate his birthday? Who advocates for the canonization of Charles I, last
Habsburg emperor? Who even remembers that Austria-Hungary was until 1918 the leading and
still expanding power in Central Europe? If we want to understand identity and loyalty for most
of Central and Eastern Europe, we must first understand that our ancestors came from a world and
mindset that was neither American nor nationalist. They came from multi-national empires with
roots in the Middle Ages—a place and time when nationalism did not exist as we think of it and
ethnicity was not even a concept. This heritage is almost entirely forgotten, or at best remembered
in an utterly distorted fashion, even though millions of Michiganders are products of one of the
most resilient states in European history that sent more immigrants to the US than any country
except the British Isles, Germany, and Italy.4
Ruconich migrated to Michigan from this region during the peak of emigration from Central and
Eastern Europe (1870–1920). This time period coincided with the last manifestation of the
Habsburg Empire—the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918). Therefore, to figure out
underlying assumptions of loyalty and identity for migrants such as Ruconich, we need to grapple
with a confusing array of terms used to identify this monarchy and its components (territories,
administrations, and languages) to underscore how fluid ethnic identities were during the era of
mass immigration.5
In fact, the Austro-Hungarian Empire makes little sense without its medieval past. This is not to
argue that it was anti-modern, hostile to all changes, rigid, medieval, or any other such thing. The
fact that the Habsburg dynasty ruled for six hundred years meant that it had weathered every
imaginable crisis: repeated sieges by the Ottoman Empire; international intrigue to unravel its
possessions; the Reformation and the Thirty Years War; internal divisions within the dynasty that
led to multiple branches; revolutions and rebellions; an intense rivalry with Hohenzollern Prussia
and Bourbon France; the Napoleonic Wars; the dramatic changes in society and economy with the
growth of industrialism; and every other stress to which a state was subjected since the Middle
Ages. Few dynasties or states proved as equal to the task as the dynamic Habsburgs.
One need only think of the contentious history of two rival examples: France and Germany.

4

For a historiographic review of the memory of the monarchy see, Jonathan Kwan, “Review Article:
Nationalism and All That: Reassessing the Habsburg Monarchy and its Legacy,” European History
Quarterly 41, no. 1 (2011): 88–108. For a review of interwar Polish memory of the monarchy see, Adam
Kozuchowski, The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: The Image of the Habsburg Monarchy in Interwar
Europe (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press; 2013).

5

For a broad survey of published sources on Austro-Hungarian population statistics see, Christel Durdik,
Bibliographischer Abriß zur Bevölkerungs- und Sozialstatistik der Habsburgermonarchie im 19.
Jahrhundert (Wien, 1974).
1A1–3

PAPER 1A1 – ROBERT GOODRICH
France in the 18th century was a multi-national dynastic state ruled by the House of Bourbon.
That dynasty fell to revolution in 1792, replaced by the First Republic. That government
reinvented itself numerous times before Napoleon Bonaparte crowned himself Emperor of the
French in 1804, which in turn was replaced in 1814 (and again in 1815 after Napoleon’s brief
return to power) by the restoration of the House of Bourbon. Soon, however, the July Revolution
of 1830 ousted that monarchy for the House of Orleans, a dynasty that would only last until 1848
when a new revolution created the Second Republic. That republic, in turn, lasted all of four years
until 1852 when Napoleon’s nephew established the Second Empire. Not surprisingly, that empire
soon collapsed and was replaced in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 by a Government
of National Defense that lasted until it was drowned in blood and replaced with the Third Republic
in 1871. That entity lasted until 1940. In effect, if we compare the 120 years of Habsburg vs.
French history since the late 18th century, we see that France experienced almost a dozen distinct
governments, separated by coups, wars, or revolutions.
And Germany? No such state existed until 1871. Before that the territory was a collection of
sovereign states (by some counts somewhere around 1,800 prior to the French Revolution), most,
but not all of which, were under the umbrella of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,
itself an elected entity, which coincidentally, was ruled almost uninterruptedly since the 15th
century by Habsburgs whose lands were deliberately excluded from the new Germany. Prussia
was but one, albeit one of the largest, of these states. A centralized Germany finally came into
existence only after the Franco-Prussian War as an attempt to prevent the spread of nationalism
from overthrowing the Hohenzollern dynasty of Prussia. Even then, it only lasted two generations
until 1918, collapsing at the same time as the Habsburg Empire.
In short, the Habsburg Empire, though ever changing, proved to be singularly stable and long lived.
Ironically, however, the very success of the empire in adjusting to modernity meant that its premodern tendencies were able to survive. At the top, the royal court persistently believed in its
divinely inspired purpose and in its patrimony for future generations of the dynasty, which placed
strong limits on how far it could compromise. The nobles and most of the emerging middle-class
elites, with whom the dynasty shared power especially at the local level, proved consistently loyal
to the Habsburgs. Even among the commoners, support for the multi-national empire persisted into
the 20th century, as evidenced by the willingness of its constituencies to fight for the empire until
the bitter end in 1918. Thus, the national identities as understood in the era of nation-states of the
20th century made little sense to most Austro-Hungarians. Modern nationalism was simply not a
lived experience for the overwhelming majority.
Perhaps, in part, we are blinded to this reality by subsequent history, a history that is inseparable
from nationalism. The 20th century, especially the period 1914 to 1989, a time bracketed by the
First World War and the Cold War, proved disastrous in many ways for Central Europe. Once
known as a coherent Mitteleuropa, this region bore a heavy burden in the fighting of World War
One, which concluded with the collapse of all the regional empires, resulting in decades of civil
war and genocides.6 All of the large multi-national empires of the region – Habsburg, Romanov,
Ottoman, and even Germany – disappeared, to be replaced by a patchwork of small nation-states,
6

For an engaging argument that treats Mitteleuropa as a coherent historical entity see, Lonnie R. Johnson,
Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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most recently Kosovo, officially recognized in 2012. It is no coincidence that this region
also was the epicenter of most of the horrors of World War Two, from the major battles to
the Holocaust. Would it surprise us to learn that the 1993 film Schindler’s List took place entirely
in lands previously part of the empire (Krakow, Moravia, Auschwitz), and that almost all of the
characters were prior to 1918 subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The SS commandant
Amon Goeth was from Vienna; Oscar Schindler was from Zwittau; Itzhak Stern and most of the
“Schindler Jews” were from Galicia.
This area was then the frontline of the Cold War, including the redrawing of frontiers, massive
ethnic cleansing, rebellions, the stationing of short range nuclear weapons, and generally accepted
battle scenarios that, had they been realized, would have left Central Europe more destroyed than
any previous war. Following the Cold War, the last spasm of war and genocide in Europe during
the Yugoslav successor wars of the 1990s took place primarily on former Habsburg soil.
This history blinds us to the vitality of the Habsburg Lands before the bloody 20th century and the
full unleashing of the now overwhelmingly dominant but all too often revanchist and racialized
nationalism. At the risk of distorting the record of the Habsburg Lands into one of praise when
compared to the past one hundred years, we nonetheless need to be aware of the relative peace and
prosperity as well as immense creativity of this pre-nationalist area preceding World War One.
The period around 1900 in fin-de-siècle Vienna especially has garnered an almost mythical
quality.7 Culturally, Vienna, as the heart of the Habsburg Empire and a crossroads of Europe,
reached a degree of vitality that rivaled any other city of that epoch. It was the fourth largest city
in the world with a dynamic multinational population. To name only a few of the creative minds
in Vienna alone we must mention Sigmund Freud, Karl Jung, Gustav Mahler, Oskar Kokoschka,
Egon Schiele, Richard Strauss, Anton Bruckner, Arnold Schönberg, Johann Strauss II, Gustav
Klimt, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Adolf Loos, Otto Wagner, Stefan Zweig, Hugo von Hoffmansthal,
Arthur Schnitzler. All came out of this Habsburg milieu that mixed religions and languages and
cultures into a vibrant cocktail.
A unique artistic variation of Art Nouveau, Jugendstil, flourished outside of state sponsorship with
its sumptuous art and architecture decorating not just public spaces but shaping the domestic
sphere as well. At the same time, the Habsburg state continued to promote its skilled but staid
craftsmen and artists in the Academic Style and Historicism, preferring grandiose buildings that
glorified past achievements (Neo-Gothic, Neo-Renaissance, Neo-Classical). The creative energy
was linked to an excellent education system that promoted scientific inquiry, particularly in the
social sciences, and the arts, and a surprisingly tolerant culture.
In short, Austria-Hungary at the time of mass emigration and Ruconich’s arrival in the United
States was far from moribund. Certainly, it faced significant crises, but so did all of the Europe.
That it collapsed was neither inevitable nor unique. Instead, it provided a viable alternative for
confederative identities that deeply influenced those who emigrated from it prior to 1918 and even
those who lived in its successor states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia being the prominent
examples.

7

For a seminal work on this era see Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New
York: Vintage Books, 1981).
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Emigration from Austria-Hungary to Michigan: Some Generalizations
With a few notable exceptions such as Bohemians, immigrants from the Habsburg Lands
came relatively late to North America. They had no overseas colonies to encourage early
emigration. Prior to 1790, virtually no emigration to the New World aside from certain Protestant
groups and isolated individuals came from Central Europe.8 For the future US, the demographic
consequences were long lasting. Early immigrants came overwhelmingly from the British Isles,
and Germans started to come from continental Europe in large numbers after the Thirty Years War
and the ensuing economic dislocations. In 1709 alone, some 15,000 German peasants and artisans
set out from Germany for the North American colonies so that by 1766 German immigrants in the
English colonies numbered around 200,000 persons. The Irish came in large numbers in the early
19th century to escape rural overpopulation and consequent impoverishment, greatly accelerated
by the long-term consequences of the Great Famine of 1846–1847. As a result, these three
groups—British, Irish, and German—made up the bulk of immigrants for over two hundred and
fifty years and settled most of the farming land east of the Mississippi.
During this first period of immigration, official US figures in 1850 listed only about 1,000
“Austrians.” Between 1851 and 1880, only 2.5% of immigrants came from the Habsburg
Monarchy. Mass migration from continental Europe shifted in the course of the 19th century,
however. By the second half of that century, a “first wave” brought Germans and Scandinavians,
mostly settling in the remaining farming regions of the Midwest. The “second wave” shifted
geographic focus. Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary became the new source as these homelands
suffered from a complex interplay of tradition confronting modernization—economically and
politically. However, from the start we are confronted with the diversity of Austria-Hungary, and
generalizations are dangerous for this eclectic nation.
The changes in Austro-Hungarian emigration to the US were dramatic over time. For example, in
one survey of passenger lists, between 1876 and 1885, over half came from Bohemia. Yet by
1910, almost 70% came from Galicia (though mixed between Poles, Ruthenians, Jews, and
Germans).9 That sort of regional shift was also accompanied by demographic differences as well.
For example, male and female Bohemians emigrated in roughly equal numbers, but around 70%
were single, implying both a high number of families as well as well as young singles of both
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sexes.10 Galicians that same year were overwhelmingly single men. Bohemians were highly
artisanal but Galicians were largely from agricultural laboring and servant groups.11 Even
by gender, we can discern that men tended to re-migrate but women to settle in the US.12 The table
below also exposes how variable immigration was based on national background.13

Austro-Hungarian National Groups and Immigration Rates, 1906–1910

Germans
Czechs
Poles
Ruthenians
Serbians
Italians
Hungarians
Croatians
Romanians
Slovaks
Jews
Total

Absolute
Migration Rate per 10,000 People of a Given Group
Numbers
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
1899–1910
12,085,447
29
34
23
17
22
221
6,435,983
20
21
15
10
12
153
4,967,984
88
120
53
74
122
871
3,948,301
40
60
31
39
70
369
1,831,979
24
40
41
20
25
194
768,422
25
20
14
15
24
255
8,753,275
49
68
27
32
31
381
2,935,044
147
161
67
66
148
1,148
3,074,594
35
60
28
24
44
250
2,417,402
151
173
66
93
133
1,550
2,159,941
69
87
71
39
61
840
47,218,431
56
72
36
36
55
492

Czechs stayed at home; Slovaks left. Yet they directly neighbored each other. The same difference
applied to Italians and Croatians. Also, while Germans stayed, Jews left, even though both lived
in scattered enclaves throughout the Monarchy. The table indicates that every national group in
the Empire followed its own dynamic, though all were drawn into the process of migration.
Economically, modernization of farming, stimulated by the end of serfdom, and industrialization
created surplus rural populations that could not be supported in the countryside but also were no
longer either tied to that land or possessed the right to reside there. As late as 1869, up to 80% of
the population of Austria-Hungary still possessed the right of residence in their home villages as a
vestige of serfdom. That number had fallen to 65% by 1890 and would continue to drop.14 Mass
migration thus first occurred from the countryside to the cities, but the still developing industries
10
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of Austria-Hungary could not absorb this migration.15 Indeed the internal migration of
Austria-Hungary most likely exceeded international migration. At the same time, though,
larger and faster steam-powered transatlantic ships, with drastically lower fares, began to advertise
aggressively for passengers, promising easy prosperity in new lands. With few prospects, millions
migrated abroad. We should remember that the US was not the only destination. Migrants went
wherever there was economic opportunity—a chance to escape the poverty of home, and hopefully
return once enough money had been earned. Thus, it was not the promise of opportunity that in
the first instance began to draw millions of Austro-Hungarians to the US. Instead, it was the push
of rural poverty.
Politically, continental European states began to reconsider their previous restrictions on
emigration at this moment. Contrary to Britain, during the 18th century, Austria had banned
emigration in the spirit of mercantilism, which viewed the populace of a state as its backbone and
the source of its welfare. The French economist, Jean-Baptiste Say, claimed, “If 100,000 persons
leave a country with 10 million Florins, that is the same as if 100,000 fully equipped and armed
soldiers go across the border and perish there.” In this spirit, Emperor Joseph II tightly regulated
emigration in 1784 with what amounted to a ban. In 1832, Emperor Francis Joseph I issued another
emigration patent that recognized “legal emigration” but with the loss of citizenship. However, the
obvious economic success of liberal Britain, Belgium, France and the Netherlands by the middle
of the 19th century forced a sea change. Despite its deep conservativism, Austria-Hungary
recognized that it could not compete militarily without a modem economy after a series of defeats
in the 1850s and 1860s culminating in the loss of Northern Italy to the French and humiliation at
the hands of the Prussians. The Imperial conclusion was that economic policies must be
modernized. In 1867 freedom of movement was legalized; the only restrictions applied to
conscripts.
The net result was a dramatic shift in immigration patterns to the US. At the start of the era, as the
first tentative steps towards the deep changes in Central Europe were occurring in the 1860s, Josef
Schmidt, Commander of Vis (Lissa), an island off the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, reported on
6 October 1860, “All the young people have left, more than a hundred to America and Australia,
while many others are on the Lloyds and other cargo steamships….” Dalmatia proved the tip of
the spear in the 1860s and the 1870s, even though emigrants from the Habsburg Monarchy still
numbered only several thousand per year. By the 1880s, though, more Austro-Hungarian observers
were aware of the extent of emigration. Yet there were no efforts to staunch it. Many regarded it
as an essential part of economic liberalism that would strengthen the Empire, others as part of
political liberalism that would lead to positive reform of the state.
Nonetheless, the extremely Slavic and Magyar nature of the emigration led many Magyar
nationalist and Slavic Pan-nationalists to worry. In 1904, the Pan-Slavic people’s tribune and
peasant leader, Stjepan Radić, wrote in Modern Colonization and the Slavs,
Under the circumstances, we should not dwell on theoretical questions about the pros and cons of
emigration. Here I would like to reiterate and stress: recently, we, the Slavs, have not been
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emigrating from our homeland, we have been fleeing from here in desperation. When I say
‘we,’ I have in mind primarily the backbone of our nation: our peasants and workers.16
Indeed, the economic recession of the 1880s stimulated overseas emigration from the Austrian part
of the Empire, rising sharply to 20,000 persons per year—a level below which it would never fall
again. In 1892, the number of emigrants reached 50,000 and in 1904 as many as 100,000. In the
Hungarian part of the Monarchy, the numbers were even greater. As late as 1890, 82% of
immigrants to the US came from traditional areas of North and Western Europe. From 1891 to
1920, however, that number dropped to 25%, with a corresponding rise in immigrants from East,
Central, and South Europe, who now made up 64% of immigrants. Between 1871 and 1915,
emigration from Austria-Hungary totaled 4,383,000. For a country of forty million people, to have
over four million leave in less than a single generation is staggering.
If we look at the extended era of mass migration, lasting from the Napoleonic wars until World
War II (1815 – 1940), we see that one in ten European immigrants came from the Habsburg Lands.
After Great Britain (11.4 million), Italy (9.9 million) and Ireland (7.3 million), this represented the
fourth largest source of emigration. We should note, though, that almost all of the Central European
immigrants came between 1880 and 1919, making this mass movement even more phenomenal.
If we look at one dramatic year, 1907, we see that 338,452 Austro-Hungarians came to the US,
almost a third of all US immigrants that year. If we consider one decade, 1901–10, we find that
2,145,266 Austro-Hungarians arrived in the US, 24.39% of all immigrants in that period, more
than any other country. More than half of all emigrants from Habsburg territory who had emigrated
during the century between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War to the US arrived in
America during that single decade.
This concentration, however, will allow us to make some generalizations since the compact timeframe meant many shared conditions despite the diversity of Austria-Hungary. We must be
cautious about these generalizations, however. Consider education. Obligatory free public
education had been introduced in the predominantly German-speaking crownlands and the Czech
Lands by 1880 where 95% to 99% of school-aged children attended school. In the Kingdom of
Hungary proper, the rate was lower at 82%. In Cisleithanian Dalmatia the number was 67%; in
Bukovina 36%. In the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina the rate was 15%. This
educational gradient followed other economic developments. The peasantry of the east was still
partially mired in debts to previous feudal lords (emancipation had only occurred in 1848 and
under conditions favorable to the lords, not the peasants). Austria had exacerbated the problem by
developing a conscious policy of not industrializing the largest and most populous state, Galicia,
in order to keep it as a hinterland source of food and military recruits. Industry was concentrated
therefore in the west or in a few select urban areas such as Trieste or Budapest.
Until the 1860s much of the east lived in conditions that would have been considered feudal. Even
as late as 1897 one report made by a physician to the Hungarian Medical Society noted, “The
elementary conditions of the lives of the working people in many parts of the country are below
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the biological minimum necessary for survival.”17 The grinding rural poverty and
indebtedness of some regions meant that crime reached endemic proportions. Important
roads, such as those connecting the center of Hungary with Fiume, remained under the watch of
entire army companies in the middle of the 18th century. Military courts, which summarily hung
the guilty, operated in certain areas through the 1860s.
We should not, however, conclude that the poorest were the ones most likely to emigrate. In fact,
the poorest stayed, lacking the resources or motivation to leave. Consider the statistics of Austrian
Vice-Consul Jtizsef Schwegel located in Cleveland for 1902–03 when he looked at the
composition of Austro-Hungarian immigrants in the US:18
Poles
37,499
Slovaks
34,499
Croats and Slovenes 32,892
Magyars
Germans
Jews

27,113
23,597
18,759

Rusyns
Czechs
Bulgars, Serbs, and
Montenegrins
Romanians
Italians
Dalmatians, Bosnians
and Herzegovinians

9,819
9, 577
4,227
4,173
2,170
1,723

His numbers were back of the envelope calculations at best and grossly undercounted, but they
provided an impressionistic assessment from the point of view in the US of the Austro-Hungarian
state.
Several aspects emerge by looking at the Vice-Consuls numbers compared to the earlier table.
Firstly, the national terms, while similar, are not identical. The Vice-Consul counted numerous
smaller groups separately, and used a different term for the Ruthenians; one links Croats, Slovenes,
Dalmatians in one group; and Serbs, Bulgars, and Montenegrins in another; the other does not.
These differences reflected clearly differing views of what constituted a national group.
Still, a comparison between the emigration of Magyars and other nationalities in the Hungarianhalf of the Empire shows that most emigration occurred from non-Magyar areas. The tie between
emigration and industrial development, as seen by comparing the agricultural Slovak (Upper
Hungary) and industrial Czech areas (Bohemia) is clear. Approximately four times as many
Slovaks emigrated as did Czechs. Magyars migrated more than Czechs These differences become
even more dramatic when one compares the total number of members of one group to another.
There, a weighted comparison shows clearly that the less developed areas constituted a
disproportionately high amount of emigrants in contrast to the industrialized areas.
In general, few migrated from the large cities, the neighboring villages, prosperous commercial
farmlands, or industrial developed regions (largely in the Austrian parts). In contrast, the
17
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borderlands of the east (Galicia and Bukovina in Austria; Subcarpathia and Banat in
Hungary) were over-represented. In fact, just five counties in Hungary from those regions
accounted for one quarter of all Hungarian emigrants 1899–13.19 Even without a listing of their
occupations, we can conclude from their origins that they were largely hard-pressed peasants –
most likely the younger sons unlikely to inherit or those seeking to pull themselves out of debt.
However, the fact that every national group participated in emigration brings us to the phenomenon
of chain migration both within and between groups.20 For example, about two-thirds of Hungarian
emigrants to the US were non-Magyar (even though Magyars were over half the population).
Certain regions suffered depopulation while others saw almost no impact.
Migration began on the western borders—Bohemians and Moravians followed the migrations of
Germans; they were followed by Slovaks of Upper Hungary whose successes attracted Polish and
then later Ruthenian Galicians, finally reaching all the way to distant Bukowina and the rest of
Hungary. What must be understood, along with the more common use of chain migration to
describe kinship networks drawn into migration, is that chain migration also worked inside
Austria-Hungary across nationalities.21 What we see in Michigan is a pronounced tendency of
“neighbors” in Austria-Hungary to remain neighbors in Michigan. The Poles of Detroit set up their
first homes with the Germans, even using the same parishes until their numbers had grown.
Ruthenians and Hungarians then initially set up their homes amongst the Poles. Since Austrian
Galicia and the Kingdom of Hungary were so diverse, even at the village level, such connections
should not surprise us. However, the mistake is to assume that these neighboring ethnic enclaves
were created in Michigan based solely on local conditions (cheap housing, proximity to employers,
etc). Instead, they were as much predicated on the experiences in the homeland and the connections
reinforced rather than eroded in the process of migration.

Michigan as Destination
Naturally, neither the US nor Michigan were the sole destinations of emigrants from AustriaHungary. Since the motives were economic, they went where economic opportunity was available.
Many remained inside the Empire, usually in the cities or in sparsely populated regions where
farmland was available such as Bosnia-Herzegovina; large numbers also went to neighboring
countries for work, often seasonally, in Romania, Serbia, Germany and Russia.22 The majority,
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however, crossed the Atlantic, though not exclusively to the US but also Brazil, Canada,
and Argentina.
For Michigan, then, its ability to offer either income or land determined who came. The various
waves of immigrants consequently largely followed patterns of economic opportunity beginning
with the first French fur trappers, traders, and missionaries, followed by the homesteaders of the
19th century, to those coming for the various mining booms and the industrial promise of the
automotive industry. Even the aboriginal populations experienced migratory patterns of settlement
and displacement prior to European contact and later settlement. Thus, Michigan has always been
a land of immigrants. And therefore automatically one of emigrants, too.
Indeed, we cannot understand the problems in dealing with a history of immigration to Michigan
without first understanding its necessary prerequisite—emigration. Every immigrant is ipso facto
also an emigrant. And it is precisely the experience of emigration that ultimately draws our
attention. Why? Because most of us who look at the history of immigration to Michigan are
interested in our roots. We want to know who our ancestors were, which means their origins in
some foreign land; why they came to Michigan, which means why they felt compelled to leave
that foreign land; and what they brought with them as our heritage, which means their native
culture founded in that foreign land. Michigan is about emigration from a specific place as much
as immigration to this state.
The problem is that, generally, we tend to think that our ancestors had simple, even simplistic
identities. We usually assume that their native language sums up who they were. They were
Hungarians if they spoke Magyar, or Germans if they spoke German, or Italians if they spoke
Italian, or Slovenes if they spoke Slovene, etc. And we then tend to identify that linguistic identity
with a national identity—an identity tied to a modern nation state (for the examples just given,
Hungary, Germany, Italy, and Slovenia). In fact, we make this identification even if no such nation
state existed at the time of emigration or even exists today. We just assume that every linguistic
group is a natural cultural community that instinctively wants to and ultimately succeeds at
creating a nation state. But is this assessment fair? The question of loyalty, especially in a time of
war, challenges this conclusion for Austria-Hungary.

Austro-Hungarian Conscription of Emigrants
In Austria-Hungary’s multi-national state, the military served as one of two key unifying
institutions (the other being the monarchy itself).23 Since the Ausgleich, it was one of the few
K.u.K. ministries with jurisdiction throughout the entire Empire. All recruits took the same oath
of loyalty to the Emperor, and the rank of officer served as one of the most important markers of
social status for nobles and the middle class. The military’s function for maintaining the Empire,
therefore, was less about defense (or expansion) of the borders and more about social integration.
Indeed, the military was one of the only means in which loyalty to the Emperor, and thus the
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dynastic state, could find concrete expression.24 No wonder, then, that Austria-Hungary
engaged in all the pomp and circumstance of some of Europe’s best uniformed troops. The
Emperor himself, along with most social elites, rarely appeared in public without a military
uniform, giving the Empire a highly militarized appearance. And compulsory conscription was a
defining facet of life for the young men who made up the bulk of emigrants.
In many ways the military reflected the Empire. The officer corps, while dominated by Germans
in 1900, nonetheless revealed no discrimination in its promotions, in fact being over-represented
by certain groups such as Jews.25 Promotion required mastery of more than one language spoken
in the realm, with the assumption of fluency in German. By 1904, the bi-lingualism of the officer
corps was considerable, and the General Staff kept close records on this development, showing its
importance.26
Officers Able to Speak a Second Language in 1904
Reflecting the linguistic reality of the Empire, regiments were organized
Language
Percentage
Czech
47.0
along those lines, though German was the language of command. The
Magyar
33.6
linguistic make-up in the enlisted ranks in 1906 broke down as follows:
Polish
19.3
26.7% German, 22.3% Magyar, 13.5% Czech, 8.5% Polish, 8.1%
Serbocroatian
15.3
Ruthenian, 6.7% Croatian and Serbian, 6.4% Romanian, 3.8%
Romanian
8.8
Slovakian, 2.6% Slovene, and 1.4% Italian. Thus, the army roughly
Italian
8.5
reflected the demographic make-up of the Empire. Even though the army
Ruthenian
7.8
sought to keep units linguistically homogenous, mixing inevitably
Slovene
7.3
occurred. The Army responded by creating a specialized language, Army
Slovak
6.9
Slav (German: Armee-Slawisch), as a vocabulary of about eighty words
related to the most important commands. Even though many officers
feared disloyalty and possible mutiny based on national divisions in the Empire, during World War
One the forces of Austria-Hungary performed loyally and competently until the collapse of the
Empire in the autumn of 1918.27 For all the nationalist vigor of the Czech Legion that ended up
fighting against Austria-Hungary, that unit proved exceptional rather than representative.
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Unlike the US, which had a small military system in times of peace, Austria-Hungary
followed the model of other European states and maintained a standing army and navy with
compulsory service of three years (four in the navy) and ten years reserve. In practice, only about
one in five young men were called into service; many were sent on leave after two years. Yet so
many young men were leaving Austria-Hungary that military authorities began to worry. While it
is not true that most immigrants were trying to evade conscription as their primary motivator, the
resulting loss to the military was nonetheless significant. Hungarian authorities tightly regulated
its port at Fiume to find draft dodging emigrants but could do little when its citizens easily crossed
the border into more liberal Austria. Military authorities in Carniola noted the “disappearance into
the thin air” of many military age men due for recruitment. In 1905 the Slovenian Carniolan
politician Fran Šuklje informed the Parliament in Vienna about the disappearance of 5,240 recruits
from just three areas. He cited a remark by a local official, “Our best bet would be to send the
recruitment board to America. Our recruits are there and not here!”28
Austria-Hungary did try to summon men liable for military service from abroad, which proved
ultimately unenforceable. In 1906, a Ferenc Schmal, a Magyar living in the US, wrote a letter to
his draft board in Tolna County, Hungary: “Most Honored Sir, why did you even bother to send
me a call-up? This correspondence is in vain: I do not intend to return because I feel fine in
America…Thank you for your effort to turn me into a soldier, but I am totally indisposed to
wearing the black and yellow uniform.”29 The “black and yellow” refer to the Hapsburg colors
used by the K.u.K. military. Without a coercive apparatus on the ground in Michigan, the state
could only rely on patriotic appeals to citizens abroad. And we have seen that such appeals were
of spurious effect.
Given the slowness of the Monarchy to recognize the importance of Michigan, its military
recruitment efforts there began correspondingly late. The Cleveland consulate set up sessions to
muster its citizens in Michigan, especially in the Delray district of Detroit, starting in 1912. During
the registration sessions of 1913 in Delray, vice-consul Pelenyi noted that only Magyars showed
up, not the more numerous Poles, causing the consul Ludwig to order afternoon sessions in Polish
Hamtramck.30 Still, only nineteen Magyars took the medical check-up at the 10 May 1913 session
required for mustering. Nineteen Poles were mustered that afternoon in the Polonia Hall. All
deemed fit swore their oath of allegiance to the Emperor on the spot. All told, then, on that one
day sixty-one Austro-Hungarians registered: From Austria, 3 Germans, 19 Poles, 1 Czech (6 were
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deemed fit for service); and from Hungary: 19 Magyars, 9 Romanians, 8 Germans, 2 Serbs
(16 were deemed fit for service). The numbers were disappointing given the estimate of up
to 80,000 citizens in the area. Still, it was a start and served as evidence for the need to open a
separate permanent consular office in Detroit.
The problem became acute with World War One, however. As the case of the Ruconich family
(see below) reveals, Austria-Hungary soon conscripted every available son. For immigrants, fear
of conscription was weighed against patriotic support for Austria-Hungary once war started. Here,
in the last moments of the Habsburgs’ multi-national empire, the results were at best ambiguous.
Remembering that the US had a policy of strict formal neutrality and did not enter the conflict
until the spring of 1917, Austria-Hungary had the formal right to call up its citizens living in
Michigan. In practice, though, it could do little to reach them. Also, coordinating any large-scale
return to its ports was all but impossible due to the British blockade which had bottled up the
Adriatic and North Sea ports; France and Italy in 1915 were belligerents, cutting off all other
possible avenues of return.
In 1914 Austria-Hungary nonetheless tried to call up its reserves abroad and offered immigrants
in the US who had evaded military service full “rehabilitation” if they returned and served for the
duration of the war. The US government interpreted this action as a violation of its neutrality
policy, which forbade any US citizen, no matter how long they had resided in the US, from actively
taking sides in the war.31 Austria-Hungary, however, pointed to its 1871 treaty with the US that
regulated matters of citizenship and specifically addressed the matter of draft dodging, precluding
the right to claim that one had become a US citizen as a release from duty: “In particular, a former
citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy who… is to be held as an American citizen, is liable to
trial and punishment, according to the laws of Austro-Hungary, for non-fulfillment of military
duty.”32
The international court cases of Max Fox (formerly Fuchsbalg) and Alexander Tellech revealed
the complexities of conscription and migration.33 Each case reflected how fluid identities were,
even at the formal level of citizenship. They also present an Austrian Czech and a Hungarian
Magyar whose families moved back and forth between the US and Central Europe.
Fox sued the successor states of Austria and Hungary to recover damages alleged to have been
sustained during his enforced military service in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War
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One. He was born in the US in 1896 to Magyar immigrants, but, like so many other Magyar
immigrants, his parents returned to Hungary when Fox was three. His mother died in
Hungary and his father returned to the US, leaving Fox in Hungary to be raised by relatives. At
the outbreak of World War One, Fox, then twenty, was called up for military service. Fox’s lawsuit
claimed that he protested that he was a US citizen and therefore not subject to military services in
Austria-Hungarian. Nonetheless, in May 1915 he was compelled to report for duty. He applied to
the US embassy in Budapest for support but his application was denied. Serving on the Eastern
Front, he was hospitalized for several months from a flesh wound in October 1916. His education,
however, led to his promotion to lieutenant and he continued in active service until the Armistice
was signed. He returned to the United States in 1920. Yet in 1928 he sued Austria and Hungary
on the claim that he only took the oath of allegiance to the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary
under duress. He lost his suit on the basis that, according to Austro-Hungarian law at the time of
his conscription and international treaty, he was also a citizen of that state by parentage and thus
possessed “dual nationality,” making him liable to all duties as a citizen.
Alexander Tellech was born to Czech immigrants in the US in 1895 and was thus a US citizen, but
when he was five years old he accompanied his parents to Bohemia, where he continued to reside.
In August 1914, the now nineteen-year-old had become involved in pan-Slavic politics. At the
start of World War One he was arrested on the Galician border with Russia for spreading proRussian propaganda. He was sentenced to sixteen months internment, after which he was
impressed into the Austro-Hungarian army after taking the obligatory oath of allegiance. He
appealed in 1915 to the US for his release, but his application was denied. In July 1916, he deserted
and escaped to Russia, where he was arrested and held by the Russian army as a prisoner of war.
However, with the Russian revolutions of 1917, he was released and after the war returned to
Prague, where he opened a medical practice. In 1928 he sued Austria and Hungary for time lost
and for alleged suffering and privation. Similarly to Fox, the international court decided that he
was an Austrian citizen accordingly to Austrian law, to which he had voluntarily subjected himself.
The Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian authorities were therefore well within their rights in
dealing with him as they did.

World War one and The End of the Great Wave of Immigration
In the US, the Dillingham Commission, a bipartisan special committee of Congress operating
1907–1911, presented the best thinking of the day on immigration. Looking at records since 1819
through 1910, the Commission reached several empirical conclusions that then led to some rather
unempirical conclusions. Firstly, it recognized a clear shift in immigration patterns. Prior to 1880,
immigrants from Western and Northern Europe comprised more than 95% of all immigrants. In
the first decade of the 20th century, however, immigrants from Central, Southern and Eastern
Europe amounted to 77% of all immigrants. Secondly, the Commission recognized that emigration
had its source in economic rather than political or religious sources. Thirdly, the new wave of
immigrants, especially those from Southern Europe, intended to return to their homelands rather
than settle permanently. Fourthly, the Commission concluded that the US was attracting the
healthiest, hardest working, and most enterprising from Central Europe, even if they faced greater
difficulties in integrating.
With this baseline, the Commission then fit this data into the racially oriented Social Darwinistic
paradigm of the times. Simply put, Central Europeans were deemed inferior to those of Germanic
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stock. The Commission therefore made a single proposal to filter immigrants. To keep out
poor Eastern peasants, literacy had to become a standard of admission.34 But when it was
recognized that literacy rates had been rapidly rising in Central Europe, new arguments were made
to base immigration quotas explicitly on race, creating a new hereditary barrier that could not be
overcome. Indeed, drawing upon legislative precedent in the Chinese Exclusion Act and the socalled "Gentlemen's Agreement" aimed at the Japanese, the Commission's overall findings were
used a decade later to support the 1920s immigration reduction acts, including the Emergency
Quota Act of 1921. The quotas of the 1920s were based on the percentage of each group in the
immigration contingent of 1890, plotted against the number of immigrants in 1910. The year 1890
had been deliberately chosen. It represented one of the last years before the dramatic shift in origins
away from Germanic north-west Europe. The result was a quota that set maximums as low as 3%
for less desirable groups. In effect, the quota system, combined with dramatic changes in Europe
ended mass immigration from Central Europe.35
By that time, though, Austria-Hungary had disappeared. Europe was entering the Great Depression
and the era of chauvinistic nationalist warfare that culminated not only in civil wars and World
War Two, but in relentless genocide and ethnic cleansing ranging across all of the former lands of
the Habsburgs. World War One had effectively ended the Great Migration. Many who had planned
to emigrate could not, and quickly became caught up the in the dramatic events of war and its
consequences. For Austro-Hungarians in Michigan, over half of whom had planned to return to
the homelands, this option simply disappeared. Four years of war, intense US propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, fear of conscription, and then the reality of political instability from 1918
onwards permanently altered the pattern of migration and return. The Austro-Hungarians in
Michigan had lost their citizenship since their state no longer existed. Overwhelmingly they chose
the easiest option and simply stayed in Michigan and became US citizens. Assimilation now
became an even stronger imperative and the preservation of the old identities became hyphenated
to American.

Mario Ruconich: The Last Austro-Hungarian immigrant?
All of this leads us back to Ruconich. His narrative, and that of his family, exemplify these
patterns. Ruconich came from a large peasant family (fifteen children) in Ossero, on the Adriatic
islands of Cherso-Lussino, Istria in the Austrian Littoral.36 His parents, Domenico and Caterina
Gercovich-Gerconi, were illiterate Roman Catholics who spoke Istrian (the local Italian dialect)
34
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as well as Croatian. Their children attended a compulsory state school but were free to
choose from the Istriot, Croatian, and German schools. The family was relatively
comfortable, having moved just before the war from the impoverished village of Trsich on the
same island, owning sheep, goats, chickens and a horse and supplementing their diet and income
as fishermen.
Mario was the third of the four oldest brothers (Domenik, Johan, Mario, and Anton). As citizens
of Austrian Istria, the brothers were all liable for military conscription. They were loyal Austrians,
showing no tendency towards any of the political currents undermining Habsburg authority. They
were not attracted to Italian Irredentism, pan-Slavism, or socialism. When World War One began
in August 1914, the family saw all of its military-age sons fight; all but the youngest died in
combat. Mario, as we know, died in France in 1918 fighting the Germans as an American.
Domenik, the oldest, was killed in action in 1915 on the Isonzo Front fighting the Italians—that
is, fighting those who spoke his native language. Johan disappeared on the Eastern Front; there are
no records of him as a prisoner of war or killed in action, but this was in the wake of the chaotic
Russian Revolution. Anton also served on the Eastern Front but survived despite multiple wounds,
being taken prisoner and a three-month odyssey that took him from Odessa on the Black Sea back
to home.
The family that survived the war saw the nationalist consequences as Istria became a bone of
contention between Italy and Yugoslavia. The family name was forcibly Italianized in 1926 by
Italian Fascism to Rocconi.37 After World War Two, though, the name was forcibly Slavicized by
Communist Yugoslavia to Rukonic. The family now has relatives with all three versions. Almost
the entire family ultimately emigrated. The Ruconich story is thus highly representative and
simultaneously exceptional. It reinforces our understanding of some basic patterns of immigration
and conflicting loyalties, but also cautions us against generalizations. While this paper turned
several questions about migration on the axis of military service, we can draw numerous tangential
conclusions.
Firstly, Mario’s roots as a farmer facing economic pressure from overpopulation and limited
economic opportunity fits the most powerful “push” factor for Austro-Hungarians to migrate.
However, his search for work initially in an urban part of the Empire (the bustling port of Trieste)
was just as typical as emigration. Indeed, relatively few Triestine immigrated. The local economy
was powerful enough to offer ample employment locally. As was the case elsewhere in Europe,
when local industrial capacity could absorb the excess rural population, those people chose to
remain in the cities of their homeland rather than leave. His older brothers also had not left the
area, which is why they were caught up in military service.
Secondly, the Istrian family that stayed showed the demographic consequences of the collapse of
Austria-Hungary. They lived in a mixed border land that Italian Irredentists claimed for Italy,
annexing it after World War One but losing it after World War Two. Various waves of ethnic
cleansing and mass migrations, especially the Istrian Exodus of the late 1940s, created a more
homogenously Croatian population, including on the once predominantly Italian islands of Cherso-
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Lussino. 38 Today, the demographic composition of much of the former Austro-Hungarian
Empire, including Istria, has altered considerably. The family, like the region, was forcibly
Italianized and then Slavicized, in successive efforts to purge them of their multinational Habsburg
identities. The only one to preserve the original family name was a younger brother who was a
sailor in the 1920s and constantly at sea and thus avoided the forced Italianization before he later
emigrated to the US.
Thirdly, migration was complicated, even in a single family. Different members often revealed
divergent attitudes towards migration. Some refused to migrate, some left only once a family
connection had been established. Some migrated with the intention of returning, others planning
never to return. Mario presents yet another reason: contingency. Sometimes unusual and
unpredictable circumstances determined migration. Indeed, the ending of the great migration came
with World War One, a global event that few had predicted and that had dramatic consequences
for emigration and immigration. As for the rest of the family, a few migrated to the US: a younger
brother of Mario, Gaudenzio, migrated to New Jersey under the Italian fascists; and a niece, Janine,
left for the US after marrying in the 1960s and settling first in New York and then California. The
rest of the family, except one son, Joseph, left with the Istrian Exodus for Italy after the Communist
took possession of the island.
Fourthly, Mario’s apparently itinerant life was typical of the single young males who comprised
the bulk of Austro-Hungarian emigrants. Michigan’s mines, forests, and later industries of the late
19th and early 20th century attracted young single men more than any other group. These men
moved from camp to camp, or mine to mine as they heard of new opportunities. Most planned a
return home; after 1914 most stayed, cut off from home by the war. These men often only appear
in the records of the shipping companies and their employers, occasionally on the police records
for drunk and disorderly charges as they celebrated after payday. The numerous AustroHungarians who fit this category in Michigan often did not set roots in the state, but they
established Michigan’s economic foundations nonetheless.
Fifthly, Mario’s personal experience of immigration based on a likely illegal entry was certainly
atypical. Entry to the US prior to the 1920s was well regulated but not prohibitive. Like Mario, all
Austro-Hungarians came by ship, many using the same port and shipping company for which he
worked. There was little reason for most immigrants to “jump ship.” With $20 in the pocket, an
address of someone in the US, tolerable health, and a willingness to swear that one was neither a
polygamist nor an anarchist, just about anyone who made it to a US port was admitted.
Lastly, on our question of identity, loyalty, and the important reality of compulsory military
service, Austro-Hungarians seem to have reached a complicated equilibrium as long as external
factors did not disrupt the delicate balance. While the monarchy stood, men overwhelming served
loyally in the imperial army (Mario’s brothers); some emigrated to avoid such service (perhaps the
case for Mario); and a very few, under extenuating circumstances, served the enemy (certainly the
38
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case for Mario, though his motives are unclear). In any event, conscription was a factor in
decision making about emigration for the young men of the monarchy, but there is no
evidence that it made them either less loyal to their homeland or to their adopted homes. Only the
unexpected convulsions unleashed by World War One forced immediate reconsideration of
traditional loyalties and migration patterns.
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Population, the Lessons of War, and the Promise of Peace
Dr. Kathleen A. Tobin
Purdue University Northwest
Nineteenth century Malthusian theory gained significant attention at the outbreak of World War I.
Beginning with his 1798 book Essay on the Principle of Population, Thomas Malthus had argued
that war served as a check on population when resources became scarce. His work gained a
substantial number of followers. During the modernist era of science and progress that unfolded
after 1900, neo-Malthusians observed real conditions leading to war, but they were now less
willing to accept war as inevitable. They looked more carefully at Malthus’s assertions that
overpopulation would lead to competition for resources and hence into violent conflict, and noted
that humankind now had within its hands the power to control births.
The scientific community added arguments of Charles Darwin, who, according to the prominent
neo-Malthusian V. Drysdale, “has shown beyond the possibility of dispute that over-reproduction
leads to a constant struggle for existence. Animal life is one perpetual conflict, and man too has
been in a constant state of war—the impelling force being really, although not always ostensibly,
the need for food.”1 Opponents argued that birth rates in Europe had been declining and policy
makers should instead address food supply and distribution, which would make the control of
births unnecessary. Darwin, himself, did not condone family limitation and considered artificial
checks to natural population growth as problematic and detrimental to healthy family life.2 Yet,
Malthusianism prevailed among intellectuals and the upper classes, drawing from the teachings of
natural selection.3
Before the outbreak of the First World War and during its execution, observers also wrote on
Malthusianism within a framework of militarism. The contemporary state of Europe drew
significant attention from Malthusians, and in the United States, they argued that rational,
progressive thinkers should view the Europeans’ tendency toward war with disgust. In this
“Progressive Era” it seemed unimaginable to them that self-proclaimed civilizations could not
resolve their conflict without resorting to arms.
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Edwin W. James described the increasing destructiveness of weaponry and war in “The
Malthusian Doctrine and War,” published in the Scientific Monthly in 1916. Late nineteenth
century technology that advanced transportation, industrialization, and economic expansion in
Western Europe and the United States also contributed to innovations in warfare, he wrote, and
nations with access to chemicals, explosives, modern steel-making processes, and mass
production, applied them to war technology. Capitalist competition between and among nationalist
economies added strong undercurrents to militarist preparations, creating an increasingly
dangerous environment that many believed was sure to lead to war.
James described a world in which historical ills may have been eradicated while an inclination
toward war was amplified. “In at least two of the great western nations compulsory military service
has existed for many years; in several others large standing armies and powerful navies have been
maintained in times of peace,” he noted. “While the public mind has been turned toward
ameliorating the harshness of famine and pestilence, it has been accustomed to consider war as a
possible contingency, not to be combated as undesirable but to be prepared for.” The preparations
for war guaranteed an increase in intensity and destructiveness of human life when it did come.
James argued that man had become desensitized to the military culture surrounding him, paying
taxes to support it, always aware of army units and naval fleets nearby, his children playing on
fortification ramps and slopes while vacationing at seaside resorts. In some cases, he served in
militias or attended military school. “The individual mind finds no shock in considering a resort
to war.”4
James reminded readers Malthus had argued that because resources multiplied only arithmetically
while population multiplied geometrically, there would be shortages. If population were not
checked through preventive measures such as delayed marriage, it would ultimately be limited
through positive measures, such as famine, disease, and war. As famine and disease had been
alleviated by modern man, the only positive check remaining was war. And because man had been
so conditioned to accept war as inevitable—through “civilized” society’s creation of a military
culture—he was accepting the only positive check left, according to Malthusianism, which could
meet and temper the pressures of population.
There were aspects of modern society that Malthus could not have taken into account and the
capacity for which transformed even further in the nineteenth century, creating an even wider
chasm between his analyses and the world at the turn of the twentieth century. First, Malthus
described what might be considered pre-modern societies where lack of food, for example, directly
led to individuals turning on one another. In more modern economies and governing systems,
however, the individual was more remotely and indirectly connected with military action. While
individuals were recruited and assigned to engage in war, decisions to declare war were made at
much higher levels. In addition, it was only necessary for governments to give the impression that
there were economic pressures or scarcity of resources so severe as to make danger imminent.
Second, sensibilities regarding “necessities” had shifted through the nineteenth century. A growing
middle class had become reliant on a certain standard of living which expanded their notion of
essentials beyond food and water and engaging in war for the sake of protecting a certain standard
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of living against all others had become more likely. As modern war took place between and
among nations, orchestrated by nations’ leaders, it became more critical to look at unequal
distribution of wealth in natural resources. The acquisition of petroleum and metals such as iron
and copper needed for industrial strength and consequently increased accumulation of capital
might occur because of an advantageous geographical position and chance location. While
disadvantaged nations could practice conservation and frugality, there may come a day when they
resort to war in order to forcibly share in the wealth denied to them by circumstance.
A consciousness of global inequity and the potential for war due to lack of accessibility of
resources or perceived economic pressures inspired peace movements. However, an enlightened
attitude toward international relations should not be comprised simply of propaganda in favor of
peace for the sake of peace, wrote James. Rather, the causes of true economic pressures must be
removed. Recommendations included advancements in science and rural development, making
rural life more attractive, elimination of trade restrictions, agreements, and tariffs in order to permit
free trade among all nations, the abolition of absolutism, and greater efficiency in republican forms
of government. In addition, governments should legalize the dissemination of contraceptive
information.5
The summer of 1914 had marked a peak in pacifism in the United States. The new century had
ushered in progressive ideals of cleaning up corruption in government and business, implementing
programs of economic justice, expanding democratic institutions including the right to vote for
women, alleviating social ills through public health, nutrition programs, and child labor laws, and
in essence eliminating many of what progressives termed the root causes of conflict. Peace would
stem naturally from such an environment, they believed. By 1917, however, militarism became an
integral part of culture. Pacifists did not see this as the exception; rather, an intensification of the
norm. They strove hard to infuse the populace with pacifistic sensibilities, but the outbreak of the
Great War and the Americanization of what was to become the First World War seemed to tear
those efforts apart.
In addition, it became clearer that the U.S. was not, at its foundation, a peaceful nation at all. With
the onset of war and eventual U.S. entrance in 1916, plans for international arbitration were
dropped, as were movements toward toleration for minorities, greater freedom of conscience, and
freedom of speech.6 Elsie Clews Parsons explained why she believed the American public became
acculturated so easily to recent militaristic patterns. She noted how Americans exhibited preexistent resemblances which lent themselves to militarism:
Negro disenfranchisement, segregation and lynching suggested that racial discrimination
is not altogether alien to American practice. A number of instances in the treatment
accorded to Hebrews might also be cited in this connection, as well as certain attitudes
towards immigrants, particularly immigrants from southern or southeastern Europe.
Americanization, whether conscious or unconscious, is characterized not only by racial
discrimination, it insists on homogeneity, and the homogeneity or like-mindedness it

5

Ibid., pp. 267-271.

6

Elsie Clews Parsons, “Patterns for Peace or War,” The Scientific Monthly 5:3 (September, 1917), p. 230.
1A3–3

PAPER 1A3 – KATHLEEN A. TOBIN
demands permits of so little variation that we are led to question whether respect or
tolerance for minorities in general is a notable American trait.7

Pacifists also warned that businesses and corporations benefited greatly from militarism; the
buildup of armaments brought profits and replenishment after the use of those armaments brought
even more profits. When society saw economic benefit in war, leaders were less inclined to address
basic weaknesses that led to war. The price paid for this superficial boost to the economy was
further human destruction, even more widespread and brutal destruction as advances in technology
led to greater casualties. Further, corporations were exempt from regular taxes as they contributed
to the war effort, placing increased burdens on the working class who sacrificed through their labor
and increased taxes to pay for defense. World War I was referred to as a “rich man’s war.”8
At times, pacifists used terms such as hysteria and epidemic of fear when describing the newfound
intensity of militarism in American society during the war. Columbia University Professor of
Sociology and History of Civilization, Franklin H. Giddings, dismissed such rhetoric, arguing that
it was reasonable to expect one percent of the male population to serve in the military. Adjusting
for age and ability, a force of one million would represent five percent of the population, still
realistic, though pacifists would consider it monstrous. The term militaristic might appropriately
be used to describe Europe, he said, with German forces—those organized plus those trained but
not organized combined—numbered 8,000,000 in a country of less than 70,000,000. Organized
forces in the six greater nations of Europe—Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Italy, and
Great Britain—totaled 25,000,000. He concluded a U.S. force of 1,000,000 should not be
considered evidence of militarism.
In addition, the United States was comprised of significantly more territory than European nations,
given the area of Alaska and possessions abroad. This gave the U.S. more coastline to protect and
also a less dense population overall. The lack of population density would make any military
presence less noticeable. A million-man force, supported by five million in reserves should have
no effect on American domestic life. “It would be neither more nor less appreciable than a police
force of 15,000 men in [the] city of Philadelphia, with its population of more than one million and
a half inhabitants,” wrote Giddings.9 Giddings argued that the democratic nature of military service
requirements strengthened democracy, and that military training was beneficial in and of itself. It
instilled discipline, responsibility, love of country, loyalty, and obedience in young men.10
Throughout history, he contended, democracies and republics did not become militaristic, while
monarchies always did, or tended to become so. Democracies had nothing to gain and everything
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to lose by engaging in an aggressive war. But they placed themselves in danger by failing to
protect themselves against aggression of the ruthless.11
While many intellectual leaders argued that fundamental tenets of modern civilization should
prevent war, age-old connections between population, manpower, and military might did not die.
The connections were rooted in biblical descriptions equating the bearing of sons as the increase
of arrows in one’s quiver. Some might expect that technological advances in weaponry would
make such ancient connections irrelevant, but that was not the case. The capacity for destruction
and lives lost only increased, and if a nation were to remain strong—in militarists’ eyes,
Malthusians feared—population should remain strong.
In addition, medical advances had contributed to rapid increases in population, and a higher
standard of living created higher demands on resources in developed nations and their colonies.
From 1800 to the onset of World War I, the world’s population nearly tripled, from 640,000,000
to 1,693,000,000. The greatest growth occurred not in less developed regions, but in wealthier
countries. While birth rates dropped alongside industrialization, so did death rates, with better
health lowering infant mortality and extending longevity. Europe’s population increased from
127,000,000 in 1741 to 452,000,000 in 1914, and similar growth appeared to take hold wherever
there was British influence, or what was often termed Western civilization. Areas that exhibited
tremendous population growth in the same period included the United States, Australia, South
Africa, Egypt, Argentina, and the Philippines.12 In addition to food supply, the British were also
concerned about continuing increases in consumption of coal. Nearly all industries had become
dependent on coal, either directly or indirectly. In addition, an abundant supply of coal was
required to maintain Britain’s position in global trade, and the export of manufactured goods was
necessary for increased exchange of food imports. As Britain was importing a majority of its food,
its coal reserves were diminishing by millions of tons annually. Very importantly, coal could not
be regenerated and replenished as agricultural produce could. It was estimated that in 1801, Britain
consumed more than ten million tons of coal per year and by the onset of World War I was
consuming more than 263 million tons per year.13 He referred to the classic work, The Coal
Question, in which Professor W. S. Jevons warned in the 1860s, “We cannot long continue our
present rate of progress. The first check to our growing prosperity must render our population
excessive.”14
In his 1917 work Essays in Wartime, Havelock Ellis criticized those who did not see a problem in
recent trends in population growth. He was a friend and associate of Margaret Sanger, leader of
the birth control movement, and a strong proponent of birth control himself. He was particularly
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hard on religious figures and condemned contemporary references to the biblical order to
“increase and multiply,” describing it as an “authoritative command of a tribal God who
was, according to the scriptural narrative, addressing a world inhabited by eight people.” The world
of the early twentieth century was a starkly different place, he reminded. Still, some professed
patriots held onto this notion in their “clamoring for plentiful and cheap men.” While it may have
been considered a religious, moral, natural, scientific, and patriotic duty at one time, the earth
could no longer withstand the practice of having as many children as possible. This, he said, set
the stage for war.15
Ellis agreed that war may well affect the quality of the new race detrimentally, and there was no
doubt of the effects—while perhaps temporary—on the quantity of men. While there may be a
brief increase in birth rates once veterans returned home, the drafting of a large portion of young
men in the first place diminished the population through the “pouring out [of] the blood of the
young manhood of the race,” said Ellis.
The wars of a century spill 120,000,000 gallons of blood, enough to fill three million fortygallon casks, or to create a perpetual fountain sending up a jet of 150 gallons per hour, a
fountain which has been flowing unceasingly ever since the dawn of history. It is to be
noted, also, that those slain on the battlefield by no means represent the total victims of a
wary, but only about half of them.16

Ellis also looked more directly at the eugenic effects of war. “For war never hits men at random.
It only hits a carefully selected percentage of ‘fit’ men. It tends, in other words, to strike out
temporarily, or in a fatal event, permanently, from the class of fathers precisely that percentage of
the population which the eugenist wishes to see in that class.” He went on:
For, however an army is recruited, it is only those men reaching a fairly high standard of
fitness who are accepted, and these, even in times of peace, are hampered in the task of
carrying out the race, which the less fit and the unfit are free to do at their gown good
pleasure. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the age of conscription was lowered to
eighteen and marriage was an exemption from service. This resulted in many young men
marrying hastily to avoid the draft, certainly injurious to the race.17

Ellis blamed German militarists for advocating for war, in part, because they saw it as a
regenerator—a process that would strengthen the hardiness of the future German population.
According to Hegel, “War invigorates humanity, as storms preserve the sea from putrescence.” To
Molke, “War is an integral part of God’s universe, developing man’s noblest attributes.” To
Treitschke, “The condemnation of war is not only absurd, it is immoral.”18 A recently unified
imperial Germany adopted expansion as a primary foreign policy, coming comparatively late to
the colonization process and thus turning its attention toward neighboring nations on the continent
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of Europe. The Geopolitiker argued that nation-states were organically expansive and the
obvious result of population pressure in a growing nation.19
Adelyne More disputed major claims against the use of artificial contraception, saying it was the
most effective way to limit births and that limiting births had a number of advantages. First, it was
the only way women could hope to attain independence and self-development, which were key to
the progress of humanity as a whole. Second, it was the most effective way to alleviate infant
mortality, as mothers would have more sufficient time and attention to devote to each child. Next,
it was necessary to limit family size if one wished to better his or her economic situation. More
also argued that modern prophylaxis (through the use of rubber condoms and diaphragms)
prevented the spread of venereal disease. And very importantly the regulation of population was
“the most effective way of ensuring the cessation of war.” She maintained that the feeling of
expansion when brought up against geographical barriers acted blindly in the direction of conflict,
whether in colonial rivalry or territorial “swarming.” In addition, the lowering of social conditions
due to overpopulation made people long for a change of any kind, and at any price. They may not
consciously desire war, but their resistance to the powerful interests which flourish on war was
weakened to a dangerous degree.20
According to More, industrialization could not be considered a primary cause of a declining birth
rate, as it fell rapidly between 1870 and 1900 in much of Europe and after 1900 in Germany, after
industry began flourishing. She argued it was simply because women of the upper classes had
decided not to have as many children. Though birth rates continued to decline during the first years
of the war, More feared they might quickly rise once the conflict had come to an end. Militarists
in Germany could appeal for more births once again on the grounds of patriotism, particularly if
they viewed the Russians and English as producing too many babies. This appeal, she reminded,
was the one remaining source of danger—the primary basis for wars in the past.21
Physician and birth control advocate C. Killick Millard acknowledged the militarist argument and
fear of Germany among the British, noting that most nations have an “inherent desire to increase
and become greater as compared with their neighbors, and if necessary at the expense of their
neighbors.” This was often considered and taught as patriotism, but Millard described it as a
pseudo-patriotism, which threatened world peace. “All through the world’s history, ever since the
herdsmen of Lot strove with those of Abraham, one of the fundamental and predisposing causes
of war, apart from immediate and personal causes, has been the pressure of increasing populations
and the desire for national expansion.” He added, quoting a recent Birth Rate Commission report,
“A pressure of population in any country brings as its chief historic consequence overflows and
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migrations into neighboring or other accessible countries, not only for peaceful settlement,
but also for conquest and for the subjugation and exploitation of the weaker peoples. This
always remains a chief cause of international dispute and wars.”22 Millard contended that German
dreams of national expansion and world supremacy were fostered and encouraged by the rapid
growth in population, due primarily to its high birth rate in the late nineteenth century. Quoting
from the first chapter of Prince von Bulow’s 1913 Imperial Germany, entitled “Germany’s
Struggle for World Power,” which justified a shift from Bismarck’s Continental Policy to one of
expansion, Millard wrote,
The course of events has long driven German policy out from the narrow confines of
Europe into the wider world. It was not ambitious restlessness which urged us to imitate
the Great Powers that had long ago embarked on world politics. The strength of the Nation
. . . as it grew, burst the bounds of its old home, and its policy was dictated by the new
interests and needs.

He also quoted from a 1916 Berliner Post opinion piece:
Can a great and rapidly growing nation like Germany always renounce all claims to further
development or to the expansion of its political power? The final settlement with France
and England, the expansion of our colonial possessions in order to create new German
homes for the overflow of our population . . . these are the problems which must be faced
in the near future.23

At the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference held in London in 1922,
Swedish physician Anton Nyström reinforced the neo-Malthusian view that contraception could
well act as a preventive of birth and consequently overpopulation in this modern century, so that
“death-bringing” population checks of the past like wars and extermination of peoples might come
to an end. He pointed to reckless killing in the past, with examples from wars between civilized
states:
[F]or instance, when the Assyrian Empire was destroyed by the Medes and the Persians,
nearly half the population perished; hundreds of thousands of Germans were killed by the
Romans when they threatened the Roman Empire; when Carthage was taken and destroyed
by the Romans, the greater part of its 700,000 inhabitants were killed . . . The crusades led
to enormous losses of human life; the same was the case with the Europeans in the Thirty
Years War. The witch trials and the cruelties of the Inquisition led to the death of
innumerable persons, in total at least 1-1/3 million.24

Nyström warned that despite the practice of preventing births throughout history, overpopulation
won out and contributed to pressures for territory and ultimate war. Significant growth in numbers
and the need for new sources of food had driven the Germans to expand into the Roman Empire.
The same was true of Asians moving west into Europe. Colonies had served as outlets for
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overcrowded European countries, and this was the case with the British colonies in North
America. Throughout the process of expansion, European nations battled one another for
possession of colonies and colonists devastated Native populations.
Germany based its military and colonial policies on the recent increase of its population, argued
neo-Malthusians, for it saw strength in its own nation against others that did not experience so
great an increase as its own. There was no question that this was a primary cause of the outbreak
of war in Europe. If Germany had a population of 50 million instead of more than 60 million,
“there would have been no world war.”25 Social hygienist Max Gruber argued that the war was
inevitable and unavoidable due to the recent growth in Germany’s population from forty million
to eighty million. He called the war a “biological necessity.”26 Ellis added that the belligerents
responsible for initiating the war—Russia, Austria, and Serbia, in addition to Germany—had the
highest birth rates in Europe. He noted that they had not yet experienced a lowering of their birth
rates, as had occurred in other European nations in the previous century because they were among
the most backward people in Europe.27 Gruber estimated that if Germany’s population continued
to grow at the same rate that it had between 1900 and 1905, by the end of the twentieth century it
would reach 250,000,000, making it invulnerable to other nations. Ellis pointed out that Russia,
with a growing population, could indeed be a threat to Germany, and also that Germany’s birth
rate had begun to fall.28
Among the most gruesome of considerations regarding population and the categorizations of
humans in the age of modern warfare, were those using the term “cannon fodder.” Societies of the
past did argue extensively for the need to fight wars and that required military might in the form
of manpower. Neo-Malthusians following World War I recognized that new technology had
increased weaponry’s capacity for death, and maintained a modern, peaceful world should leave
no room for the idea of children as future cannon fodder. Such a notion was deemed antiquated at
best. In addition, methods of carrying out war were changing, particularly with the introduction of
air attacks. Cicely Hamilton argued that should a nation be able to engage in air warfare, “a teeming
population will be a real handicap to a belligerent nation’ and that military strategy and tactics of
the future will be directed less towards the destruction of armies in the field than towards the
terrorizing and stampeding of large masses of disorganized civilians.” She continued:
Cities and industrial districts stampeded will resolve themselves into hordes of famished
nomads—men and women who are dangerous as well as useless because deprived of their
means of livelihood. If sufficiently panic-stricken when they take flight, they will avoid
railways and roads—which are likely to be targets from the air—and not only devour the
countryside, but trample it beneath their feet. . . . In a day or two a vagrant and millionfold
starvation—grown reckless, a widespread invasion by famished plunderers, more terrible
by far than invasion by an army that is fed and disciplined.
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Hamilton decried any continued consideration of population as backup support for a nation’s
military forces. While non-combatants may have served some purpose as an auxiliary force
in the past, air warfare would instead work to destroy centers of production, sending civilians into
a state of chaos. She warned that “starvation on the run” had become the military objective of the
future, and “the aim and object of the ‘scientific’ soldier of the future will be to produce nomadic
anarchy and break an enemy Government by burdening it with useless mouths.” This would be
more effective where populations were dense.29
The discussion of warfare continued. In her presentation “War and Malthusianism,” the German
feminist and pacifist Helene Stöcker reflected on the hope she and her Malthusian colleagues had
held in 1911, before the outbreak of war, when the last international conference had been held in
Dresden. Though the war had since brought disillusionment, skepticism, and despair, they had not
been totally discouraged and she felt once again inspired by the London gathering. She
acknowledged an intensification of their efforts due to the war, saying that its destruction served
as evidence that population control was necessary. Various political parties in Europe were
demanding legalized abortion by this time. Soviets, free from religious condemnation, were
working to provide abortion access as a woman’s right to equality and as a solution to poverty and
Germans were considering the same. Stöcker reminded her audience that preventing conception
was preferable to ending a pregnancy at the very least for health reasons, arguing for more
widespread dissemination of contraceptives and contraceptive information. She also advocated for
better protections for women in the workplace, so that they would not have to labor in factory
environments proving dangerous to her health and to that of an unborn child. In addition, she
pointed to the hypocrisy of condemning abortion—considering it murder—while believing the
wartime murder of adult men natural and necessary.
For good reason, at the last German Conference of Pacifists, a Catholic chaplain received
the greatest applause when he declared he had always pleaded the following point of view:
. . . You have no right to proclaim the holiness of the unborn life of the human embryo as
long as you have not secured the protection and the inviolability of human life against the
murderous force of war.

Stöcker pointed to advances made in recognizing the benefits of birth control information since
the war and again hoped leaders would acknowledge the truth of war, that it was unnecessary and
a threat to human life and the progress of man. For those who had suggested the Great War was
necessary in moving civilization forward to the goal of peace, she quoted Napoleon, who believed
war itself did not lead to an eternal peace: “Someone said after a terrible battle, looking at the
numerous dead: ‘They will bring us through their deaths eternal peace.’ Napoleon answered, ‘I am
afraid they will keep it for themselves.’” Stöcker added, “It is the Living’s turn to make use of this
knowledge so terrible confirmed by the last war.”30
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So convinced were neo-Malthusians gathered at the Fifth International Conference that
overpopulation contributed to war, that Harold Cox, president of the “National and
International” session put forth the following resolution:
The Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference calls attention now
to the generally admitted fact that over-population due to high birth rates is the most potent
cause of international rivalry and war. It also wishes to point out that mere numbers are not
an effective protection to a nation in the event of war, as modern warfare is becoming more
and more a question of science and engineering directed and carried out by highly trained
individuals. The three conditions for securing universal peace and national security are (a)
the limitation of the birth rate of each country to its area and resources, (b) increase of
racial efficiency through abstention of reproduction of the unfit, and (c) development of
international law and international co-operation in place of national rivalries.
It therefore calls upon the Governments of all nations to promote the extension of Birth
Control knowledge, especially among their least efficient inhabitants, and urges the League
of Nations to proclaim as a general principle that increase of numbers is not to be regarded
as a justification for national expansion, but that each nation should limit its numbers to its
own resources.31

The Fifth International Conference marked a notable intersection among the history of birth
control, First World War, and peace efforts. It was there that leaders articulated, with a greater
degree of evidence in their minds, the many ways in which population issues related to war in the
modern era. Their case for wider access to contraception in both the developed and less developed
world was fortified by world events, as tragic as they were. Though the League of Nations did not
fully embrace birth control policies, the United Nations made them a key part of their efforts
following the Second World War and into the twenty-first century.
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The End of Guy Brown Wiser’s Air War:
Notes on an American Airman’s First World War P.O.W. Artwork1
Douglas N. Lantry
National Museum of the U.S. Air Force
Archival holdings at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force (NMUSAF), near Dayton, Ohio,
include a small sketchbook of vivid, amusing watercolors describing a young American airman’s
brief captivity as a prisoner of war in Germany at the very end of the First World War. The
paintings, by Lt. Guy Brown Wiser, are unusual and instructive. They stand out immediately
because of their obvious artistic quality as a colorful tongue-in-cheek record of the American POW
experience, and they are instructive because they offer unique insight into how a young American
and his comrades interpreted what they did and what happened to them. This paper traces Wiser’s
path through the war by combining his artwork with his own verbal narrative explaining what he
thought and saw, and offers arguments for what the work signifies and why it is important. The
aviator’s particular circumstances of combat, capture, captivity, and freedom in 1918–1919, and
how the artist turned experience into pictures contemporaneously with a sense of humor and
optimism, suggest a particularly American sensibility and attributes of personality that enhance
understanding of the U.S. Air Service’s WWI culture and heritage. Moreover, the paintings and
the artist’s story add to a broad appreciation of the American war experience overall.

Guy Brown Wiser’s Story
Guy Brown Wiser was born in 1895 in Marion, Indiana, in the heart
of the American Midwest. A talented artist, he graduated South
Bend High School in 1912 and went off to study architecture at
Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. In college, “Bud” Wiser
(the nickname says something about his sense of humor) put his
visual ability to good use in several activities, including illustrating
the yearbook as its artistic editor and drawing for the monthly
humor journal The Cornell Widow as well as leading the staff of
artists at the university’s newspaper. He also joined the engineering
society Tau Beta Pi and “Gargoyle,” the university’s architectural

Figure 1. Guy Brown Wiser as a
Cornell student. (Cornell University).
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society, as well as serving on various student boards, other
organizations, and rowing on the crew team. Wiser graduated in
1917 (Figures 1 and 2).2
The U.S. having entered the war not long before his graduation,
Wiser enlisted in Chicago with a desire to fly airplanes. He was sent
to aeronautical ground school at The Ohio State University,
Columbus, where he spent some free time drawing for Ohio State’s
Sun-Dial undergraduate humor magazine, then edited by James
Thurber. As Wiser went off to war in November 1917, Thurber
wrote that “…if he is half the aviator he is the artist, our worst fears
and best hopes for him will be realized, which is circumlocution for
saying that we are selfish enough to want him to ‘stick around,’ and
ply ever an anon for our issues the pen and India ink on the Bristol
board … Our heart will be with a certain war plane every time it’s
in action bombing Kaiserism deader. So long, all luck, Guy, and
our regards to Paree.”3

Figure 2. Guy Brown Wiser’s cartoon
style is evident in his illustrations for
Cornell’s 1917 student annual.
(Cornell University).

And so, after much more training and travel, 2d Lt. Wiser, having
been commissioned at Ft. Worth, Texas, and further trained in
England, was posted to France. After yet more instruction there, he made it to the front as a pilot
in the 20th Aero Squadron, 1st Day Bombardment Group, based at Amanty, and later Maulan, in
early September 1918.4

He flew two-place, single-engine biplane De Havilland DH-4 bombers on combat missions during
the late-war St. Mihiel and Argonne drives. His final mission took place during the Argonne effort,
on September 26, 1918. Flying from Maulan to bomb Dun-Sur-Meuse in the company of aircraft
from another squadron, the formation was attacked by seven German planes after dropping bombs,
and was thereafter engaged, still over German territory, by a much larger enemy force. During the
fight, five of the seven U.S. planes were lost, four airmen ended up as prisoners, and seven were
killed in action.5
2

Cornell University, The Cornell 1917 Class Book: A Record of the Class of 1917 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University, 1917), 60-61, 208-368 passim; National Museum of the U.S. Air Force (hereafter
NMUSAF), Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account); “Wiser
’17 Missing,” Cornell Alumni News 21, no. 6 (October 31, 1918): 62.

3

The Sun-Dial 7, No. 2 (November 1917): 5.

4

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account); Guy
Brown Wiser, letter to Woodford Patterson, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, regarding service record,
April 8, 1920 (Cornell University Archives).

5

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account); Maurer
Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: USAF, 1978): 372; Sidney
Howard, “The Raid on Dun,” The North American Review 210, No. 769 (December 1919), 809-819.
See also Caroline Ticknor, ed., New England Aviators, 1914–1918: Their Portraits and Their Records,
Vol. 1 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 113-114; Martin Matrix Evans, ed., American Voices of
World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920 (London: Routledge, 2001), 129-132; Mitchell
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Wiser’s observer, Lt. Glenn Richardson, found his twin
Lewis machine guns jammed, and so emptied a revolver
at the Germans, and finally threw cartridge cases and
map boards at them. Meanwhile, a vulnerable main gas
tank between Wiser and Richardson was punctured,
along with a smaller reserve tank in the wing above the
pilot, and fumes bathed the observer. Around 11:00
AM, main and reserve gas tanks wrecked, engine shot
out, and radiator holed, the vital fluids leaked away and
the DH-4’s engine stopped at 13,000 feet over Conflans.
Observer Richardson had been shot in the heel. Gliding
and defenseless, Wiser tried for the front but was turned
instead toward a German field by an enemy plane’s
warning bursts of machine gun fire across his nose; the
German wanted to capture the men and the plane. Wiser
could only obey.6
They landed and were unable to burn the DH-4 as they’d
been taught to do—Richardson was much affected,
“inebriated” Wiser wrote later, by gas fumes, and his
revolver was empty in any case—though Wiser shouted
“shoot the damned thing!” 7 (In later years, that
exclamation would be a source of inside humor between
the two men.) They were immediately surrounded and
taken prisoner by Jasta (Jagdstaffel, or squadron) 12 at
its airfield at Giraumont (Figures 3 and 4).8 This is where
Wiser’s visual account begins.

Figure 3. Captured: Wiser (seated, center)
Richardson (seated, left), and Jasta 12. Alfred
Greven, who shot them down, is standing, center,
without hat.

Figure 4. Damaged: Wiser and Richardson’s DH-4
at Jasta 12’s base at Giraumont.

A Unique Sketchbook
About three weeks after being shot down, Wiser obtained art supplies and began his watercolor
journal of captivity. He was a prisoner from September 26 through December 1, 1918, a total of
only 67 days. But in that time, he managed to set down in color and line a unique record of his
experience. Many years later, he gave a talk in which he explained the main incidents; this audio

Yockelson, Forty-Seven Days: How Pershing’s Warriors Came of Age to Defeat the German Army in
World War I (New York: Penguin, 2016); Mark Jones, “The Wild Blue Yesteryear of WWI Fliers,” Los
Angeles Times, (October 1, 1976):1, 4.
6

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account).

7

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account).

8

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account; letter of
Alfred Greven, April 22, 1963).
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recording stored at the Smithsonian National Air and Space
Museum adds detail and perspective to his watercolor diary.9
Humor is the hallmark of Wiser’s work. For instance, he
begins the book this way: “Note: We acknowledge our
indebtedness to the Richtofen Circus, whose help has made
this book possible,” and “Preface: A modest account of the
entertainment accorded us while guests of the German
Government.” Irony and sarcasm were never far from Wiser’s
brush.
The sketchbook itself, held in the NMUSAF’s special
collections, is compact and sturdy. It has 38 leaves and
measures 9” by 5 ½”. Front and back covers are heavy papercovered cardboard, and six stapled folios are bound at the top
short end with fabric tape and a narrow glued-fabric outer
covering. The bottom short edge has a small round metal
clasp that once secured a leather closing strap, and rounded
corners; the leaves likewise have rounded bottom corners.
The book’s manufacturer is
unknown.

Figure 3. Front cover of Wiser’s notebook
with self-portrait. Note that the mischief
on his face contrasts with the halo on the
“coat of arms” inside the cover.

Wiser’s work is pencil
drawings with watercolor
and ink, and comprises 41
single-sided plates (he used
both sides of a few leaves).
He decorated the outer cover
with a “behind bars” selfportrait, the inner front cover
with a fanciful personal coat
of arms, and the back inner
cover with a small cartoon
about the book being “made Figure 4. GBW “coat of arms” and “made in Germany” label in the sketchbook. The KG
stands for Kriegsgefangene or prisoner of war; the stripes reinforce the point. Wiser makes
in Germany” (Figures 5 and subtle sport of European traditions and pretensions with this coat of arms.
6). He did the paintings, he
notes in the book, between
about October 20, 1918, and February 1919, when he finished the collection aboard the USS
Michigan en route to the United States after the war.

9

National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Archival Resource 1981-D11, Sketchbook, Guy Brown Wiser;
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum Sound Archives (hereafter NASM), “After Dinner
Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1, file xxxx-0139 (sic),
May 20, 1966.
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Figure 5. Making light of German versus
American thinking while being taken to their
first POW holding place.

Figure 6. Wiser’s depiction of getting shot down
on September 26, 1918.

Wiser excerpts the significant moments of his POW days with humorous sincerity. Air combat is
a serious attempt by pilots and aircrew to kill one another and on Wiser’s last mission several died.
However, he painted the event in a wry cartoon spirit (Figure 7)—both he and “Rich” stare at
individual bullets and one appears to be chasing Richardson. This casual humor in the face of
danger is not an uncommon way of dealing with such events (compare with Bruce Bairnsfather’s
famous “Old Bill” WWI cartoons). What is uncommon is that this comic sensibility is set out in a
cartoon POW diary, the only such record of the American WWI aerial and prisoner experience in
the hundreds of collections in the NMUSAF’s holdings.
Wiser made sure to contrast orderly German habits with the easy-going, casual attitude of
American troops. On the car ride to their first POW quarters, a tiny house at Joeuf (Figure 8), the
roads were rough, and the tires were fragile, and the car only had four seats—but there were five
riders: Wiser, Richardson, the commandant, a driver, and a guard. The Germans just couldn’t put
five people in a four-place car. Wiser said “This was not to be thought of, with German efficiency,
without a great deal of thought. I didn’t know if they were going to shoot one of us to make the
car balance.” Wiser ended up sitting atop the front seat facing rearward and claimed he was
airborne for much of the trip. Richardson, with his wounded heel, got the back seat with the
commander.10

10

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 16:20.
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Figure 9. Beer and cards with friendly
German guards at Joeuf.

Figure 10. “Torture” involved getting a
haircut from a truly unskilled barber.

This is not to imply that Germans were unfriendly or punctilious, though some were. When the
airmen encountered some elderly men assigned as prison guards, Wiser and Richardson found
them to be quite kind. One of them gave Richardson his cane because of his wounded foot, and
the good-natured guards brought beer and taught them how to play German card games with an
unfamiliar 32-card deck decorated with what Wiser thought were roses and cabbages instead of
the usual clubs, hearts, spades, and diamonds (Figure 9). The closest Wiser and friends came to
torture was getting a brutal haircut from someone that Wiser supposed had been trained by shearing
sheep (Figure 10).
One German officer they came across, who escorted them via train to another camp at Karlsruhe,
apparently was mean, or at least mean-looking. He was a classic type with dueling scars and struck
fear into German soldiers they met along the way. He “made Humphrey Bogart look like Little
Lord Fauntleroy,” according to Wiser, so of course the artist made light of this character (Figure
11): At one stop, a night-time air raid “put the wind up” this officer, who took to his heels and
sprinted in panic for the bomb shelter. “Our real hero captain, the tough boy,” said Wiser, “He
blasted off without a countdown. He just took off down the station platform and into an air raid
shelter. He left the guards to take care of us.”11 Note in the painting of this brave flight that the
crossed searchlights echo the famous insignia of the 9th Aero Squadron, now 9th Bomb Squadron,
which specialized in night bombing, and this emblem is still used today (Figure 12). This may or
may not have been intentional, but one hopes it was.

11

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 22:25.
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Figure 11. “Tough boy” runs for shelter at
the Strasbourg station during an air raid.

Figure 7. Today’s 9th Bomb Squadron uses an emblem introduced
in WWI. Note the echo of this in Wiser’s art. (U.S. Air Force)

The prisoners in transit locked this same officer in the restroom on the train by blocking the door
with Richardson’s German-gift cane. There was some commotion, but no punishment. Their
captor, finally released, counted prisoners, sighed, and sat down (Figure 13).
Camp conditions where Wiser was held—Joeuf, Karlsruhe (the infested “Hotel d’Engleterre” and
a larger main camp), Landshut, Villingen, Constanz—were unpleasant but not terrifying or deadly
for Wiser and his comrades. Wiser managed to visually joke about many aspects of how camps
were run. For instance, upon arriving at the main Karlsruhe camp, inspectors regarded an English
flier’s artificial leg as a notable challenge, certain that something was hidden inside it. They
searched everyone vigorously, but took special interest in and a great deal of time with the leg
(Figure 14). Near the end of his captivity, the terror of disease had crept into Landshut prison as
one Italian orderly had died of flu. Wiser and the other flyers there were vaccinated many, many
times for malaria, typhus, etc., and Wiser called it “branding” (Figure 15). While annoying, this
was in fact health care. Food was a constant concern and it was often bad and even inedible by
reasonable standards (Figure 16). However, Wiser noted their rations were not so different from
German soldiers’ rations. The very serious blockade of Germany was having its effect. Wiser
described bread and thin soup as poor, short rations, but the Red Cross fortunately supplemented
the fliers’ diets. “Every ten days we had a shipment of Red Cross rations, and they were
marvelous,” he recalled (Figure 17). They had rice, beans, tinned meat, cigarettes, and chocolate,
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Figure 13. Locking their escort in the
restroom on a train to Karlsruhe.

Figure 15. “Branding,” or being vaccinated
over and over again, at Landshut.

Figure 14. Inspectors at one camp made a special, long
search of a British prisoner’s artificial leg, sure that
there was something nefarious to be found.

Figure 16. Food was not good, but fliers’
rations were as good as Germans’.
Applesauce was the culprit in this illustration.

and “the prize of all was Gail Borden’s Eagle brand milk.” They all swore when they got out they
would buy it by the case, spread it on bread, and eat it because it was sweet and tasty.12
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Figure 17. Red Cross packages included
the much-loved Borden’s condensed milk,
seen here atop the pile.

Figure 18. Wiser was no fan of French
popular music.

Figure 19. Itinerant photographers
provided portraits to send home; Wiser
wasted no time making fun of this.

The Americans and other aviators were able to cobble together entertainment and even to have
their pictures taken and sent home
to loved ones (Figures 18, 19, and
20). These aspects of camp life may
have relieved boredom and Wiser
certainly made use of them for
joshing. He described and painted
his least favorite act, a French
singer: “I think the worst was the
French, I’d still put the French
popular song of 1918 against
anything in the world for
tunelessness…it goes on by the
hour…give a Frenchman a guitar,
and he hits those five notes
endlessly.”13
Despite diversions to fill the time,
the airmen still were in prison, and

Figure 20. The reality of portraits for hire: American fliers at Karlsruhe, Wiser
on the far left and Richardson on the far right, still with cane.

12

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 29:00.

13

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 32:35.
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Figure 21. Escape was verboten. Though it
was probably a bit funny, the man went to
solitary confinement.

Figure 22. When a friend thought lost showed up,
Wiser was ecstatic. Though a cartoon, this painting
depicts real affection.

escapes were contemplated. One attempt was made during Wiser’s captivity and it failed. Three
men found a washed-out hole under the three-layered barbed wire fence, and one of them, a rather
big man, tried to get through it. He got stuck, as the hole wasn’t as big as it looked. The other two
saw this happening and melted away; the would-be escapee spent some time in solitary
confinement (Figure 21). And of course, they were still at war and people were still dying in the
thousands not very far away. One of Wiser’s dear friends, who they had thought dead and of course
hadn’t heard from, showed up several days after their September 26 battle as if risen from the
grave. Lieutenant Ed Leonard personified a miracle: He’d been shot through the neck and the bullet
entered and exited in such a way as to narrowly miss killing him; the round was so hot it cauterized
the wound and after ten days’ recovery Leonard joined his mates in prison. Wiser’s depiction of
Leonard’s return is perhaps the most touching plate in the sketchbook, the most illustrative of
friendship and affection among the American fliers (Figure 22).
Landshut, one of the last places the fliers were imprisoned (and where they got vaccinated so many
times), was most interesting. The prisoners’ quarters were a huge stable adjacent to one of the
oldest castles in Germany, Burg Trausnitz, atop a very tall hill. Wiser painted the arduous trek up
the hill and decades later returned and had his picture taken next to the stable. By the time they
moved to Landshut, Wiser recalled, “We’d collected quite a lot of cooking utensils and food and
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Figure 23, The climb to Burg Trausnitz from
Landshut’s railway station, with burdens.

Figure 24. Wiser at the giant Landshut stable in 1963. It is atop the
hill adjacent to the castle.

junk of all kinds, all in a box; it was quite a job carrying it from the railroad station up all those
steps to that castle.” (figures 23 and 24)14
The end of the war was a cause for joy for the American fliers and for continued humor in Wiser’s
sketchbook. When the news came through at Landshut, where they could and did order food,
writing checks on a Paris bank (!) for whatever they wanted, there was a drunken celebration
(Figure 25). Wiser remembered “We were there when the armistice was signed; the boys went and
sent out for a lot of Rhine wine. I couldn’t stand the stuff, it was too bitter, or too something for
me, fortunately, because all of the rest were terribly plastered.”15

14

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 39:00.

15

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 43:45.
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Shortly thereafter, they walked out through Landshut in confident style (Figure 26), only to be
stymied by administrative delay and having to hang around a more southerly camp at Villingen
awaiting transport to Switzerland. While in this curious middle zone of not-freedom, Wiser and
his mates encountered a strange phenomenon: Germans would trade anything for soap. “I got a
first-class Iron Cross for half a stick of shaving soap,” said Wiser, “And one fella took his whole
jacket apart. Took all his decorations and buttons and everything, and was trading every part of it,
pockets, epaulettes, everything, he was just tearing them off and trading them in for any kind of
soap. Cuckoo clocks, briar pipes, meerschaums, Dachshunds, anything you wanted, for soap”
(Figure 27).16 Finally the erstwhile prisoners made it to Bern, Switzerland, and enjoyed a scene
that inspired the best painting in Wiser’s remarkable sketchbook (Figure 28). At Bern, they met an
American diplomatic delegation and were absolutely deluged with luxuries: “They just descended
on the train; we had twenty-six different brands of cigarettes given us, just showered with
everything—oranges, letter paper, stationery, everything they could think of including old G.I.
overcoats. We all got them, but no one got one that fit him. We spent the rest of the time trading
overcoats trying to get one to fit. But that was the first time we’d seen the stars and stripes….”17

16

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” file xxxx0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 45:50.

17

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 1,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 47:30.
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Wiser’s war story ends shortly thereafter. He spent some time being evaluated with others
at a French hospital, and visited his friend, and aerial observer whose place Richardson had
taken on the fateful day, and who had lost a leg in later combat. Wiser was assigned to help gather
the history of the war for the Air Service for a short while, then tried unsuccessfully (too much
Army bureaucracy) to remain in France to attend more college, and finally went home aboard the
USS Michigan. He was discharged at Garden City, New Jersey, on March 17, 1919, and returned
to South Bend to begin a career as an architect and illustrator. (Fig. 29) “I just consider that I’m
one of the luckiest guys alive,” he said to a WWI history audience decade later, “And I’ve been
through some fairly lively experiences, and I just thank the good lord for keeping a hand on my
shoulder when I needed it.”18 Wiser married and went on to a notable career teaching and studying
art, illustrating science textbooks and children’s books, and becoming a modernist painter. He
eventually contacted Alfred Greven, who shot him down, and they reunited as friends in the 1960s.
For many years, he celebrated September 26th with Glenn Richardson and friends as “Our Shootin’
Down Day.” Guy Brown Wiser passed away in 1983 in California.19

Figure 29. Returning home in 1919, Wiser
continued drawing and painting as a
successful illustrator and artist.

18

NASM, “After Dinner Conversation with Lieutenant Guy Brown Wiser (20th Aero Squadron),” part 2,
file xxxx-0139 (sic), May 20, 1966, 2:25.

19

NMUSAF, Research Division, archival resource 68-D21, Wiser, Guy Brown (Wiser’s account and
various other documents); “Alumni Notes,” Cornell Alumni News XXIX, No. 17 (January 27, 1927):
213; Edan Hughes, “Artists in California, 1786-1940,” Los Angeles Times, December 23, 1924,
reprinted in “Biography: Guy Brown Wiser,” www.askart.com, accessed January 9, 2018; Farhat Art
Museum, “Guy Wiser (1895-1983),” https://farhatculturalcenter.wordpress.com, accessed January 9,
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Links, Connections, and Meaning
What do Wiser’s whimsical paintings and his explanations of them mean for the heritage of the
U.S. Air Force in the history of the First World War? Foremost, they represent a unique record of
a rare experience. They preserve events that otherwise would probably have been forgotten had
not a keen and comic eye transferred them to paper. Compared to later wars, not many American
aviators—only153—were taken prisoner, and those who were, like Wiser, were not held long
before the war ended. Overall, 123 U.S. Air Service fliers and one balloonist were forced down
and captured, along with 19 Americans flying with the British, 10 with the French, and one with
the Italians. The Air Service was still small, fielding at the end of the war 45 squadrons at the front,
with 38 seeing combat, and a total of 767 pilots, 481 observers, and 23 aerial gunners.20 For those
captured, their experience was relatively humane compared to later wars, as Wiser’s chronicle
shows. 21 Kindness and respect was evident, along with a degree of freedom unknown in later
conflict. Germany’s dire circumstances near the end of hostilities may have played a part in this,
as other prisons at other times and places during the war were far less hospitable.22
So, while Wiser’s small slice of experience was but a tiny part of a gigantic and horrible war, its
evidence preserved in art is precious to the U.S. Air Force. It demonstrates qualities the USAF
values, including courage, resourcefulness, and calm in the face of danger, that are unaltered by
time. This heritage is both educational and inspirational. Of his humor in the midst of war, and the
loss of several men on his last mission, Wiser wrote later that “Only because the whole action
seems unreal, because we had been conditioned to accept death lightly, and because we were still
alive, are we able to joke about such a tragedy.”23 One quality in particular, that of “wingmanship,”
is evident in Wiser’s experience: the USAF wants its airmen to look after and care for one another
the way Wiser shows in his greeting of the friend they thought was killed. Being able to point to a
real-life example through the medium of firsthand artistic witness from the earliest days of air
power is invaluable to USAF heritage.
One can argue that Wiser’s art, while demonstrating his own personality and perspective, also
suggests a particularly American sensibility. Though this is hard to test or prove, Americans seen
through Wiser’s lens seem easy-going, open, optimistic, perhaps a little loud and mischievous—
or in other words, typically American, in the way we might feel others see Americans and
especially American soldiers in Europe. This may have been especially true as confident, well fed,
well-equipped, motivated, and surely somewhat innocent and naïve U.S. troops arrived in 1917
and 1918. In this way, art’s ability to transmit feeling, atmosphere, and nuance, where bare facts
may not, enhances its value as historical interpretation.

2018; “Alumni Notes,” The Cornell Architect 4 (June 1919): 52; Guy Brown Wiser, “Our 59th Shootin’
Down Day, 1918-1977,” Invitation, September 25, 1977, Van Nuys, CA (Cornell University Archives).
20

NMUSAF, “Meuse-Argonne Offensive,” fact sheet, www.nationalmuseum.af.mil.

21

NMUSAF, “WWI Prisoners of War,” fact sheet, www.nationalmuseum.af.mil.

22

For further information on other POW experiences, see United States Air Force Academy, The American
P.O.W. Experience, Special Bibliography Series No. 96, November 2000.

23

Guy Brown Wiser, typescript photocopy attached to sketchbook, n.d. (Cornell University Archives).
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And as historical record, Wiser’s art vividly demonstrates both change and continuity, the
foundations of meaning and significance. The machines and clothing, the structures of
authority and manner in his work, are clearly of another century, but the concerns of daily life
remain unchanged. That soldiers relish Red Cross and other “care” packages, play jokes, obey and
persevere is as true in the 21st century as it was then. And an American serviceman making fun of
his daily life is definitely nothing new. Guy Brown Wiser simply did it very well in a very rare
circumstance and we are the beneficiaries of his generous and perceptive talent. Through his little
sketchbook of a century past, he lets us peek into a vanished era and see its echoes in the present.
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Propaganda as Public Relations Antecedent:
The Complex Legacy of the Creel Committee
Christopher J. McCollough
Columbus State University
Wars are not won on battlefields alone. Logistics, strategy, resources, force strength, and
technology have all played critical roles in determining outcomes in major conflicts throughout
history. Yet, there are still two related factors that have much to say about the outcome of major
conflicts: propaganda efforts to sell the war effort to the nation states that are a part of the conflict
and its impact on public opinion around the participation of those nation states among its citizenry.
History offers us some prominent examples that reinforce this point, and they consistently revolve
around the ability of parties involved in the conflict to effectively leverage contemporary
communication outlets to effective ends in order to shape and manage public opinion.
Walter Lippmann’s iconic Public Opinion (1922) provides his perspective as a newsman and as a
member of Woodrow Wilson’s collection of journalists, advertisers, early public relations
practitioners, and education philosophers who worked from the United States’ involvement in
World War I in April of 1917 through the effort to promote the Treaty of Versailles and the League
of Nations. He warns of the potential for manipulation of information to cultivate and maintain
support for military and political action, and the need for objectivity in journalism and a refined
study of public opinion to counter its effects.
The father of modern public relations, Edward Bernays, offered two texts on the subject of
propaganda and its effectiveness in shaping public opinion on behalf of organizations. In
Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923), Bernays establishes his understanding of public relations
counsel, public opinion, its formation, how one shapes it, and its necessity for achieving public
action. In Propaganda (1928), Bernays offers some perspective on the practice, its role in public
relations, and its value to many facets of society. Many found Bernays to offer a manipulative
perspective on the discipline, and a reading of both texts leaves this author sympathetic to their
perspective. Bernays opens Propaganda with the following Machiavellian perspective in reference
to democracy in propaganda:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen
mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of
our country. ...We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in
which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate
in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society. ...In almost
every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social
conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of
persons...who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they
who pull the wires which control the public mind. Bernays, 1928, p. 1.
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While much of both texts give a reader a window into the modern intellectual evolution of
the practice of public relations, it is segments like this that left Bernays with a dubious
reputation among prominent members of society, and further damaged the initial reputation
around the professional practice of public relations. While it is clear that the work of the Creel
Committee and its membership helped solidify and advance the practice of public relations past
its early publicist origins into matters of shaping public opinion and behavior to establishing and
managing relationships, what is not clear is how early we see the elements of modern best practices
in public relations practice in play. The purpose of this study is to examine the execution of the
Four Minute Men Speech campaign, using the ROPES PR model (Kelly, 1998) to determine the
overall adherence of the campaign to modern best practices. In the examination of the Four Minute
Men, the author will draw parallels to specific strategies and tactics, content choices, and selection
of speakers to illustrate how much of the work of the CPI set early precedents for modern public
relations practice. Further, the paper will demonstrate how the actions of the Creel Committee
established a baseline for scholarship that developed theories of practice that would achieve
effective, ethical approaches to public relations practice.

Context
American War, Public Opinion, and Communication
In the case of American conflicts throughout its first 242 years, we see a country that wins or loses
its battles through effective management of the public mindset, often through the communication
modes of the day. During the American Revolution, the colonists made the most of the early postal
service and the printing press to shape and manage public opinion during a challenging conflict
with a British force superior in size and early strategy, providing enough public support to enable
colonists to outlast Britain’s patience and budget to earn independence. The American Civil War
illustrated the power of the telegraph and modern photography to permit war correspondents to
bring the horrors of the battlefield into the American home (Lewinski, 1980). The SpanishAmerican War was the product of Yellow Journalism’s sensational efforts to cultivate support
among the American citizenry to support a conflict between the nations, exemplified by William
Randolph Hearst’s infamous remarks about providing war if his staff provided the pictures
(Wilkerson, 1967). Newsreels first utilized during the Great War (Creel, 1920), were perfected
during World War II as a means of bringing news around the world and about conflict home.
Radio, still in its adolescence, took on an essential role for political leaders and broadcast
correspondents like Edward R. Murrow in bringing news from the front home, and in shaping the
public’s perspective on the actions of Axis powers, as well as in sharing the struggles and triumphs
of Allied forces (Cozma, 2010). Propaganda in film also found its stride during the second world,
as Leni Reifenstahl and Frank Capra both elevated the art form to shape public opinion and
mobilize support for their respective countries, Germany and the United States (Kelman, 1973;
Xifra & Girona, 2012). The Vietnam War brought network news to the forefront as correspondents
brought the quagmire into American homes and elevated the reputation of CBS anchorman Walter
Cronkite to be able to decry the efforts of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, ultimately
undermining the war efforts (Gitlin, 1980).
In modern conflicts, the Department of Defense has effectively managed modern communication
to create the public images that generate support for military efforts, with a helping hand from
lessons learned from cable television. Cable News Network’s (CNN’s) Bernard Shaw, John
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Holliman, and Peter Arnett made the decision to stay in Baghdad the night of January 16,
1991 and captured U.S. airstrike coverage on the scene, in spite of every other news
organization’s decision to leave under the threat of the attack issued from the U.S. embassy.
The coverage earned critical acclaim for then upstart CNN, as well as for 24-hour cable news,
while also sanitizing modern warfare for the American public, often drawing comparisons to
watching video games.
Always apt to learn from innovation in communication, on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the Pentagon announced it would embed journalists with military units to provide access to the
invasion. What was not a part of the dialog was the strategic placement of journalists away from
the most severe aspects of the action in order to control the narrative of the conflict. Journalists
themselves came away with the impression that they did well, but acknowledged they had a much
narrower view of the conflict than if they had a wider access to the invasion (Fahmy & Johnson,
2005).
The impact of mass communication to shape public opinion and the outcome of warfare in
American history is clear. It is unsurprising then that Woodrow Wilson would seek to leverage
mass communication strategically to shape public opinion and align public thinking with the
shifting perspective of the United States’ involvement in World War I. This becomes essential
when considering where public opinion was on the War, and how Wilson had positioned himself
during his first term in office and successfully earned re-election.
“He Kept Us Out of War”
In the summer of 1914, the United States had no interest in the conflict brewing across Europe.
Aside from the geographic barrier of the Atlantic, the United States held none of the binding
treaties that drove 11 nations into the fight by September of 1914, and would have maintained that
distance if the country had been left to do so (Axelrod, 2009). Over the first two years of war,
submarine attacks on American shipping and civilian vessels (most notably the deaths of 128
Americans on the British Lusitania), pleas from allied nations, and rumors of German spies and
plots to attack the United States created a growing pressure to join the fight and support the allied
effort. This was balanced against a pacifist movement from Jane Addams and the American Union
Against Militarism (Badertscher, 2014), the National Women’s Party, along with a consistent
public outcry from the then popular Socialist Party of America’s Eugene V. Debs, as well as
progressive Republicans in Congress, among them Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follete. This was
reinforced by general anti-war sentiments from German-Americans, Jewish-Americans, IrishAmericans, Wilson’s own base of southern whites, who feared unrest among immigrants in border
states like Missouri, and prominent American industrialist Henry Ford. Wilson even saw pressure
and criticism from his own party as his Secretary of State and fellow progressive Democrat
William Jennings Bryant stood in opposition to war and resigned in protest over Wilson’s use of
a warning against the German government if they persisted in submarine warfare against American
civilian vessels following the attack on the HMS Lusitania (May, 1966). These competing
pressures were set against the backdrop of Wilson’s campaign for re-election.
In 1916, Wilson faced a challenge from popular Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
who ran on the Republican ticket with heavy support from former President Theodore Roosevelt
(Pietrusza, 2018). The Democrats built their campaign around the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of
War," saying a Republican victory would mean war with both Mexico and Germany. Wilson's
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position was probably critical in winning the Western states (Cooper, 2009). Charles Evans
Hughes insisted on downplaying the war issue, while advocating a program of greater
mobilization and preparedness. Wilson had successfully pressured the Germans to suspend
unrestricted submarine warfare, making it difficult for Hughes to attack Wilson's peace platform.
Hughes, instead, criticized Wilson's military interventions in Mexico, where the U.S. was
supporting various factions in the Mexican civil war, and his progressive positions on labor. His
criticisms gained little traction, however, especially among factory workers who supported such
laws. Hughes was helped by the vigorous support of popular former President Theodore Roosevelt,
and by the fact that the Republicans were still the nation's majority party at the time.
Wilson’s campaign advanced the idea that entrance in the war created the potential for a conflict
on two fronts with Mexico’s relationship with Germany still in question, as well as the native
presence of immigrants from both sides of the conflict living throughout the continental United
States. These concerns in no small part led much of the electorate in the western United States to
support Wilson, bringing the previously Republican stronghold of California into question.
Hughes made a key mistake in California. Just before the election, Hughes made a campaign swing
through the state, but he never met with the powerful Republican Governor Hiram Johnson to seek
his support. Johnson, in turn, never gave Hughes his full support. Wilson carried California by
3,420 votes (0.3%) and with it the presidency. With his re-election campaign won, Wilson would
now have to put his focus back on America’s position on World War I.
A White Hot Mass of Support
A confluence of factors finally led Wilson to determine it was necessary to enter the war in support
of the allies. Over the course of the first two years of war, America’s neutrality was grounded in
staying off the battlefields, but maintaining open business practices with nations willing to pay for
goods and resources. Due to the heavy blockades, which limited commerce with the central
powers, this led to a heavy bias in commerce with Great Britain and France.
In 1917, Germany decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare against any vessel
approaching British waters in an attempt to starve Britain into surrender. Their desperation to gain
a strategic advantage came with the knowledge that it would almost certainly bring the United
States into the war. Germany also worked through diplomatic backchannels to bring Mexico and
Japan into the fight. Germany offered to help Mexico regain territories lost in the Mexican–
American War in an encoded telegram known as the Zimmermann Telegram, which was
intercepted by British Intelligence. British intelligence, showing strategic prudence, held this
intelligence for the right time to get the desired response from Wilson. Publication of the telegram
outraged Americans just as German U-boats started sinking American merchant ships in the North
Atlantic. Wilson then asked Congress for "a war to end all wars" that would "make the world safe
for democracy,” and Congress voted to declare war on Germany on April 6, 1917 (Link, 1972).
While it was clear Wilson’s decision to take the United States into war came with a split public
perspective on the decision, there were indicators among members of the public that there was
sound support behind the decision. In 1914, there was a healthy base of support for the war among
Americans who sympathized with France, Great Britain, and Belgium. Progressive politics had
also brought much of its support base to the idea of being “citizens of the world.” Civic
organizations had cropped up all over the United States with the expressed mission to support the
war effort.
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The Committee for Relief in Belgium negotiated relief efforts for civilians on both sides of
the fighting in Belgium. The committee also sowed the seeds for national concern by
advancing the principle of America generosity. African-Americans open outrage with the
central powers’ actions in the Congo prompted them to push to volunteer in opposition to the
Germans and Austrian-Hungarian governments. The Jewish community in the United States
worked actively with other Jewish relief groups around the world to support those in the faith in
peril in the region (Axelrod, 2009). In short, there were pockets of support to be leveraged in the
same way Wilson leveraged pacifists to win election in November of 1916 as he came to address
foreign policy in April of 1917.
Former political opponents became a resource as focus turned from neutrality to mobilization.
Teddy Roosevelt’s preparedness movement opened the door for Wilson to more easily bring in
early volunteers prior to pushes for the draft. When it was clear war was imminent, and Wilson
needed to have a moral argument for shifting his position, he leveraged the Progressive drive for
preparedness and these pockets of support to achieve the change in opinion he sought. His
argument: Democracy needed to be the model for benevolent world citizenship to avoid future
wars, and America needed to drive this change through action to preserve freedom for the world
(Axelrod, 2009).
Popular forms of modern mass communication had already begun influencing public opinion in
advance of the turn to the CPI to drive the action, demonstrating the power of mass communication
in contributing to shaping public opinion. Filmmakers had begun telling the story of the German
assault on Belgium. Editorials had called for American support. Artists and political cartoonists
had driven the dialog around American support for the war since 1914. Finally, sheet music and
early recordings from Tin Pan Alley had been a forum for dialog from both camps on matters of
American involvement and neutrality, respectively (Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920).
Knowing that he had made the request and gathered solid support for entry into war, Wilson was
keenly aware that he would have to change public perceptions of the war and the United States’
participation in it. Given the split in American public opinion, Wilson understood that he needed
to get a unified public position that would support his push into the war effort. To achieve this, he
reached out to his supporter, political operative, and former journalist George Creel. Wilson issued
Executive Order 2594 mobilizing the Committee of Public Information (also known as the Creel
Committee) on April 13, 1917. Creel was a true believer in Wilson’s doctrine, and had been so
since meeting him as a Governor in New Jersey. In his conversations with Wilson, Creel stated
that they needed to achieve a monolithic, “white hot mass of support” (Axelrod, 2009; Creel,
1920).
The committee consisted of George Creel (chairman) and as ex officio members the Secretaries of
State (Robert Lansing), War (Newton D. Baker), and the Navy (Josephus Daniels). The CPI was
the first state bureau covering propaganda in the history of the United States. Creel urged Wilson
to create a government agency to coordinate "not propaganda as the Germans defined it, but
propaganda in the true sense of the word, meaning the 'propagation of faith.'" He was a journalist
with years of experience on the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News before accepting
Wilson's appointment to the CPI. He had a contentious relationship with Secretary Lansing
(Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920).
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Wilson established the first modern propaganda office (Creel, 1920). Creel set out to
systematically reach every person in the United States multiple times with patriotic
information about how the individual could contribute to the war effort. The Committee also
worked with the post office to censor seditious counter-propaganda. Creel set up divisions in his
new agency to produce and distribute innumerable copies of pamphlets, newspaper releases,
magazine advertisements, films, school campaigns, and the speeches of the Four Minute Men. CPI
created colorful posters that appeared in every store window, catching the attention of the
passersby for a few seconds (Adams, 1999). Historians were assigned to write pamphlets and indepth histories of the causes of the European war (Blakey, 1970; Committee on Public
Information, 1920).
In spite of the tensions, a rapid growth in the CPI illustrated the priority on influencing American
public opinion, and Creel’s ability to recruit and attract talent to the effort. From the original
handful of cabinet members and Creel, the CPI grew to a staffing population of over 100,000
members. The large membership included a diverse population of artists, journalists, advertising
executives, political scientists, the famous educational philosopher John Dewey, and some of the
early forefathers of modern public relations, including Carl Byoir and Edward Bernays (Axelrod,
1920; Creel, 1920). In putting the committee together, Creel married the most innovative
journalists, public relations practitioners, advertising professionals, and other key social scientists
to achieve the aim of the organization. In the process, they set a foundation for modern practices
in public communication and public relations.
The CPI used material based on fact, but spun it to present an upbeat picture of the American war
effort. Creel claimed that the CPI routinely denied false or undocumented atrocity reports, fighting
the crude propaganda efforts of "patriotic organizations" like the National Security League and the
American Defense Society that preferred "general thundering" and wanted the CPI to "preach a
gospel of hate” (Committee on Public Information, 1920).
The CPI staged events designed for many different ethnic groups, in their languages. For instance,
Irish-American tenor John McCormack sang at Mount Vernon before an audience representing
Irish-American organizations (Fleming, 2003). The Committee also targeted the American worker
and, endorsed by Samuel Gompers, filled factories and offices with posters designed to promote
the critical role of American labor in the success of the war effort (Axelrod, 2009; Fleming, 2003).
The CPI's activities were so thorough that historians later stated, using the example of a typical
midwestern American farm family, that every item of war news they saw—in the country weekly,
in magazines, or in the city daily picked up occasionally in the general store—was not merely
officially approved information but precisely the same kind that millions of their fellow citizens
were getting at the same moment. Every war story had been censored somewhere along the line—
at the source, in transit, or in the newspaper offices in accordance with ‘voluntary’ rules established
by the CPI.
The CPI could not escape charges of censorship and presenting a false presentation of the war
effort. The most common example was the critique of the organization’s perceived role in
censorship. While it is well established that they influenced news coverage through promoting
self-censorship with news organizations as a function or patriotism, and by issuing press releases
that presented Wilson’s perspective on the war (Axelrod, 2009), Creel took offense that his agency
was responsible for censorship. Creel said of the critique in his memoir:
1B3–6

PAPER 1B3 – CHRISTOPHER J. MCCOLLOUGH

In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or
repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the positive. At no point did it
seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of speech and
press. In all things, from first to last, without halt or change, it was a plain publicity
proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventures in
advertising.... We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to
be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative
throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was
needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of the facts. Creel, 1920; emphasis
added.

It was clear the public criticism was taking its toll on the efforts of the CPI. By 1917, the term
propaganda had already become toxic enough that Creel himself worked actively to distance CPI
work from the characterization. With a background on the development of the broader set of tools
and practitioners employed to re-shape public opinion around the Great War, the attention now
shifts to the strategy that is the focus of this study, the Four Minute Men Campaign.
Speaking Tours For the People, Of the People
The Four Minute Men were a group of volunteers authorized by United States President Woodrow
Wilson, to give four-minute speeches on topics given to them by The Committee on Public
Information (CPI). In 1917-1918, around 7,555,190 speeches were given in 5,200 communities
(Creel, 1920). The effort began when William McCormick Blair approached Creel with an idea
about how to make one more point of contact with American citizens to generate support for the
war effort. Blair recognized that there was an opening during the four minutes between reels
changing in movie theaters across the country, where films and news reels in support of the war
were already playing. In time, the four-minute speeches allowed for presentation at town meetings,
restaurants, and other places that had an audience. This is an instance of "viral marketing" before
its time (Mastrangelo, 2009).
For his idea, Blair was appointed as director of the Four Minute Men by the CPI. Blair appointed
state chairmen of the Four Minute Men, who then would appoint a city or community chairman.
Each of these appointments needed to be approved in Washington. The local chairman would then
appoint a number of speakers to cover the theaters in the city or community for which he was
responsible (Creel, 1920).
With many millions of German-Americans in the United States, as well as Irish-Americans and
Scandinavian-Americans and poor rural Southerners, with strong isolationist feelings, there was a
strong need for a propaganda campaign to stir support for the war. This effort had many unique
challenges to meet to address the existing political climate. Wilson needed to speak directly to the
fragmented and spread-out audience in the United States. He had to address the country's selfperception to generate support for the war. The Four Minute Men provided an answer to these
challenges (Mastrangelo, 2009).
In addition, the Four Minute Men urged citizens to purchase Liberty Bonds and Thrift Stamps.
The CPI trained thousands of volunteer speakers to make patriotic appeals during the four-minute
breaks needed to change reels. They also spoke at churches, lodges, fraternal organizations, labor
unions, and even logging camps. Speeches were mostly in English, but ethnic groups were reached
in their own languages. Creel boasted that in 18 months his 75,000 volunteers delivered over 7.5
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million four-minute orations to over 300 million listeners, in a nation of 103 million people
(Axelrod, 2009; Creel, 1920). The work of the Four Minute Men continued beyond the
Armistice, as the speeches turned towards generating support for the Treaty of Versailles at
the community level in an effort to gain support for Congressional endorsement (Axelrod, 2009).
The Four Minute Men idea became a useful tool in the propaganda campaign because it
addressed a specific rhetorical situation. One of the challenges of the effort was the fragmented
audience of the United States. Many different heritages were represented in the countrty, and the
president needed their support for the war. To address each group’s specific needs, the Director
of the Four Minute Men, William McCormick Blair, delegated the duty of speaking to local men.
Well-known and respected community figures often volunteered for the Four Minute Men
program. This gave the speeches a local voice. Further, the Four Minute Men brought in movie
celebrities of the day like Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, and Douglas Fairbanks. Even
Woodrow Wilson engaged in the campaign.
The Four Minute Men were also given general topics and talking points to follow and rotated
among theaters to help the speeches seem fresh, instead of generic propaganda speeches. They
were encouraged to improvise and be extemporaneous, within the bounds the strategic aims of the
campaign. These speeches usually celebrated Woodrow Wilson as a larger than life character and
the Germans as less-than-human huns. The speakers attended training sessions through local
universities, and were given pamphlets and speaking tips on a wide variety of topics, such as
buying Liberty Bonds, registering for the draft, rationing food, recruiting unskilled workers for
munitions jobs, and supporting Red Cross programs (Mastrangelo, 2009). It becomes clear to
modern practitioners on first blush that some essential elements of public relations work come
through in the discussion of Wilson’s management of public perception before and after the United
States entering the war, reflected in the operations of the CPI and the Four Minute Men. This raises
a key question: To what extent does the Four Minute Men campaign adhere to the steps of modern
public relations practice?
Learning the ROPES
Initially conceived of as a viable model for conducting public relations work focused on
fundraising and development, Kelly (1998) devised the ROPES model as a means of refining the
long-established RACE (Research, Action, Communication, Evaluation) model of public relations
campaigns. The ROPES model consists of the following steps: Research, Objectives,
Programming, Evaluation, and Stewardship. The following presents Kelly’s advice to the
practitioner.
Before beginning a campaign, Kelly urged practitioners to understand the background behind it.
The research stage of ROPES has three elements to help a practitioner do this. First, you identify
the opportunity or problem that forms the basis for your campaign. Then, you ensure that you have
a solid knowledge of the organization you represent, understanding its history, current position
and future objectives. Finally, you should research the company's audiences, taking time to
investigate past public relations initiatives and the way that external stakeholders, such as
customers, feel about the organization.
In the second stage of the ROPES formula, you set one or more clear goals, which you can assess
through establishing measurable objectives for your campaign based on the opportunity or problem
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identified in the research stage. Typically, objectives are outputs, outtakes or outcomes. For
example, an output objective might focus on achieving media coverage, an outtake on
changing audience awareness and an outcome on an action, such as an increase in sales or
web traffic. Your client may not be specific about what he wants from the campaign, but you
should be. Over time, ROPES scholarship has improved, and scholars have adopted a principle of
best practice from management literature to suggest public relations objectives should be specific,
measurable, actionable, realistic, and time-based, or follow the SMARTS model (Doran, 1981).
Once you understand where your campaign should go, you must plan how to get it there and launch
it. In the programming stage, you decide which public relations communication tools to use to
meet your objectives, taking into account the messages you need to convey, the audience you are
targeting and the media you need to use to reach this audience. During this stage, you also set your
budget. It is important that as you engage in programming and execution, you have chosen
strateg(ies) and tactics that align with your stated goals and objectives. Your preliminary research
should inform your goals, objectives, and strategic approaches.
Stewardship (Kelly, 2001) has become a trending practice for public relations professionals
because it allows them to establish and maintain relationship-building efforts with stakeholders
who should be included in everyday communication. Practicing relationship cultivation strategies
is important to solidify ongoing relationships with your organization’s publics in order to maintain
a strong and trusted brand. Since it is important for public relations practitioners to foster
relationships with clients, partners, journalists and key audiences, scholars posit four dimensions
of stewardship: reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and relationship nurturing.
Reciprocity. Recognizing stakeholders and demonstrating gratitude for their involvement
with the organization is always important. Treat stakeholders to dinner or send them a
company newsletter. Reciprocity will create the ultimate “win-win” situation for both
stakeholders and your company.
Responsibility. Being responsible means keeping promises to stakeholders while
achieving high standards of organizational management and decision making. In order to
ensure a trusted brand, company representatives need to make sure they meet client
deadlines and put client needs first – that way there is no discernible gap between promise
and delivery.
Reporting. Organizations should communicate internal developments to their publics
when they can. For instance, in a crisis communication, it is extremely important to report
to publics what is actually happening. A more in-depth explanation about the crisis and
how the organization will address it is better than an unclear response.
Relationship Nurturing. Organizations will be most successful when they focus on both
taking care of existing stakeholders and fostering relationships with new stakeholders.
Customer appreciation events are a great way to show existing stakeholders that an
organization cares. By employing these four elements in interactions with current clients,
partners, reporters and key audiences, organizations not only build a trustworthy business,
but also find management valuing strong relationships with those people who work for the
company.

These five dimensions are one common form of assessment for an organization’s adherence to
best practices in public relations practice. While this author is aware the modern public relations
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was still in its infancy or adolescence, it is of value to see how the practices adopted in this
early stage of public relations may have ultimately shaped modern practices and set the
foundation for how public relations are now practiced a century later. With the theoretical
basis for assessing public relations practices in the Four Minute Men campaign identified, the
method by which the Four Minute Men Campaign will be assessed.

Method
Method of Study
To answer the two questions posited in this study, the author performed a case analysis of
scholarship and reporting on the work of the CPI’s Four Minute Men Bureaus to document the
daily operations, decision making, and execution of the campaign process. This is particularly
valuable for determining organizational commitment to each step in the ROPES model (Kelly,
1998). In addition, the author reviewed electronic archives of the Four Minute Men Bulletins from
1917-1919. They are housed as part of the University of Colorado Boulder’s Department of
Archives World War I Pamphlets Collection and open to the public. The author used the bulletins
to ascertain what evaluation was in place for the Four Minute Men membership and how they may
have used that evaluation to adapt practices throughout the 18 months of work to shape public
opinion. While the author would have liked to also review existing copies of Four Minute Men
speeches as part of his analysis, it quickly became clear how fundamentally committed to
extemporaneous speech the organization was, as only a few sample speeches appear to have
survived.
Method of Analysis
The researcher employed a hybridization of Berkowitz’s (1997b) approach to qualitative data
analysis, facilitated with NVivo 9 qualitative analysis software. Using Nvivo, the researcher loaded
the pool of data into the software and performed the coding process using Berkowitz’s (1997b)
approach: each piece data file was read twice carefully, audio recordings were played while
reading through each of the transcripts, and a broad initial coding of emergent themes was
performed. NVivo expedites the process by permitting consolidation of large bodies of diverse
text-rich research data into one central location where the researcher can more efficiently classify,
sort and arrange information; examine relationships within the data; and combine analysis with
linking, shaping, searching, and modeling (Nvivo 9, 2011).
Result
In this review of the documented practices of the Four Minute Men, the results present a mix of
practices that reflect an early interpretation of public relations work. The following will provide
analysis of each step in the ROPES model of public relations practices (Kelly, 1998) to facilitate
a clear breakdown of practice.
Research Stage: Kelly (1998) advocates the use of research to better understand the organization,
to identify publics, opportunities, and stakeholders associated with the organization and the
opportunities associated with the campaign. What is clear about the approach of the CPI and its
Four Minute Men is an absence of primary research prior to action. Decisions were largely based
on inferential logic and the collective wisdom of journalists, advertisers, public relations
practitioners, politicians, and social scientists (Axelrod, 2009). That said, the team working to
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develop the plan for the Four Minute Man campaign made sound decisions on audience
based on what they knew about the American public. This is not inconsistent with many
modern practitioners who have to engage in strategy and tactics with minimal research due
to a lack of resources (Kelly, 1998). In short, there is limited evidence of advanced research in
practice, which doesn’t reflect the modern definition of best practices in public relations.
Objectives Stage: As is the case in examining research, there is limited data suggesting a clear set
of goals and objectives that reflect best practices in public relations. While there is a broad goal or
objective behind the Four Minute Men campaign, there is no clear articulation of a particular goal,
followed by the use of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, timely, and sufficient (SMARTS)
objectives (Ledingham, 2006). This poses problems later when we get to the evaluation step in the
process. While there is clearly a logic to the strategic approach, and the desired end is clear, the
approach of the Four Minute Men and the CPI is one that remained largely inferential.
Programming Stage: A consistent theme in the foundation of the CPI is the cooptation of good
ideas that can be of potential service to the war effort. It is apparent in how George Creel gets
support from Wilson to establish his committee, how Creel adds new areas of focus to his
propaganda effort, and in how Creel embraces the Four Minute Men campaign as part of the CPI’s
function (Axelron, 2009; Creel, 1920). While a reflection of the desperation to shape public
opinion, it is clearly not a decision couched in research. It is clearly not a plan devised of a body
of research devoted to the war effort. In this regard, WWI practices are not in keeping with the
modern definition of programming in public relations (Kelly, 1998).
This step does, however, help modern practitioners see a targeted approach to connecting with
necessary audiences, to tailor messages to those audiences, to utilize community leaders and
celebrities to deliver the message, and to see a more effective impact than other approaches.
Inasmuch as the decision-making and actions of the Four Minute Men lack the research to drive
the decision, the antecedent provided an effective example that set the tone for modern best
practices in programming, with the benefit of time and additional scholarship. In fact, the approach
of the Four Minute Men was a clear example of opinion leader theory and the two-step flow of
communication (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) at work in influencing opinion and behavior.
Evaluation Stage: Kelly (1998) identifies multiple means of evaluation in public relations work.
Summative evaluation offers an examination of the effectiveness of the campaign after the work
is complete. In reviewing the work of the Four Minute Men campaign, it is clear that nothing
summative was planned or conducted to allow for a review of outcomes. The possible exceptions
to this are Creel’s (1920) reflections on the work of the CPI and the Four Minute Men campaign,
and the direct report of the Committee on Public Information (1920). It is clear in reflection that
Bernays (1923; 1928) offered his own anecdotal evidence of the successes of the CPI, as well.
Kelly (1998) is also clear that effective evaluation should be aligned with a clear set of measurable
objectives. As noted previously, the work of the Four Minute Men campaign lacked objectives that
met this standard, so it falls short of best practices in modern public relations.
An interesting element of the Four Minute Men campaign that points to a clear precursor to
incremental evaluation (Watson & Noble, 2007) are the Four Minute Men Bulletins published and
distributed throughout the life of the campaign. The updates on achievements provided early
justification of effectiveness of the campaign process. The bulletins also offered examples of
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rhetorical approaches from members that both succeeded and failed. In the process of
offering these examples, the bulletins also offered advice on how to adapt messages and
approaches to leverage those successes and avoid the failures. In this way, as in incremental
evaluation, the Four Minute Man worked to help practitioners improve and adapt messages to each
public effectively over the life of the campaign. In addition, the bulletins provided notice of
emerging concerns, akin to boundary scanning (Fearn-Banks, 2016).
Stewardship: In this final regard, it is clear that stewardship is not the focus of the campaign. This
is understandable given public relation’s relative infancy. The work of the CPI reflected a topdown, one-way approach to communication that emphasized pushing out messages and
information in an effort to influence the public without regard to the interests of audience. In many
respects, this is largely due to the fact that modern public relations did not think in terms of
relationships until the work of Ferguson (1984), Grunig & Hunt (1984), and Ledingham &
Bruning, 1998), which emphasizes enduring, mutually beneficial relationships in public relations
work. Interestingly, given the volume of Four Minute Men campaign messages around Liberty
Loan drives, rationing, donor drives, and other philanthropic efforts, the campaign could have
benefitted from Kelly’s (2001) emphasis on effective development strategies and its added
dimensions of stewardship.

Discussion
Literature already tells us that the CPI was an engine for modernization of practices and a better
understanding of the potential influence of journalism, advertising, and public relations on the
individual mindset and actions of citizens (Axelrod, 2009; Mastrangelo, 2009). While the present
paper draws connections to practices adopted by the CPI and Four Minute Men that helped set the
foundation for modern public relations practices, it is clear that the evolution of best practices is
the result of study of adopted practices during public relations infancy and adolescence.
Additionally, reflecting on modern campaigns has ensured the continued progression of modern
professionalism.
The need for this approach to study the discipline and refine practice becomes clear when one
considers the darkest consequences of the writings of one CPI member: Edward Bernays. In
Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) and Propaganda (1928), Bernays offered a callous picture of
the public and the ability of mass communication and persuasion to manipulate public opinion to
meet a government’s needs. These texts proved to be the stars of Joseph Goebbels personal library,
and he leveraged the lessons learned to instigate a shift in public opinion that gave rise to fascism
in Germany, dehumanization of ethnic groups and minorities, and the impetus for the Holocaust
(Bernays, 1965).
Deep reflection on this led Bernays to work to professionalize the discipline and push for greater
rigor in education and practice. His efforts in the discipline and in the classroom also helped give
rise to the Public Relations Society of America and the Public Relations Student Society of
America. His commitment to professionalization set in motion the fields of study in best practices,
ethics, and philosophy that strive to make perceptions of the field more positive.
While the Four Minute Men campaign offers an example of a clear public relations antecedent,
like most antecedents, it offers glimpses of best practices to be institutionalized, but not the whole
picture (Cutlip, 2013). This could only come from the continual self-reflection on practice that
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enables modern practitioners to better themselves and the practice as individuals and as part
of the larger discipline. Without this self-reflection, the practice of public relations runs the
risk of future grave consequences. As such, it is worth looking back at these examples and
at current work to assess not only effectiveness of practice, but the integrity of each action.
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Oshkosh on the Home Front:
Activities and Attitudes During World War I
Amy Elizabeth Fels
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
The outbreak of World War I not only ushered in a new era of military technology and strategy,
but introduced the notion of a total war as well. For the first time, citizens’ contributions away
from the front lines were just as vital to victory as the direct actions of soldiers and military
personnel engaged in combat. In both Europe and the United States, home fronts developed and
stood as testament to citizens’ voluntary and government-imposed adjustments to life during the
war. While such activities are often discussed on a broader, national scale, local impacts were also
significant. Once the United States joined the war in 1917, for example, home front activities in
the city of Oshkosh, Wisconsin dramatically increased and reflected a committed desire by a vast
majority of community members to promote a strong sense of patriotic duty and support the war
effort through a wide variety of direct and indirect activities that became part of their everyday
existence.
While by no means entirely exhaustive, the Oshkosh Daily Northwestern serves as the foundational
source for generating a comprehensive understanding of the atmosphere of Oshkosh’s home front
during WWI. Founded in 1860 and published daily from 1868 onward, the Daily Northwestern
soon developed a reputation for being the city’s largest and most respected paper for local,
national, and international news.1 Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, the paper became the
first in Wisconsin outside of Milwaukee to have a direct connection to the Associated Press over
its news wires, which published a 12,000 to 15,000 word report each day. The Daily Northwestern
was under the trusted leadership of O.J. Hardy come the beginning of WWI in 1914; Hardy began
his career with the paper as a carrier while still a boy and continued to advance his position until
he was placed in charge of the entire paper in 1905.2 Given that the Daily Northwestern was
Oshkosh residents’ primary newspaper, in conjunction with the fact that it was regarded as a
credible source of information, its coverage of WWI events abroad likely influenced the city’s
overall attitude toward the war. Conversely, the Daily Northwestern thoroughly reported the home
front activities that occurred in Oshkosh during WWI and thus provides a uniquely direct
perspective in regards to understanding the attitude of the city’s populace throughout the duration
of the conflict.
Although interest in the European conflict seems to have been relatively high prior to the United
States entering WWI, evidence of widespread home front activity in Oshkosh is minimal in
comparison. The headlines of the Daily Northwestern are filled with updates concerning the
1
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tenuous conditions in Europe and almost immediately present a negative characterization of
Germany as an aggressor. Following Germany’s declaration of war in August 1914, the
Daily Northwestern featured an image of Kaiser Wilhelm II on the front page under the caption
“Europe’s War Lord Strikes,”3 though the paper “refrained from running the lurid and false
portrayals” of the Kaiser or other Germans that were common among WWI propaganda.4 Yet
beyond the first page, discussion of the war is almost entirely subsumed by articles of both serious
and frivolous domestic concerns, like changing campaign laws for Wisconsin congressmen and
senators or a trip taken to Madison by a team of Oshkosh sailboat racers.5 The one column of
interest regarding local reaction to the outbreak of the war is found near the end of the August 3rd
issue. In light of what was likely to be a deadly war, several local Protestant pastors offered prayers
and hopeful sentiments that peace may be reached before any real fighting need occur, while the
pastor of the city’s Christ Lutheran church expressed hope that “victory would again be given to
Germany” without “the causing of too much suffering.”6 This article presents a twofold interest.
One, it provides evidence of early sympathy among the extensive German-American community
in Oshkosh; Winnebago County, in which Oshkosh is located, had the third-highest concentration
of German-born citizens in 1920.7 The sympathetic sentiment is then contrasted with the paper’s
description of Wilhelm II as a “war lord” and lays the foundation for nuanced ethnic tensions
within the city’s population exhibited later in the war. Two, it indicates a local desire to avoid
conflict that will also further manifest itself later during WWI as the possibility of the United States
entering the war became more likely.
Further evidence of an active German-American population present in Oshkosh is also seen a few
months after WWI began, indicated by a local chapter of the German-American Association’s call
for donations for “the relief of widows and soldiers in Germany and Austria” in December 1914.8
Beyond this, however, the absence of advertisements or articles in the newspaper issues asking
for donations toward war relief efforts suggests that Oshkosh’s home front was generally
nonexistent during the beginning stages of the war. Although reports of the European conflict in
the Daily Northwestern became commonplace as the fighting overseas escalated and continued,
they retained a fairly objective tone before 1917. Instead, greater concern was often directed
toward the Mexican border conflict that occurred in 1916, as the Wisconsin National Guard was

3

Oshkosh Daily Northwestern (Oshkosh, WI), August 3, 1914, Accessed November 13, 2016, Access
Newspaper Archive, p. 1.

4

Michael J. Goc, Oshkosh at 150: An Illustrated History of Oshkosh, (New Past Press Inc, 2003), 117.

5

Oshkosh Daily Northwestern (Oshkosh, WI), August 3, 1914, Accessed November 13, 2016, Access
Newspaper Archive, p. 4.

6

“Prayers for Peace,” Ibid., p.10.

7

Paul W. Glad, The History of Wisconsin: War, a New Era, and Depression 1914-1940, ed. William Fletch
Thompson, vol. V (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1990), 13.

8

“War Relief Fund Grows,” Oshkosh Daily Northwestern (Oshkosh, WI), December 3, 1914, Accessed
November 13, 2016, Access Newspaper Archive, p. 14.
2A1–2

PAPER 2A1 – AMY ELIZABETH FELS

mobilized in June and sent south to take part in the fighting.9 Disappointment was even felt
in Oshkosh when it was announced that General C.R. Boardman, a native of the city who
took part in the 1898 Spanish-American War, was not to be placed in charge of the newly
mobilized troops.10
However, as the conflict in Mexico ended with the close of 191611 and the threat of entering the
world war became more prominent in the opening weeks of 1917, the individuals behind the Daily
Northwestern became more vocal in their desire for neutrality, writing that “it [the United States]
safely may pass through this crisis without becoming involved in the war maelstrom is the sincere
hope of every patriotic citizen.”12 Similarly, while the paper does not outrightly criticize President
Wilson’s plan to “establish world peace on a permanent basis,” its tone suggests a subtle reluctance
to “abandon its [the United States’s] time-honored policies of isolation and rejection of tangling
alliances.”13 The limitations of the evidence provided by the Daily Northwestern must be
acknowledged since it offers merely one perspective and is therefore not exhaustive, but it
nevertheless suggests that the city of Oshkosh and its citizens, at least in part, were in no rush to
join WWI. Such an apparent commitment to neutrality in January of 1917 is starkly contrasted by
the explosion of home front activities in support of the war effort that occurred once the United
States formally entered WWI in April and perhaps makes Oshkosh’s significant efforts all the
more noteworthy.
To better understand Oshkosh’s extensive home front activities, the city is best considered as a
microcosm of enthusiasm within an equally active state. By April 12, 1917, less than a week after
the United States declared war, Wisconsin became the first state in the country to organize a state
council for defense in accordance with the federal government’s request.14 Not only was
Wisconsin’s state council extensively praised and its organization recommended as a model for
other states, Wisconsin was also one of the first states to create additional county and city defense
councils.15 In several other instances, Wisconsin proved itself to be a banner state in regards to
successful home front activities. Not only did Wisconsin institute a number of liberty loan drives
in which quotas were greatly exceeded, but it also became the first state to organize “state and
county history commissions to preserve records” of the wartime activities. Furthermore, Wisconsin
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introduced the now-familiar ideas of ‘wheatless’ and ‘meatless’ days that were later adopted
and instituted nationwide.16
However, there also existed a darker side to Wisconsin home front activities that must be addressed
in addition to the state’s more positive war effort contributions. Increased Red Cross donations or
other volunteer activities cannot erase the existence of anti-German sentiment or nearly fanatic
patriotism that prevailed in many areas across the state and manifested itself through organizations
like the American Protective League and the Loyalty Legion. The A.P.L. was technically a
vigilante organization operated by volunteers but was given official consent by the Department of
Justice to take action against individuals thought to be pacifists, German sympathizers or spies, or
harboring anti-war ideas that posed an apparent threat to the American war effort. Members often
intimidated, harassed, or spied on their suspects, a vast majority of whom were perfectly ordinary
and innocent citizens.17 Similarly, the Loyalty Legion, another voluntary patriotic organization,
also sought to eliminate disloyalty during WWI and punish those found guilty in addition to
promoting more innocuous activities like Red Cross efforts or Liberty Loan drives.18 Altogether,
the broader themes that seemed to characterize Wisconsin’s statewide home front, both the genuine
and the ethically questionable, also occurred in Oshkosh and thus creates a multifaceted image of
the city’s WWI home front efforts.
Returning then to the specific home front sentiments and activities within the city of Oshkosh that
contributed to the greater state atmosphere, the world war that was once to be entirely avoided if
possible suddenly became a “fight for all humanity” in which the “democracy of the world [was]
to be vindicated” after the United States declared war on April 6, 1917.19 Patriotism no longer
meant hoping to maintain neutrality. Instead, it meant mobilizing the home front as quickly as
possible so as to provide the greatest contributions to the American war effort. The people of
Oshkosh responded with a similar level of urgency found at the state level and held a large parade
in a show of “intense patriotism” on April 27, 1917. Approximately 15,000 people participated
while others watched the paraders march through the city streets.20 A few weeks later, by the
middle of May, the Daily Northwestern featured an intensely patriotic poem titled “The Voice of
Washington” that called for Americans to “strike for the altars of freedom” and “strike at barbarian
coils.” to “finish the work” George Washington had begun in the American Revolution.21 The
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same issue also published advertisements urging Oshkosh citizens to “Do your bit” and join
the expanding Oshkosh chapter of the Red Cross that had been formally organized in
October of 1916.22
The Oshkosh chapter of the Red Cross was one of the city’s most active home front groups on the
during the war. On July 14, 1917, the Red Cross presented 371 comfort kits to members of the
local National Guard companies soon to go into federal service. These kits consisted of cloth bags
sewn by Oshkosh women and were filled with personal items such as toothbrushes, writing paper
and envelopes, and soap. 23 Nearly five hundred more of these kits would be sent out just before
Christmas of the same year.24 Later into the summer, the Red Cross also established itself inside a
local school and continued to knit and sew items for soldiers or hospitals from scraps of yarn and
cloth. Women of all ages were involved in the work, and young children were often assigned to
sorting the pieces of fabric, indicating that Oshkosh’s home front efforts were not confined to one
age demographic.25 In addition to creating tangible aid for soldiers, local Red Cross members also
hosted fundraisers to finance their activities. One such reception hosted in Omro to celebrate New
Year’s Day raised nearly one hundred dollars for the Red Cross fund26 and highlights the dual
purpose of social interactions that emerged as part of the war effort.
Social events during WWI were no longer simply recreational gatherings; they also became an
additional way for individuals to show their support for their country and local servicemen, as
evidenced by a local dance advertised as a “Patriotic May Ball” a little more than a month after
war was declared.27 A variety of dances, concerts, and parties continued to be promoted in the
Daily Northwestern under the auspices of patriotism throughout the war. These dances and
concerts were hosted by both organized groups and individuals, further indicating that the desire
to contribute to the home front effort was widely disseminated among Oshkosh citizens. The July
3rd issue of the paper, for example, features an advertisement for a “Patriotic Ball” hosted by the
“Co. B Boys” at one of the city armories.28 By comparison, in May 1918, tickets were sold to the
public for a concert held in the home of Edgar Sawyer, a prominent and wealthy Oshkosh citizen,
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to raise money for overseas hospitals.29 A large number of such patriotic dances or concerts
took place in Oshkosh during WWI, particularly around holidays, and suggests that they
were both popular forms of entertainment and effective means to raise funds for the war effort.
In addition to the familiar notion of hosting an entertaining event to raise money or the
recognizable name of the Red Cross, several other groups emerged during WWI that played a
significant role in forming Oshkosh’s homefront, both in terms of attitude and activity. In July
1917, the Daily Northwestern featured a lengthy column calling for the teenage boys of Winnebago
County to join the Boys’ Working Reserve, a national service organization designed to give boys
at home the chance to “show their loyalty” and feel “they have done their part in these strenuous
times.” The column does not detail the type of work the boys would do but instead emphasizes the
privileges of gaining accredited membership, like receiving awards and badges.30 Girls in Oshkosh
were also active on the home front and given recognition for their efforts. The Oshkosh Girls’
Club, according to the local paper, worked closely with the Red Cross and hosted classes to teach
girls to knit and make surgical dressings.31 The presence of both the Boys’ Reserve and the Girls’
Club in Oshkosh indicates that community members of all ages were involved in the war effort.
Additionally, the newspaper’s attention to their activities suggests that the city was proud to
publicize their work and strengthens the notion that a strong patriotic sentiment prevailed
throughout Oshkosh even as the war continued with no real end in sight.
Furthermore, groups like the Oshkosh Food Conservation Committee published recipes in the
Daily Northwestern and hosted educational events regarding the importance of not wasting food
in wartime or how to go about substituting ingredients that were in short supply.32 The local chapter
of the Loyalty Legion held meetings and organized door-to-door pledge drives designed to
generate patriotic support and determine who in the city posed an anti-American threat to the war
effort. Individuals who refused to sign the pledge or give money to the various war efforts in
Oshkosh were summarily characterized by both the Daily Northwestern and local citizens as
“exhibiting socialistic tendencies” or “disloyalty and pro-Germanism.”33 In a similar vein, the
Oshkosh chapter of the American Protective League consisted of over one hundred men
determined to eradicate local German propaganda and sympathizers. Between 1917 and 1918,
more than three hundred reports were filed with the national government, but the overwhelming
majority of these accusations were unfounded and unfruitful.34 The simultaneous existence of
29
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these three groups exhibits the wide range of war effort activities that occurred in Oshkosh
during WWI and contributes to the complexity of the overall image of the city’s home front.
The Food Conservation Committee, on one hand, discouraged wastefulness and encouraged
resourcefulness, a mentality that would still be considered positive and beneficial for a community
today as it was thought to be in Oshkosh during the war. Conversely, though the Loyalty Legion
and the American Protective League were heralded as patriotic during WWI, their actions were in
reality discriminatory and their methods often invasive. It is important to note this dichotomy,
because to celebrate the aspects of home front efforts that generate a positive image of Oshkosh
but ignore the darker, more uncomfortable activities would be revisionist and dishonest.
Apart from highly publicized social events and larger group contributions, a variety of other home
front activities occurred in Oshkosh that indicate how support for the war effort also became
ingrained into the community in smaller, less ostentatious ways. The Oshkosh Normal School
raised several hundred dollars from within its own student body for the local YMCA chapter’s war
work and unveiled a service flag commemorating the seventeen students and two teachers who
had left the school to join the military.35 The Oshkosh Equitable Fraternal Union dedicated a
similar commemorative flag in July 1918.36 Able-bodied men who remained in Oshkosh registered
for volunteer farmwork positions outside the city that had been vacated by men leaving for military
service.37 A local department store yarn advertisement featured an offer for a free booklet of
knitting patterns to encourage women to make sweaters or other articles of clothing for army and
naval servicemen.38 The wide variety of the events covered and advertisements published in the
Daily Northwestern suggests that the opportunities offered to contribute to the war effort or the
patriotic mentality that was advanced to encourage such contributions were made accessible all
members of the community, which is perhaps what made Oshkosh’s home front so active and
effective, whether positively or negatively. The city’s mobilization of its home front was thorough
and its calls to support the war effort omnipresent.
On the whole, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the entrance of the United States into
WWI catalyzed the emergence of intense patriotic sentiment and a flurry of home front activity in
Oshkosh that persisted throughout the remaining duration of the war. Though by no means
exhaustive, the extensive coverage and promotion of these home front efforts by the Oshkosh Daily
Northwestern suggests that they were widespread and affected the entire Oshkosh community.
Whether through direct work with organizations like the Red Cross and the Loyalty Legion or
more subtle efforts such as planting gardens and attending fundraising parties, the people of
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Oshkosh, whatever their motivations, proudly committed themselves to supporting
American victory in World War I.
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‘Lest We Forget’:
Remembering World War I in Wisconsin, 1919-1945
Leslie A. Bellais
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Within months of America’s entrance into World War I, Wisconsin became labeled the “Traitor
State,” an epithet it did not manage to shake while the war was being fought. The editor of the
Louisville Courier-Journal (Kentucky) may have been the first to describe the state in such a way,
when in a July 17, 1917 editorial he asked, “Will Wisconsin be known when the war is over as the
Traitor State?”1 The national belief in Wisconsin’s disloyalty peaked in the Spring of 1918, at the
time of a contentious state election. Evidence of the state’s position could be seen in comments
from the Montgomery Advertiser (Alabama) describing the state as “the American hotbed of
disloyalty,” the Los Angeles Times declaring, “There is probably more disloyalty per square foot
in Wisconsin than anywhere else in the country,” and the Washington Post thinking, “There may
be few spots as intensely pro-German as there are in Wisconsin.”2
Those who held the view that Wisconsin had a loyalty problem usually cited three reasons for their
perception. First and foremost were the state’s national representatives, who had overwhelmingly
voted against America’s entrance into the European War. When Congress voted on April 6, 1917,
one of Wisconsin’s two senators and nine of its eleven representatives voted to keep the United
States out of the war, a stance many viewed as unpatriotic. The state’s senior senator, Robert M.
La Follette, continued to irritate self-described patriots by maintaining America should have stayed
out of the war even after the vote. By the end of 1917, he had become identified as the most
disloyal, unpatriotic American in the nation. Secondly, Wisconsin had an active Socialist party,
which, like La Follette, had not supported America’s entrance into the war. Finally, Wisconsin had
a large, vocal, and politically-active German-American population, who did not want the United
States to go to war with its homeland.
In response to this perception of Wisconsin as a place rife with treason and disloyalty, a number
of citizens throughout the state, but mainly in Milwaukee, made a concerted attempt to change the
message. Historians have called those who pushed an extreme version of patriotism during World
War I “super patriots” or “hyper-patriots,” my preferred term. In Wisconsin, hyper-patriotic groups
generally consisted of those who identified as Stalwart Republicans (rather than Progressive

1

“The Traitor State,” Louisville Courier-Journal (Kentucky) as published in Princeton Daily Democrat
(Indiana), July 17, 1917, 2.

2

“The Situation in Wisconsin,” Montgomery Advertiser (Alabama), April 19, 1918, 4; “The Heroic Hour,”
Washington Post, May 18, 1918; “Wisconsin’s Bolsheviki,” Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1918, II, 4.

2A2–1

PAPER 2A2 – LESLIE A. BELLAIS
Republicans, La Follette’s party), had a New
England or New York pedigree, and considered
themselves business or professional men. In 1917,
Wisconsin’s hyper-patriots formed the Wisconsin
Loyalty Legion, a voluntary organization created
to clear Wisconsin’s name, primarily by replacing
disloyal national representatives with loyal ones.
In March 1918, the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion
created a map showing “Where Disloyalty in
Wisconsin Chiefly Centres.” This “Sedition Map,”
which was published in the New York Sun, used
statistics from the U.S. Senate primary held on
March 19, 1917. The shaded areas refer to places
that voted for a candidate supported by La Follette.
Besides using shame and embarrassment to
control wayward Wisconsinites, hyper-patriots
also used coercive tactics to bring the disloyal into
line and became more violent as the war
progressed.
After such a tumultuous experience and charged
atmosphere, how would the war be remembered,
commemorated,
and
acknowledged
by
Wisconsinites during the interwar years?

Figure 1. The Kaiser pinning Robert La Follette with Iron
Cross Medals. (Cover of Life Magazine, December 13,
1917. Wisconsin Historical Society Image ID 3272)

While Wisconsin’s World War I story may have
been unique, the desire by powerful Wisconsinites,
usually the hyper-patriots, to control war memories
in the succeeding decades was probably duplicated
in many states around the country. Americans
tended toward three main sites of war memory:
publications, monuments & memorials, and
Armistice Day events. One message repeated
throughout each of these forums: “Lest We
Forget.” World War I saw more death than any
previous conflict. All this death had to mean
something. As a result, Americans were exhorted
not to forget the sacrifices made for the war’s
purposes as stated by President Wilson,
specifically to make the world safe for democracy
and to make this the war to end all wars.

Publications
Wisconsin’s leaders made every attempt to help
Wisconsinites remember or at least not forget. On
July 22, 1919, Wisconsin’s governor authorized

Figure 2. Sedition Map created by the Wisconsin Loyalty
Legion. New York Sun, March 21, 1918
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the creation of the Wisconsin War History Commission with the purpose “to provide for a
memorial history of the part taken by the State of Wisconsin and its citizens” in the Great
War.3 Legislation for this commission required that it publish two books: one on the homefront
and another on the state’s soldiers, sailors, and marines.4 The Commission actually produced three
books: one on the military and two “designed to give a general historical survey of the part taken
by the state and its citizens” during the war. Wisconsin journalists R.B. Pixley and Fred Holmes
wrote the latter two books, which were mainly descriptive and avoided mentioning Wisconsin’s
disloyalty issues, except in the subtitle of Pixley’s book, Wisconsin in the World War, where he
noted he was “…Giving in Part the Record of a Loyal State…” Pixley and Holmes downplayed
the disagreements and divisiveness that pervaded the state during the war and instead portrayed
Wisconsin as having a unified mission. Holmes in his book, Wisconsin’s War Record, even wrote
that the war years were a time when “men of all racial [ethnic] extractions coalesced and became
one.”5
Milwaukee’s hyper-patriots did not believe the state-produced books went far enough, so they
published their own book, Wisconsin in the Great War, to leave a record of the disloyalty, treason,
and lack of patriotism they had been up against. Wheeler Bloodgood, a lawyer and leading

3

Minutes of the Wisconsin War History Commission, 1919-1922, Series 1692, Wisconsin Historical Society
(WHS).

4

“Proposed Program for Organizing War History Committees and Collection Material,” Wisconsin War
History Commission (WWHC), general correspondence, 1918-1925, Series 1693, Box 1, Miscellaneous
folder, WHS.

5

Fred L. Holmes, Wisconsin’s War Record (Madison, WI: Capital Historical Publishing Co.), 180.
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Milwaukee hyper-patriot dispensed with the sense of
unity mentioned in the official state books and wrote that
Milwaukee had been “a hotbed for German
propaganda…and an active field for Socialist agitators
and haranguers.”6 Another contributor spoke of the
“notable strides [made] in the eradication …of strong,
deep-seated racial ties.” Although, he did not mention
how this was done.7
A manuscript, “War Hysteria,” written in the early 1930s
by a friend of Senator La Follette, attempted to correct
the history of Wisconsin’s war years as provided by the
state and hyper-patriots with information about the ugly
tactics used to eradicate ethnic ties and bring those
perceived as disloyal into line. The author left money in
his will to have it published, but that never happened.8

Monuments and Memorial Buildings
Mass-produced memorial statues had “cluttered” town
3. Wheeler Bloodgood, Milwaukee Hypersquares and battlefields after the Civil War and Figure
Patriot. August 13, 1921. Wisconsin Historical
government officials around the country wanted to avoid Society Image ID 60818.
this mistake after the Great War ended. The question
became what should a fitting monument or memorial be? In February 1919, the Wisconsin War
History Commission may have been the first to publish a document on this matter, the pamphlet
“Concerning War Memorials.”9 Historian G. Kurt Piehler in Remembering War the American Way
has suggested that the rush to build monuments may have been the method local leaders used “to
camouflage the divisions created by the war. They wanted Americans to expiate their doubts, and
sometimes their guilt, about this ambiguous conflict.”10

6

Wheeler P. Bloodgood, “The Wisconsin Defense League,” Wisconsin in the Great War (Milwaukee: Press
Publicity Bureau, 1919), 5.

7

Wheeler P. Bloodgood, “The Wisconsin Defense League,” Wisconsin in the Great War (Milwaukee: Press
Publicity Bureau, 1919), 5.

8

Henry A. Huber, “War Hysteria,” unpublished manuscript, 40-41, Henry A. Huber papers, Box 15, WHS.

9

Wisconsin War History Commission, “Concerning War Memorials, Bulletin No. 4” (Madison: The
Committee, 1919). The pamphlet mentions “the experience we have had in connection with our
memorials of the Civil War affords numerous illustrations of the pitfalls which lie in the path of the
American community which resolves to erect a memorial to its soldier dead” (p. 1).

10

G. Kurt Piehler, Remembering War the American Way (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1995), 94.
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Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has
suggested that monuments and
buildings give permanence to
important, but fleeting events, like
wars.11 World War I monuments
were also closely tied to the idea of
American
heritage
and
mythmaking. Their main story
focused on the war as an American
victory and the American military
as saviors of a victimized Europe.
Europeans were generally left out
of the story. Wisconsin’s war
monuments fell into this mold by
centering on a mythologized
patriotic story of soldier bravery
and citizen unity, and on an Figure 4. Soldier-Sailor Memorial, Manitowoc, Wisconsin. Courtesy of
American democratic narrative. Manitowoc County Historical Society.
At the unveiling of the SoldierSailor Memorial in Manitowoc, a speaker noted that the monument “will be…a shrine at which
every lover of his country may kneel and worship.”12
Many of Wisconsin’s World War I monuments were built during the 1920s with 1923 being the
peak year. In every case their stated purpose was to honor the war dead. At the unveiling of the
Merrill cenotaph, for example, one speaker noted the monument allowed Merrill to show “its
appreciation to our war heroes” better than Memorial Day, which was only once a year, while the
cenotaph “will carry the observance 365 days in the year.” At the public event for the Manitowoc
monument, another speaker stated its purpose was to remind the public “of the soldiers who went
forth to battle and the sailors who faced both battle and storm to preserve this constitutional
government.”13
Communities around the country wanted to do more than build statues and monuments that
commemorated the war dead. They wanted to express its ideals and purpose by building memorial
buildings dedicated to servicing the community, veterans in particular, and promoting
humanitarianism. Historian James Mayo has noted that the best memorial buildings were places

11

James M. Mayo, War Memorials as Political Landscape: The American Experience and Beyond (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 11.

12

“Memorial Dedicated,” Manitowoc Pilot, November 15, 1923, WWHC, Clipping files, 1917-1945, Series
1701, Box 5, folder 1/2, WHS.

13

“Lest We Keep on Forgetting,” Manitowoc Herald-News, May 26, 1923, WWHC, Clipping files, Series
1701, Box 5, folder 2/2, WHS.
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“where people can conceive that human betterment be
presented.”14 A number of Wisconsin communities created
war memorials for the improvement of humanity,
primarily humanity living nearby. Parks were popular,
since they improved the urban environment. Of the
Menasha Community Building, the Milwaukee Journal
wrote, it was not just “a statue of a soldier…but a
community building dedicated to the soldiers and sailors
of the World war and established for the use of citizens of
today.”15 Planners of other buildings, like the University of
Wisconsin’s Memorial Union, quickly learned they could
raise money more easily if they labelled it a “memorial”
building.

Armistice Day Events
With the announcement of armistice on November 11,
1918, spontaneous parades, celebrations, and parties
occurred throughout America, including Wisconsin. The
Milwaukee Journal described the day as one when “the
pent-up feelings of the people broke loose in a celebration

Figure 5. University of Wisconsin Memorial
Union, 1932. Wisconsin Historical Society
Image ID 57993.

Figure 6. World War I Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Memorial Building, Menasha, 1985. Wisconsin Historical Society
Architecture and History Inventory, #60669.

14

Mayo, 7-8.

15

Milwaukee Journal, 1928.
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that is unforgettable.”16 For
the next eighteen years (19191937),
Americans
often
celebrated and honored the
anniversary, even though it
was not an official holiday.
Armistice Day anniversaries
not only provided Americans
with a chance to remember the
sacrifices of the country’s
soldiers and sailors in a public
and interactive way, they also
became a forum where the
meaning of the war could be
discussed. Over time a fitting
and proper format evolved that
included blowing whistles and Figure 7. Armistice Day Parade in Menomonie, Wisconsin. November 11, 1918.
ringing church bells in the Wisconsin Historical Society Image ID 103411.
minutes before 11:00am when
activities suddenly ceased and quiet reigned for one to two minutes. Followed by singing, parades,
and speeches. In 1938 Armistice Day became an official federal holiday.
The year 1921 may have seen the peak of unofficial Armistice Day celebrations. In any case, it
was definitely memorable. President Harding declared Armistice Day 1921 a national holiday in
observance of burying the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery. The American

Figure 8. Presidents Harding and Wilson honor the Unknown Soldier grave in Arlington, Virginia, November 11,
1921. Literary Digest, November 26, 1921.

16

“Armistice Day,” Milwaukee Journal, November 8, 1919, 6.
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Legion noted that year “that interest in the proper observation of the new American holiday
is widespread.”17
After 1921, a fear arose that Americans were forgetting war sacrifices. A speaker at the 1922
Armistice Day celebration in La Crosse, for example, spoke of the “dangers of forgetfulness.”
“Last year,” he continued, “Armistice Day meant something…Beautiful exercises were held over
the body of the Unknown Soldier…This year is somewhat different.”18
Armistice Day, because it was ephemeral, could be molded to new societal needs, political
situations, and community desires. The rhetoric spoken around this day revealed how discussion
of war memories changed over time, especially as the world’s political climate changed. In 1922,
the Beloit News noted, “We have descended from the high peaks into the valleys of disappointment
and indifference. This is the fault of the cynics and the scoffers. Let us highly resolve today that
[our soldiers] did not die in vain.”19 But by 1930, the Milwaukee Journal, a major voice of the
hyper-patriots during the war years, wondered, “Where are we after twelve years? Alarmed by
world depression in a world we fear may catch fire. . . . Afraid and more than half convinced that
all these dead died in vain.”20 Finally in 1945, the Milwaukee Journal believed, “This is not a day
of rejoicing. This day marks the anniversary of broken promises and shattered dreams.”21 As World
War II ended, Armistice Day reminded Americans of failure, not of a proud heritage. Many thought
the glories previously celebrated on Armistice Day were best forgotten along with the war. To help
forget its existence, the federal government changed its name to Veterans Day in 1954.
In Wisconsin there was little connection between the way the war was experienced and the way it
was remembered. Once the war ended, the hyper-patriots tried to control the war history narrative.
They managed, as much as possible, to expunge any blemish of treason or un-American activities
from the record. Yet in the end it was all for naught. World War I became the “forgotten war.”
Despite the constant repetition of the words “Lest We Forget” in memorial publications, on
monuments, and in Armistice Day speeches and editorials, Wisconsin and America did forget.

17

“Legion Posts Plan to Observe Armistice Day,” Marshfield News, October 27, 1921, 2.

18

“Rev. Dudley Speaker at the Theatre,” La Crosse Tribune, November 11, 1922, WWHC, Clipping files,
Series 1701, Box 5, folder 3, WHS.

19

“The Fourth Armistice Day,” Beloit News, November 11, 1922, WWHC, Clipping files, Box 5, folder 3,
WHS.
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“Armistice Day, 1918-1930,” Milwaukee Journal, November 11, 1930, 6.
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An American Abroad:
Perceptions of Americans in Buchan’s WWI Thriller, Greenmantle
Peter Faziani
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
John Buchan is widely considered to be the father of the spy thriller, and in some respects, there’s
no argument against it. Through the development of a character that offers no specialized training
and little by way of skills in espionage and warfare, John Buchan’s Richard Hannay represents a
form of British ideology that focuses on the strength and perseverance of a common man that is
thrown into and subsequently overcomes adverse situations. In Buchan’s first Richard Hannay
novel, The Thirty-Nine Steps, Hannay is a marked man because he was in the wrong place at the
wrong time as a German plot to start the first world war unfolds. Because he is a man of no special
talents, when he teams up with other, more experienced people on his mission in the second
Hannay novel, Greenmantle, Hannay challenges the perception of foreigners. Although Hannay
has several companions on his mission, this talk will focus specifically on John Blenkiron, an
overweight American of somewhat ill health. While Blenkiron only appears in two of Buchan’s
Richard Hannay novels, he also appears in two novels outside of Hannay’s adventures. For the
sake of time and relevance, I’ll limit my evaluation of Blenkiron’s presentation to his role in 1916’s
Greenmantle as it is the first Richard Hannay novel to feature Blenkiron as well as being set during
World War I.
Because of the imminent threat and sheer danger of the mission into Turkey to decipher the secret
three-word code hastily scribbled on a scrap of paper, Hannay has, by way of Sir Walter, been
teamed up with an old friend, Peter Pienaar, and the American John Blenkiron. While Blenkiron
becomes a trusted associate of Hannay as the novel progresses, he is first described as “a sleepy
Yankee” who “suffer[s]…from dyspepsia—duodenal dyspepsia. It gets me two hours after a meal
and gives me hell just below the breast-bone. So I am obliged to adopt a diet. My nourishment is
fish, Sir, and boiled milk and a little dry toast” (Buchan 29). Although Blenkiron’s weak
disposition limits what he can eat, readers are encouraged to believe that it is his American
ideology that prevents him from serving war efforts. However, he is vocal about his unique desire
to participate in the glory of battle: “but these eyes have seen nothing gorier than a Presidential
election. Say, is there any way I could be let into a scene of real bloodshed?” (Buchan 29-30).
Although Blenkiron plays a significant role in the novel as an expert in espionage with experience
and an ability to travel freely through enemy territory, Hannay’s continuous evaluation of his
behaviors and actions suggest that, like adventure novels in themselves, Buchan is critically
disguising Blenkiron as an American that puts the group and mission at risk with his casual attitude
toward the plan because of his American neutrality. Furthermore, while Hannay is skeptical of
Blenkiron’s abilities, he is also threatened by them because Hannay is an amateur whereas
Blenkiron is not.
Interestingly enough, I’m not the first to suggest that Blenkiron’s presence in the novel is meant
to catch the attention of readers. In a 2005 article in the Telegraph, Charles Moore writes,
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The book appeared in the middle of the First World War, and one of its propaganda
purposes was to get America in on our side (which happened the following year, 1917).
This explains the otherwise superfluous presence of a character called Mr. Blenkiron, a fat,
brave, dyspeptic American, who joins the heroes’ clandestine struggle against Germany.

Moore’s casual assessment of the novel never fully ascertains the full scope of Buchan’s
understanding of America’s would-be role or addresses just how Blenkiron’s appearance would
usher America into the war. Indeed, it is my argument here that the introduction of Blenkiron
suggests that America’s complacency was a cultural code to be unconsciously read into the text
while also framing British fears of being overshadowed by that very intervention.
Blenkiron’s portrayal of an American operative without real war experience represents Americans
at large, however, the importance of that representation depends on, as Allan Hepburn recognizes,
an understanding of spies that “challenge narrow definitions of political agency. Ideology produces
spies, but spies…temper ideology” (xiv). If Blenkiron is the representation of tempered American
ideology, the issue of authentic ideology cannot effectively be raised. Throughout the novel,
Blenkiron is the only American with a real role in the plot, however, he is painfully clear that his
actions are his own and do not reflect those of his countrymen. As a result of Buchan’s narrative,
Blenkiron is less of a manifestation of ideologies because his character is not an average American
in the same way Hannay is an average Englishman. Instead, Blenkiron can be read as a tool to
evaluate British ideological perceptions of Americans. This critical evaluation, according to
Michael Denning’s work on ideology in spy thrillers, “formulates a theory of disguise, an
explanation of impersonation,” that spy novels engage in an attempt to mask the code of ideology
(45). After the initial introduction to Blenkiron, mentioned earlier, the novel demands, according
to directions of Sir Walter Bullivant, that Hannay must form his own opinion of Blenkiron before
learning what others believe: “His name is Mr. John Scantlebury Blenkiron, now a citizen of
Boston, Mass., but born and raised in Indiana. Put this envelope in your pocket, but don't read its
contents till you have talked to him” (109). Although instructed to form his own opinion,
Bullivant’s mere recommendation suggests a skillset that can be helpful to the mission, but skillset
is never in question when it comes to Blenkiron.
Bullivant and Hannay’s concerns lie within Blenkiron’s ability to mesh or blend with the group
cultural dynamic as well as Blenkiron’s perception of current war effort. Although confronted with
existing American war involvement, Blenkiron dismisses it as “some belligerent stunt,” and then
goes on to add,
But I reflected that the good God had not given John S. Blenkiron the kind of martial figure
that would do credit to the tented field. Also I recollected that we Americans were
nootrals—benevolent nootrals—and that it did not become me to be butting into the
struggles of the effete monarchies of Europe (Buchan 110).

Although Blenkiron’s assessment of the larger US mindset was not far from reality, the way
Buchan frames Blenkiron as a character on the edge of action is a facet of the thriller genre in
itself.
In Denning’s Cover Stories, the study of the genre focuses on the perception of reality from within
the actions and descriptions of the characters, and although Denning’s work focuses primarily on
Cold War era spy fiction, Buchan’s construction of Blenkiron through the lens and perception of
Hannay is suggestive of a much larger view of American involvement. In an analysis of Lukacs’
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work, Denning suggests “the spy novel, despite its preservation of plot, has a strategic
containment of realism in its short-cut to the totality…its focus on the world of espionage
does not necessarily make it about spies” (29). The question is then, what if any, is the historical
context of Buchan’s inclusion of Blenkiron as a player in the novel? In the planning of their quest,
Blenkiron’s longwinded decision to hide in plain sight as he traveled through Germany alone
demonstrates an awareness of the tension between America and Europe about their position of
neutrality:
If I were to buy a pair of false whiskers and dye my hair and dress like a Baptist parson
and go into Germany on the peace racket, I guess they'd be on my trail like a knife, and I
should be shot as a spy inside of a week or doing solitary in the Moabite prison. But they
lack the larger vision. They can be bluffed, Sir. With your approval I shall visit the
Fatherland as John S. Blenkiron, once a thorn in the side of their brightest boys on the other
side. But it will be a different John S. I reckon he will have experienced a change of heart.
(Buchan 117-118)

Certainly, Blenkiron’s position as ruffled traveler suggests a tension from the authorial
perspective. Indeed, although Buchan’s portrayal of Blenkiron as trustworthy and engaged is never
questioned throughout the novel, it is his appearance and acceptance as an American that exists
outside of the realm of other Americans that fosters an underlying commentary about the American
position in war. This suggests that Buchan is, in essence, writing a novel of encoded meaning in
the writing of Greenmantle.
As I mentioned earlier, Hannay’s entire adventure is built from three hastily scribbled words on a
scrap of paper. Those three words, “Kasredin', 'cancer', and 'v. I,” represent an encrypted message
that acts as the key to the entire plot (Buchan 107). Using this novel as an example in demonstrating
the qualities of code breaking in espionage and thriller novels, Hepburn suggests that “breaking a
code ushers a reader or a spy over a threshold of ignorance and into the domain of knowledge”
(50). If the novel’s plot can be read as an attempt to bring a resourceful American into the fold to
help break the code, and therefore to bring him over that threshold of ignorance and into
knowledge, then perhaps, to dwell on and expand Charles Moore’s assertion that the novel was an
attempt to draw the US into the conflict, it was more to suggest to readers that the American
neutrality could be an advantage if played from the right perspective. The novel confirms this
advantage when, in a conversation between Sir Walter and Hannay, Blenkiron’s effectiveness is
called into question: “Our friend's motto is ‘Thorough’,’ he said, ‘and he knows very well what he
is about’” (Buchan 121). Indeed, by effectively playing his part well and hiding in plain sight after
the plan has been set, Blenkiron disappears from the novel for nearly one hundred pages only to
reappear in the company of the German officer, Stumm, who has detained Hannay, who is
disguised as a South African Dutchman. While Hannay’s narration conveys a sense of surprise at
Blenkiron’s appearance, the thoroughness of Blenkiron’s attitude never seems to waver.
Blenkiron’s skills in deception play an important role in understanding Buchan’s larger encoded
understanding of the American issue (or lack thereof) in the first World War. While Buchan has
until this point in the novel framed Blenkiron as an American of different pedigree than other,
conventional Americans, the more frequently Blenkiron pops up in the novel without revealing his
mission, the more Hannay has to adapt or change his identity to remain hidden. Perhaps this is a
genre feature, one such as Allan Hepburn notes: “Spy fiction emphasizes problems of racial
integration, threats from other nations, and armament” (52). Even if that emphasis is squarely
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placed on Blenkiron’s ability to integrate himself into German society, the problem is that
his status as an American has prevented him from working in the right circles when later
talking.
I was too high up and refined. I've been processing through Europe like Barnum's Circus,
and living with generals and transparencies…. But the thing I was after wasn't to be found
on my beat, for those that knew it weren't going to tell. In that kind of society they don't
get drunk and blab after their tenth cocktail (Buchan 204).

It is at this point in the novel that readers are finally able to crack Buchan’s code because the
problem for Hannay was not that he had been unsuccessful in getting through Germany and into
Constantinople, but that he was concerned that Blenkiron would be successful; “I was mean
enough to feel rather glad. He had been the professional with the best chance. It would be a good
joke if the amateur succeeded where the expert failed” (Buchan 205). Although Blenkiron’s
success would have been helpful to the mission, because Hannay views him as a professional, or
at least a trained spy, the perception of success is different. Because Hannay’s experience as a spy
is fundamentally limited, whereas Blenkiron’s is not, the novel’s race to the finish line can be read
as a comment on the difference between American experience and politics as set against those of
the British in the war.
If Buchan’s novel is to be read as a critique of American involvement in the First World War, then
Blenkiron’s role in the novel should also be read as an example of changing evaluations of general
involvement. Although Blenkiron is considered to be a parallel figure to the company throughout
the first part of the novel, by the climax he is the only one to get hurt and rescued by his fellow
British counterparts: “Blenkiron got hit in the leg, our only casualty” (Buchan 287). Because the
relationship between Hannay and Blenkiron is strengthened by the experience of violence, the
novel suggests that the perception of Americans in the First World War depended on the
understanding of neutrality as a concept rather than location. In an article that examines the
sportsmanship of spying, Thomas Hitchner reasons, “The chief ideological difference between the
genres of counterspy fiction and spy fiction, then, is not over whether or not England is in conflict
with its neighbors and rivals, but the nature of that conflict” (421). Hitchner’s claim suggests that
the perception of conflict in spy fiction does not depend on the establishment of an enemy to unify
allies, instead that it depends on an understanding of the role each other plays in stopping the
enemy.
This paper set out to present and understand the perception of Americans in the First World War
through the characterization of John S. Blenkiron in John Buchan’s novel Greenmantle. Although
Blenkiron appears in other subsequent novels by Buchan, this novel introduces readers to this
American for the first time. Through the conventions of the genre, Buchan disguised and encoded
Blenkiron as a character that could blend in because of the American neutrality. This was, however,
both an advantage and disadvantage for himself and Hannay as they made their way across Europe
because although he could blend in, he was only privy to an upper echelon of information. While
the argument has been made that Buchan used Blenkiron as a way to draw Americans into the
conflict, it seems more likely that Buchan’s characterization and implementation of an American
operative among Hannay’s untrained team is geared at unifying an already existing set of peoples.
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Communication Technologies During World War I and the Interwar
Years
Martha Sloan
Professor Emerita, Michigan Technological University
Technologies often change more rapidly during wars than during peacetime, as evidenced in the
first half of the twentieth century. While the nineteenth century saw major developments in
mechanical engineering with the steam engine and its impact on industries and transportation, the
twentieth century became the electrical century, notably for improved communications. Telephone
and telegraph, established in the nineteenth century, were effective in WWI, a static war in which
fixed lines and telegraph sufficed for connections between trenches, while telegraph, telephone
and radio served for status reports or orders among military organizations. As the role of aviation
changed from spotting to fighting and bombing, communications had to change. Other
technologies, such as radar and sonar, with more direct military impacts, blossomed during the
war for both offensive and defensive purposes. These affected both aviation and submarines as
war changed from a surface phenomenon to three different spheres—below sea, ground or sea,
and the sky.
This paper looks at communication technologies developed by the three major combatants for both
world wars—the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States of America—as they grew
during WWI, languished during the early interwar years, accelerated in the late interwar period,
and exploded during WWII. Developments by the three countries varied according to their
technological strengths and weaknesses, their military strategies (especially during the interwar
years), and the degree of coordination between military units and developers.
Communication technologies can be classified in two basic ways. Wired technologies require a
physical wired connection; wireless technologies connect through the air or water. Early
communication technologies used simple on-off signals that were soon standardized into Morse
Code. In contrast, voice-based technologies required more advanced methods to convey the
complexity of human voices. Telegraph was the original wired, Morse code technology. Telephone
was the first voice technology; it began as a wired technology. The telegraph network connected
post offices, government agencies, and major corporations. To send a telegram, one had to appear
at a telegraph office and give the clerk a written message. The clerk sent the Morse-coded message
on a telegraph line to the next office where it was stored and then sent to another office until it
reached its destination. This repeated storing and forwarding took time. If the same message was
to go to multiple recipients, each message was sent individually. However telegraphy did have the
advantage of security; it could be intercepted only by physically tapping the telegraph line.

World War I
At the start of World War I, the dominant communications technology was telegraph, a mature
technology that had been used in several wars dating back to the American Civil War. In military
use, each army would set up its own telegraph network, which required horse-drawn wagons to
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carry the heavy equipment. While cables were originally available just on land, by 1900
undersea cables made near world wide telegraph messages possible. This led to the single
most importance impact of communications technology on war, the Zimmerman telegram.
Britain had guaranteed Belgium’s neutrality since 1839. Thus, when Germany invaded Belgium
in August 1914, the British gave the Germans an ultimatum to get out of Belgium with a deadline
of 4 August, midnight, German time, 11:00 pm, British time. As Winston Churchill described,
when time expired, the Admiralty’s windows were thrown open and the sounds of a huge throng
singing “God save the King” wafted in. The war had officially started.
Hours before, a British ship had sailed toward the location of five German cables linking Germany
to North America at the western tip of England. Once authorized to proceed, the ship pulled up the
cables and destroyed them. This limited Germany to wireless communications that could easily be
intercepted or to working with the two neutral countries that had cable access—the U.S. and
Sweden. Germany pleaded to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who saw himself as a peacemaker,
to allow them to send messages via U.S. lines. Wilson agreed, thinking that this would help a
peaceful resolution, but required that all messages be “in the clear” meaning unencrypted.
Two-and-a-half years later both the Allies and the Central Powers were devastated after millions
of casualties, billions of dollars, and thousands of assets had been lost. Wilson’s peacemaking
efforts were unsuccessful as the two sides were stubbornly too far apart. Germany was drafting
15-year-olds while civilians starved from shortage of food due partly to the British blockade of
German ports. Britain, while waiting for the miracle of America’s entrance to the war, fared better
as long as it could continue importing food. Seeing the discrepancy in access to food by the two
sides, Germany decided to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare announced on 1 February 1917.
However, Germany feared the announcement might lead the U.S. to enter the war. Throughout the
war, Germany had hoped that Mexico would distract the US. from the European conflict by
attacking the southern U.S. Thus Germany devised a plan to entice Mexico to do so by promising
that Germany would support Mexico with substantial funds and reward it with the formerly
Mexican-owned parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.
Thus came the Zimmerman telegram, a message from Arthur Zimmerman, a high German Foreign
Office official, to the German Ambassador to Mexico to be sent through U.S. diplomatic cable.
The telegram instructed him to pass the message of a proposed German-Mexican military alliance
on to the Mexican president if the U.S. appeared to be about to enter the war. Obviously, this
message could not be sent in the clear. So Zimmerman persuaded the U.S. Ambassador to allow
sending it enciphered.
On 19 January 1917, well before the German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare,
Zimmerman sent the telegram to the German embassy in the U.S. for retransmission to Mexico.
The telegram flowed through American diplomatic lines until it reached the cable to the U.S.
Before it could proceed further a copy was intercepted at a relay station near Land’s End on the
westernmost coast of England and sent to the British intelligence at Room 40 of the Admiralty,
the British cryptography center. Room 40, whose name was selected for its apparent unimportance,
received copies of all traffic through Land’s End and had been analyzing up to 200 messages a day
since the start of the war. British codebreakers had been aided by captured copies of the German
diplomatic and naval ciphers but even more by their knowledge of German behavior. Germans
liked order, and hence were predictable on their daily change of keys. Moreover the Germans’
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justifiable pride in their superior technology meant they believed their enemies could not
read their codes. In fact, in both World Wars Germans believed their codes were secure
when actually the Allies read nearly all their messages.
Room 40 immediately identified the Zimmerman message as critical. Within hours the British had
a partial decryption and soon a complete one. Then the British had problems on disclosing the
message. They did not want Germany to know that Britain had broken their codes. They did not
want the U. S. to know that it was eavesdropping on American diplomatic messages as it continued
to do for the next quarter century. They did want to convince America that the message was
genuine. Handing it over directly to the Americans risked the U.S. thinking it was a hoax. The
British needed a cover story.
They knew that the Mexican Embassy would relay the Zimmerman telegram by Western Union to
Mexico. So the Mexican telegraph office would have the ciphertext. They bribed an employee of
the Mexican office to steal a copy of the message, which they then showed to the Americans on
10 February. The Americans were first unbelieving and then outraged. They thoroughly verified
the telegram’s authenticity from Western Union files. The telegram read:
We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall
endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this
not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make
war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on
our part that Mexico is to conquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.
The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most
secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the
suggestion that he should, on his own initiative invite Japan to immediate adherence and
at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President’s
attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the
prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace. Signed, ZIMMERMAN

All doubt about authenticity disappeared when Zimmerman himself called a press conference on
3 March where he told American journalists that the telegram was his and real, followed by a
speech to the Reichstag on 29 March. He hoped to convince Americans that Germany would
support a Mexican war against the U.S. only if the U.S. entered the war. President Wilson was
informed. He released the text to newspapers on 28 February. (Meanwhile, the president of
Mexico, on advice from his generals, decided to ignore the German offer.)
On 1 February Germany started unrestricted submarine attacks on all U.S.-flagged ships in the
north Atlantic. Germany sunk two American ships in February, causing most American shipping
companies to avoid the Atlantic. Wilson asked the Senate for authority to arm merchant ships, but
the Senate denied it. On 2 April Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. Four days
later it did. Thus cutting German cables at the start of the war led to America’s entry into it in the
most significant impact of communications on the war.
Routine use of telegraph in World War I was much less dramatic. As the war quickly settled into
static trench warfare, both sides learned to maintain their telegraph networks well back from the
trenches to minimize destruction of lines. Generals preferred to locate their command posts at the
hubs of several interconnected lines to maximize information from their troops and to command
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them. Moving command posts was difficult due to the need of horse-drawn carts to carry the
heavy equipment.
As the war proceeded, there was more demand for voice capability, for wireless, and for smaller,
lighter equipment. Aviation was becoming more important, first with zeppelins and later with
fixed-wing airplanes. Zeppelins could easily afford the room and weight for wireless Morse code
even though the equipment weighed a third of a ton and required at least one signals specialist to
operate. However, the first airplanes were single-seaters and it was not possible for the pilot to
send and receive Morse code messages and still fly the plane, not to mention the weight of the
equipment. When larger planes became available, these limits were less important but made voice
capability even more important.
America led in telephone networks, but wired telephone networks were as vulnerable to enemy
attack as were telegraph networks. Germany was more motivated for military wireless voice
communications. Wireless communications allowed for simultaneous sending of the same
message to multiple recipients, allowing Germans to send the same orders more quickly. However,
they were unsecure as anyone could listen to them. This meant sending Morse coded messages
wirelessly as the Germans were confident their codes were safe. Voice wireless meant even lower
security so was reserved for emergencies.
Germans made the most use of radio for both land and sea usage during the war. They relied on
encryption rather than radio silence to conceal their intentions, not realizing that British
intelligence was quite effective in direction-finding. British success in detecting the sailing of the
German fleet from its ports in May 1916 led to the Battle of Jutland and the near destruction of the
German fleet. This was the second most successful use of communications in the war.
Wireless voice communications, called radio, was still in its infancy but had been used successfully
in wars before World War I, including the Boer War, the Balkan wars, and the Russo-Japanese
war. Radio, especially, needed a way to amplify signals so they could be heard from further away.
This spurred work on vacuum tubes that were introduced midway through the war.
These difficult improvements of radio had tremendous civilian impact after the war. By 1920 radio
stations playing music and offering news swept across America. Somewhat later, after Hitler came
to power in Germany, the German government sponsored the development of inexpensive
“peoples’ radios” so that German citizens could more easily listen to Hitler.
WW1 showed slower development of another wireless technology, radar and its underwater cousin
sonar. Germany led in submarine development and in sonar used to find underwater submarines.
Radar detection and later location of above ground objects was in its infancy. It was used primarily
for finding airplanes as ground use had too many objects to separately locate.

Interwar Period
After the war, Germany, Britain, and the U.S. chose independent paths in military technologies.
Germany knew there would be a war in the near future. Therefore, Germans planned offensive
uses of technology; they focused on communications (and submarine) technology nearly
continuously from WWI through the interwar period because they planned war despite sanctions
from the Versailles treaty. The UK feared there would be another war soon despite all the
Versailles Treaty had done to limit Germany. Therefore, the UK focused on defensive
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technologies. The British had learned during the Great War that the English Channel was no
longer nearly impenetrable; they’d experienced the damage of submarines and could see that
airplanes threatened invasion. Hence, they focused on defense with strong interconnections of their
defensive units, such as the network of their radar stations (and later planes). America, for most of
the period, displayed strategic indifference. Americans had learned different military and political
lessons and famously preferred to ignore both German and Japanese efforts that threatened the end
of their previous oceanic isolation.
The Germans
The overall German policy focused on airplanes, tanks, and submarines as the most effective
offensive weapons from the war. Radio communication, generally, and encryption, specifically,
enhanced the effect of these weapons by facilitating their command and control across great
distances. They continued their WW1 preference for radio telegraphy at sea and ensured voice
radio in airplanes and tanks. Because they saw radar as a mainly defensive technology, they did
little with it until late in World War II.
Germany produced the best radar systems in the interwar period. Their equipment had the farthest
range, the most rugged construction, and the greatest flexibility. However, they overemphasized
technical strength while taking operational usage for granted. They also had too many competing
research centers that did not communicate well with each other. And they became complacent,
believing in their own superiority, thus becoming a victim of their own success.
They made a major breakthrough mechanizing encryption with the German Enigma machine. It
had three—later four—rotating discs with the letters of the alphabet. Transmitting a letter meant
sending a current from the letter to be sent to different letters on the other rotors and then back.
After each letter was sent, the discs were rotated, ensuring that each succeeding letter was
enciphered in a different alphabet. The number of possible encryptions of a given message
increased exponentially with the number of rotors even before other complexities were added. The
Germans felt confident that their coded messages could not be broken, but thanks to some Polish
mathematicians and the British codebreakers at Bletchley Park, they were.
The British
At the end of World War I, the British could see that their island isolation was under threat from
both submarines and airplanes. Submarines threatened to isolate Britain while bombers threatened
to attack both Britain and its ships from overhead. German bombs from dirigibles and bomber
planes had killed almost 1500 persons and injured more than 3000 people inside the UK during
WW1.The British thus assumed a grand strategic defensive that emphasized signals intelligence
that had been so effective during the war. They considered radar to be the most effective form of
defensive intelligence and the best response to German technology.
The British lagged the Germans in most communication technologies throughout the interwar
period. However, they more than made up for their poorer equipment by the way they used them.
As Churchill explained,
The Germans would not have been surprised to hear our radar pulses for they had
developed a technically efficient radar system which was in some respects ahead of our
own. What would have surprised them, however, was the extent to which we had turned
our discoveries to practical effect, and woven all into our air defense system. In this we
3A1–5

PAPER 3A1 – MARTHA SLOAN
led the world, and it was operational efficiency rather than novelty of equipment that was
the British achievement.

This is an outstanding example of the difference between novelty of equipment contrasted with
adapting military thought to less advanced devices.
Their master plan became the Chain Home radar defense system. Interlinked radars at each site
covered the main approaches to Britain. In addition, they developed radar systems small enough
to be in fighter planes. They selectively drafted ham radio operators to service the radar sets rather
than training their own technicians.
The Americans
Americans lacked both the offensive motivation of the Germans and the defensive fears of the
British. Hence, they lagged both technically and operationally, though not by a lot. Once
Americans could see the war was coming, they stepped up their pace and often surpassed the
Europeans. One historian explained with regard to radar that in Britain the development of radar
was “a definite solution to a pressing problem” while in the U.S., it was only “a vague answer to
uncertain threats.”
American work in radar more closely resembled that of the Germans than of the British. In both
the U.S. and Germany, technical work was dispersed with notice of advances moving upward to
decision makers with little interaction among the developmental groups. In contrast, the British
effort was top down. In addition, the British “old boy” system cut through institutional boundaries.
Another way of looking at the situation is the following. Technical advances were similar in all
three countries. However, the British gained operationally because they saw a need to adapt to a
situation they had not caused and could not control; the Germans thought they could control events;
and the Americans saw no need to control far off events that did not concern them.
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American Chemical Companies in the First World War
Jason Szilagyi
Central Michigan University
The outbreak of the First World War caught America in a situation where American companies
and consumers were threatened by a shortage of chemical materials. German chemicals were a
major factor in food production and consumer goods throughout the industrialized world. Whether
these American chemical companies were producing dyes for the production of paper, clothing,
fertilizer, or munitions, the lack of imported German component chemicals threatened to drive
prices to exorbitant levels or stop production altogether. In order for the American economy to not
come to a halt during the course of the war, American chemical companies worked tirelessly to
create their own chemical formulas, expand their production base, and gear towards full war
production as the United States was slowly pulled into the conflict.
The United States initially had no interest in involving itself in a European war. In theory, the
decision to remain neutral kept America out of the direct line of fire, and allowed it to sell to and
buy materials from both warring sides. American companies sought to make profits by selling war
materials, as well as civilian goods, to both the Entente powers, Great Britain, France, and Imperial
Russia, as well as the Central Powers, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Munition export sales
created a massive boom in American business, though these were protested vigorously by pacifists,
clergy, and nationalist groups within the United States.
However, the actual physical geography of the warring nations and military mastery of the sea by
the Entente Powers quickly ensured that German chemicals could not reach American plants. The
British Grand Fleet and French Navy had slowly been establishing a naval blockade to anything
going into or out of Germany. Initially the British and French blockades enraged Americans:
British and French warships could, and would, stop American merchant ships heading for Central
Power ports. In the process of these stops, British and French sailors would search the ships for
contraband and if this was found the ship and cargo were impounded. This was seen by Americans
as a violation of their neutrality: in their view they should be able to trade anything with anyone
as they were not a combatant nation. However, the United States shifted to more trade with the
Entente Powers, as export to these nations was easiest.

Potash Fertilizer
Some of the most critical materials that were denied to American consumers involved the
chemicals needed to create fertilizers. One of the most missed chemical compounds blocked from
Americans was German potash. Potash is an alkaline potassium compound that can be used as a
highly effective fertilizer. It is an essential ingredient of commercial fertilizer, which was
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increasingly necessary for long-used fields.1 And since potassium is essential to plant life,
without this central ingredient chemical fertilizers cannot effectively increase the yields of
crops planted.
At the outbreak of the First World War, the best fields for this material were found in Germany
and it had been a major source of their export wealth. European and American farmers used the
potash as a way for plants to retain water, grow larger, and generally increase the productivity of
their fields. American farmers had become quite reliant on German exports as the American
chemical industry did not have an existing domestic source of potash.
Large German chemical corporate conglomerations, or better known as cartels, were not keen to
share the formulas with foreign competitors and buyers. They jealously guarded their secrets and
had a virtual monopoly on the production of potash. With the outbreak of war, German potash
could no longer be exported to meet the demand. German cartels had for decades refused to
manufacture their chemicals in American plants because the monopoly on those formulae and
shipments was a major source of wealth for German owners, investors, and the German
Government.
Due to the British blockade, supplies of potash and other chemicals could not be sent to the United
States. In order to crush the German economy and military, Britain expanded its list of items that
were deemed contraband. Any merchant ships going to Germany carrying foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and an exhaustive list of other items, could be seized. In 1915, Germany, facing the reality
that their merchant ships could not sail to America, initiated an embargo on potash. The logic
behind the move was to prevent their potash from going to America and then being exported from
there to England. Historian William Haynes, writing about the situation after the war, states:
Even if our Government [United States] should obtain from the British free passage for
this essential fertilizer material through the blockade, it was recognized that both English
munition plants and farmlands were in as dire need of potash salts as ourselves. Under the
circumstances, Germany would no doubt be as rigid in her embargo as was England in her
blockade.2

German potash stocks were used by Germany and Austria-Hungary to try and fend off famine in
those empires during the war. Later, those same stocks of potash would be used to make up for the
loss of imported sources of nitrate for making munitions. The potash was chemically altered, by
the Haber synthetic-ammonia process, in order to make explosives for artillery shells and bombs,
as well as propellants for bullets. Germany, along with most other countries in the world, received
most of its salt-peter and nitrogen supplies from Chile. The British blockade prevented that supply
from reaching Germany, prompting the need for other processes to obtain the materials. Haynes
explains:
In Germany this problem had a double meaning. To the Kaiser’s militaristic clique, which foresaw
a British blockade of Chilean salt-peter, nitrogen was as important for explosives as for fertilizer.
1

Edwin J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War: Neutral Rights, Belligerent Claims and American
Commerce in the Years 1914-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915), 239.

2

William Haynes, American Chemical Industry the World War I Period: 1912-1922 (New York, D. Van
Nostrand, 1949), 2: 31.
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So while Wilhelm II rattled his sword noisily for several years, he did not throw away the
scabbard until the Haber synthetic-ammonia process and its companion, the Ostwald process
for the conversion of ammonia to nitric acid, had been perfected and tested. 3
Starting in September 1914, American newspapers, politicians, and scholars quickly sought to
assuage concerns from farmers about the loss of this core fertilizer component. An article
published by The New York Times on 18 October 1914 discussed the issue: “A practical monopoly
[sic] in the potash market has been maintained in America by German syndicates. The war’s
embargo has brought a complete severance between supply and demand.”4 The reality of having
almost no readily available large stocks of potash had the potential to drastically reduce American
food supplies. American chemists were charged with finding an alternative compound to keep
crops growing.
The lack of German potash forced American chemical companies to develop American potash or
to find an alternative fertilizer to make up the shortfall. In an interview with the New York Globe,
Dr. William H. Nichols stated “Stassfurt (Germany) potash supply, upon which the world depends,
is, of course, entirely cut off. The American farmer may have to get along for the time being
without potash fertilizers; but other substitutes will take their place for the present.”5 At the time
Dr. Nicholas was Chairman of the Board of General Chemical Company and also the president of
the Nichols Copper Company. His expertise was sought out in order to assure Americans that the
shortages of potash would not cripple farmers. His advice in 1914 was simply that these vital
chemicals could be obtained from alternate European or South American sources or could be lived
without altogether.
By 1915, the lack of German potash and limited success of American chemists and chemicals to
fill the gap was beginning to be felt. Prices of the remaining stock of potash soared and became
increasingly cost-prohibitive to the average farmers. According to Corda (qtd. In Jenson) “the price
remained fairly stable at about $8 to $10 a ton until 1911-12 when it began to rise, perhaps because
of the unsettled political situation in Europe.”6 Measures needed to be taken to ensure that
American farmers would be able to fertilize their fields. The price of potash would jump to nearly
$150 per ton by 1917, an exorbitant cost that was prohibitive.
Suitable alternative sites for the production of potash inside American borders were in some cases
found in the most unlikely of circumstance. Richard Jensen describes a perfect example of this
process, by which the small towns of Antioch and Hoffland, Nebraska, became boomtowns
because of the potash industry. “Early in 1917 several potash lakes were discovered on state-owned

3

Ibid, 57.

4

“Foreign Purchases of American Products,” The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1914, p. 119 [From Library of
Congress, World War History, www.loc.gov/item/2004540423/1914-10-17/ed-1/, accessed Aug. 28,
2018].

5

“Effects of the War on Chemical Trade,” The New York Globe, Sep. 1, 1914, p. 110 [From Library of
Congress, World War History, www.loc.gov/item/2004540423/1914-08-31/ed-1/, accessed Aug. 28,
2018].

6
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school land, and a company was quickly formed to lease the mineral rights.”7 These
chemical companies had to quickly establish rights to take over the lakes, build the factories
necessary to create the potash, and finally have transportation systems that would allow for the
finished product to hit the market. The population of the towns swelled as workers and chemists
swarmed in to build and labor in the plants.
Nebraska became a center of potash production, but it was by no means an easy process, nor was
it the only state to have the rare materials. Twenty-one states in total would find the means to build
128 plants to create an American potash industry. The massive price of building these facilities
was only exacerbated by the inflation that the original shortages of potash caused. J. W. Turrentine,
writing in 1950, also describes the difficulty that American chemical companies had when
confronted with creating the potash industry from the ground up:
The critical nature of the emergency did not permit technological research. On the contrary, potash
was being extracted in many instances by main force and awkwardness. As a result, with the
reappearance of German potash on the American market at a carefully regulated descending scale
of prices, the wartime domestic industry faded away, with only three units surviving to recent
years.8
The completion of the factories and the economic boom to those states lasted only two years: by
1919, the cheaper German potash began to become available again. Those newly built chemical
potash factories ended up closing during and after 1919 as the profits of companies plummeted.
While potash fertilizer was important to food production inside the United States, it was also
needed for non-food agricultural work. Cotton production in the Southern states also required
fertilizers. The lack of German potash saw a precipitous fall in the amount of fertilizer available
for Southern farmers. The lack of fertilizer had the potential effect of producing poor cotton crops,
thus reducing the amount available for the export market. Edwin J. Clapp sums up the situation:
As a result of these conditions the use of fertilizer in this country for the agricultural season of
1915 was greatly curtailed. This was especially true of the cotton states, where a reduction of 40
to 50 per cent was reported. Such fertilizer as was used contained less potash than usual. The effect
on the cotton crop may not be noticeably great for the year 1915; but if the war continues and in
1916 no more potash is available than this year, the results, according to agricultural experts, will
be very marked.9
The United States produced far more cotton per year than its own industry consumed. This had
been the case since cotton had become the major crop of the South during the nineteenth century.
With the outbreak of World War I, the demand for additional supplies for textile industries all over
the world had the potential to boost a slumping pre-war American economy. But if the lack of
cheap, available chemical fertilizer could not be found, then cotton crops would fail and Southern
farmers faced economic collapse. Over the course of the war, the cotton that was grown in the
United States shifted away from export and was used instead domestically by American textile
7

Jensen, 28.

8
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9
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manufacturers. The lack of fertilizer, as well as foreign markets, saw the American cotton
farmer drastically lose economic power.
The lack of potash affected the growth of crops on the Pacific coast of the United States as well.
California had, and still has, a tremendous ability to grow foodstuffs that can be either consumed
domestically or abroad. In order to keep those vast fields productive, scientists in California turned
to a truly unique solution to the fertilizer shortage: seaweed would be a new major chemical
component. As Peter Neushul states, “Responding to this wartime opportunity, enterprising
American businessmen built a new industry designed to extract both potash and acetone from
California’s giant kelp. Although short-lived, California’s World War I kelp industry was the
largest ever created in the United States for the processing of plants from the ocean.”10 Initially
harvesting the kelp was hazardous and exhausting work for the people involved in the process.
The earliest version of harvesting the plant was to physically haul the kelp out of the water and
onto the ship, a difficult practice as the crew had to physically secure the kelp underwater and then
hoist it up. This method was detrimental because the kelp stalk itself was displaced from the seabed
and could not be regrown. Between 1917 and 1918, the kelp harvesting industry lined up its
technological issues and began producing a vital alternative to German potash
A vast kelp harvesting and processing industry was born along the California coastline in order to
boost domestic potash production. Factories, ships, and railway lines were laid in order for the
kelp to be harvested, dried, and finally processed into potash for use either in the United States or
to be exported abroad. The kelp potash was used to supplement the fertilizer industry and in the
application of munitions manufacturing.

Potassium Nitrate as a Weapon
Potash was an essential component in the manufacture of chemical fertilizers, but it can also be a
key in the creation of munitions. A different blend of potassium and other chemical elements
similar to potash is known as saltpeter, or potassium nitrate, an essential piece in black powder
production. Saltpeter can be found in several varieties each of which has different applications.
The most soughtafter version, before and during the First World War, was Chilean sodium nitrate.
This version of saltpeter comes from the deserts of Chile and was a major source of wealth for that
South American country. By the end of the nineteenth century, the last major supplies of naturally
occurring Chilean nitrate lay in the Atacama Desert.
By 1911, Chile was supplying the majority of the entire world in nitrates. European powers sought
to have close ties to Chile hoping that favorable diplomatic relations would lead to a steady supply
of nitrates. As mentioned above, Chilean nitrate was used to produce not only fertilizers, but
propellants used for bullets, explosives used in artillery shells and bombs. According to Manuel
Bastias Saaverda, “Before 1914, only one-fifth of all Chilean nitrate exports were consumed in the
powder and explosives industry; almost four-fifths of all nitrate exports were used for military
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purposes thereafter.”11 Without the supply of this rare mineral for continuous manufacturing
of munitions, a long war would be out of the question for potential combatants.
Germany had a massive advantage over the Allied Forces during the early years of the war due to
stockpiling the Chilean nitrates in anticipation of war. It also had an additional edge because most
of the enemy European nations needed German chemicals to manufacture their own munitions.
This initial lack of extra nitrates to manufacture new munitions was a terror for both those Allied
soldiers fighting in France and the people at home. This early German advantage was also tied to
the fact the Britain and France had to switch their industries over to the large-scale manufacture of
war goods, something that did not come into full effect until 1916.
This lack of munitions caused a number of issues for both the British and French militaries.
Between 1914 and 1915, the rapid consumption of shells by artillery pieces on the Western Front
meant that rationing of those munitions needed to take place. Allied forces that went onto the
offensive and those launching counterattacks had strategically used their limited shell supply to
maximum effect. Even the vaunted British and French fleets had to keep a close eye on the amount
of heavy ammunition their ships used until newly implemented war production could match
demand.
Initially the British government was quick to dismiss the shortfall of chemicals needed to replace
munitions used on the frontlines. In addition to a lack of chemicals, some newspapers actually
mentioned the lack of British chemical engineers to manufacture them. This issue was rather
eloquently addressed by a Times of London article from 18 August 1914:
We ought, however, at once to admit the real, if unpalatable, fact that we have not
encouraged the technical side of chemical education, which is so necessary for the
manufacture of fine chemicals, and that as a consequence we lack men with the necessary
practical knowledge.12

This practical viewpoint on the lack of chemists in Britain skilled at replicating many of the
imported chemicals from Germany during 1914 was lost over the course of the war. Instead of
focusing on the need to train the existing and new chemical engineers to help the war of munitions,
the British government sought out other reasons for early shortfalls.
During 1914 and early 1915, the British government repeatedly claimed that the issue was not so
much one of lack of supply or technical skill, rather they attributed it to a lack of will-power on
the part of the workers in the existing plants. The government insisted that strikes organized by
industrial workers consistently held up production rather than a lack of vital chemicals. In
discussing a strike of engineers at Clyde, in The Times the Chief Industrial Commissioner for the
British government, Sir George Askwith, said “I am by the Government that important munitions
of war urgently required by the Navy and the Army are being held up by the present cessation of
work.”13
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This lack of chemical components for the British, as well as the French, left the Allies in a
precarious position for resupplying their armies fighting the Central Powers. If the British
couldn’t produce their own domestic supplies of munitions, another source of those rare chemicals
needed to be found. One solution was to buy completed munitions from the United States. This
was a risky move to undertake for both the British and Americans, as the sale of munitions to only
select warring countries would technically violate American neutrality. The Allies could also not
be one hundred percent sure whether that American munitions would go only to themselves and
not be sold to the Central Powers.
The question of what exactly could be shipped to warring or neutral nations became a topic of
great concern. The biggest initial concern for American companies, government officials, and
private citizens was whether items deemed contraband would result in American ships being seized
and impounded. Since the British Grand Fleet controlled the Atlantic Ocean and access to
Continental ports, American ships were routinely stopped and searched by British warships. Those
heading for German ports were seized while those heading to British or French ports were allowed
to conduct their business. Americans did not see the war as a reason for their ships to be seized, as
they believed that free trade with all parties should not be impinged upon.
This issue of arms sales led to great tensions between the American government and those
governments of the belligerent nations. In 1915, Austria vehemently denounced the expansion of
munitions plants inside the United States for the express purpose of manufacturing arms. Austria
demanded that the United States stop the possible planned industrial expansion that would see new
plants built alongside the already existing factories to supply weapons and ammunition. In a
response piece to that focused on Austrian demands printed in the New York Times, the author lays
out the Austrian argument succinctly:
It [the Austrian Government], however, did protest against the creation of new and
extension of existing plants for the manufacturing of and exporting of war materials to such
an extent that the economic life of the United States has practically, so to say, become
militarized…the concentration of a large part of the American working power toward one
goal, namely, the supply of munitions…invalidates any reference to previous wars.14

The issue was not that American munitions were reaching Britain and France and not Austria;
rather the Austrian government was arguing that if American industry started to focus strictly on
the production of war material, the United States was no longer a neutral country. The Austrians
knew that American arms and munitions would not be able to reach their ports but they did not
demand a complete embargo. That type of demand would have also forced the Americans to violate
their neutrality. If the Americans were forced by the Central Powers to enact an embargo, Britain
and France would suffer for lack of those vital missing chemicals for munitions. The laws of war
would dictate that the United States had chosen one side over another. American neutrality meant
that some war materials would reach the Allies and not the Central Powers.
As more and more munitions were shipped from American ports, the awareness of just how much
was being sent to the battlefield was realized. Regular reports discussing monthly shipments of
munitions dawned on American public awareness. This awareness did raise questions among
14
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Americans of whether they were actually neutral. The Austrian demands also raised a
number of economic and moral issues. The pre-war American economy had been relatively
weak; with the war, the economy was booming and items not available for manufacture in Europe
ensured American prosperity and expansion. But what was the ethical cost of this war-material
export industry?
Americans themselves were concerned about the legality, as well as the morality, of selling
munitions to warring nations. Numerous letters to the editor and opinion pieces were printed
discussing this topic between 1914 and America’s entry into the war in April 1917. The Atlantic
Conference of German Baptists stated their moral objections and their desire to keep America from
exporting any arms: “We therefore earnestly protest against any exportation of things which kill
any of the warring nations of Europe.”15
The New York Times published several op-eds by Professor Theodore Woolsey, a former
International Law lecturer from Yale University, which discussed the legal and ethical morality of
American munition sales. He argued that the United States treated both sets of belligerents equally
which ensured American neutrality. His argument rests on the fact that both sides have equal access
to buy U.S. arms, but that Germany cannot carry this out because of a lack of transportation across
the Atlantic. He stated:
She [Germany] cannot transport, because she does not care to contest the control of the
seas with her enemies. Have we [The United States] aught to do with that? To supplement
her naval inferiority by denying the Allied the fruits of their superiority would be
equivalent to sharing in the war on the German side…notice no complaints of our exports
of munitions have come from the German Government.”16

Later in the same article, Professor Woolsey pointedly expressed who he blamed for such
complaints reaching the United States Government: “The opposition to the trade seems to come
from two classes: 1) German sympathizers…and 2) those who are governed by their emotions
rather than reason and respect for law.”17
The flow of munitions from the United States to European battlefields did not slow down because
of the arguments and protests against their sale; rather every month saw orders from Britain,
France, and even Russia increase as the massive battlefield expenditures of ammunition swelled.
The New York Times reported on 14 June 1915, “It was said yesterday that the serious shortage of
ammunition by the British, French, and Russian armies has spurred manufacturers in this country
to extraordinary efforts to forward supplies in the shortest amount of time.”18 It was reported that
around $30 million worth of supplies went to the Allies that April. The New York Times in
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September reported “that shipments of horses, mules, automobiles, aeroplanes, and
explosives all classed as war supplies, aggregated nearly $50,000,000 in July.”19
The monthly exports of munitions and other war supplies only increased in volume after 1915.
The quantity of bullets and shells used in Europe, and further afield, grew as major land battles
increased during 1916. The Battles of Verdun and the Somme alone consumed hundreds of
thousands of heavy shells and millions of bullets. All of these munitions needed to be replaced and
new stockpiles established. American industry increased by expanding existing plants and building
new facilities.
Chemical companies inside the United States needed to increase their own production in order to
fill the requirements of the ammunition plants. The manufacture of existing types of bullets and
shells continued throughout the war in order to fulfill the orders sent from Allied governments. In
addition to the older models, new types of weapons were also produced. Dow Chemical, based out
of Midland, Michigan, invented a magnesium bullet, known today as a tracer bullet, which allowed
soldiers to track where their bullets were traveling. “Dow was a major source of explosives and
other chemicals, devoting 90 percent of its production to war material such as phenol and
magnesium.”20 With nearly 90 percent of Dow Chemical’s production switched to war-materials,
Austrian fears of American industrial expansion were confirmed.
In addition to magnesium production, Dow Chemical also received orders to begin production of
mustard gas. Mustard gas is a chemical weapon that was developed late in the First World War.
Germany was the first to use this weapon in 1917; before this the majority of chemical weapon
attacks consisted of chlorine gas that suffocated the victims. Mustard gas was a new substance that
could not only cause death by asphyxiation, but also painful blisters on any exposed tissue.
The U.S. Army requested that Dow Chemical produce the compounds necessary to create an
American version of mustard gas. Dow Chemical produced and shipped out more than 100 tons’
worth of mustard oil. This mustard oil could then be added into specially designed artillery shells.
Once those shells were fired and exploded, the mustard oil went from a liquid to an aerosol form
which permeated the battlefield. Even with gas masks on, soldiers were not necessarily spared: the
aerosol would land on uniforms and then soak into the material. The soaked uniforms would then
transfer the oil onto skin and cause painful blisters to spread.
The U.S. Army deemed it necessary to have its own chemical warfare program to create new
protection techniques for its soldiers as well as to produce its own chemical weapons. Since this
was a new type of warfare, the United States had to build its resources almost from the ground up.
Gas masks, antidotes, and chemically treated uniforms (to provide additional protection from
attack) were just some of the things that American chemists needed to perfect. They had to
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decipher reports from the Allies as to what elements comprised the German chemical
weapon compounds and experiment to see how to protect soldiers against them.
The U.S. Army used controlled exposure to tear gas in training (another chemical weapon
developed early in the War) to give American soldiers a better understanding of how to prepare
and defend against chemical attacks. This gave the soldiers a firsthand experience as to the effects
of the chemical without a gas mask, allowing them a personal example of how quickly these
chemicals can be debilitating. In 1917, American soldiers were given additional training as they
arrived in France by British and French officers who had survived German chemical attacks.

Conclusion
American chemical companies during the First World War proved to be essential to the victory of
the Allies. Without American munitions and fertilizer flooding into Britain, France, and the United
States itself, the early German advantage in chemical production may have given victory to the
Central Powers. The millions of rounds of ammunition that were ordered and delivered to the
Allies during the period of America’s neutrality helped to keep the British and French militaries
fighting. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, the expansion of the
American chemical companies in the immediately preceding years ensured that ammunition and
chemical weapon production could match demand.
In addition, American efforts to create its own synthetic fertilizers from local products and
chemicals gave the United States the ability to meet not only the needs of its own people, but those
of the Allied nations as well. The ingenious use of either seaweed off the California coast or the
exploitation of salt lakes in Nebraska gave a new source of potash. While prices of these artificial
fertilizers were high, they did provide American farmers with a means to continue producing food
and not bankrupt themselves. For many of the new fertilizer companies, the end of the war meant
the closure of the plants that required so much time, money, and effort to build.
Once hostilities ceased, the American chemical companies were prepared to receive the cheaper,
more plentiful German chemical compounds they expected. But they did not completely abandon
the cooperation they had gained with the United States military. Instead, American chemical
companies kept contact with the US Army and continued to develop new weapons and protection
equipment. That relationship established in the First World War would be used again in World
War II, Vietnam, and beyond. American chemical companies were, and continue to be, a twoedged blade: they have the ability to provide either life-giving or life-taking products depending
on who makes the order.
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Your Duty on Display’:
The Allied War Exhibition in Chicago, the State Council of
Defense, and the Role of the State in Defining American Identity
Josh Fulton
Northern Illinois University / Moraine Valley Community College

They have Chicago sweethearts—until said C.S.’s see them in German uniforms. Then the
stuff’s off. They just won’t be seen strolling around the place with German soldiers and the
first thing the poor make-believe boche knows, his girl is strolling with some soldier in
O.D.1

War trophies from the battlegrounds of the Western Front dominated the Allied War Exposition,
which was held in Grant Park on Chicago’s lakefront from September 2 to 15, 1918.
Demonstrating the “realities” of war for some 100,000 onlookers daily, army units from nearby
Camp Grant performed re-enactments of trench warfare while faux artillery sounded and newfangled warplanes flew overhead. In an article on September 6, 1918, the Chicago Daily News
pointed out the displeasure of some participants. Six hundred enlisted men from Camp Grant had
to play the role of the “’Fritzies,’” and the women of Chicago wanted nothing to do with them as
a result. 2
Publicly emasculated for appearing in German uniform, the men from Camp Grant and the Allied
War Exposition symbolize Chicago’s and Illinois’ engagement with the public in a display
conveying the meaning of the government’s war effort. The Exposition was a joint venture
between federal, state, and local officials originating with the U. S. Committee on Public
Information (CPI), overseen through the State Council of Defense of Illinois in conjunction with
a committee of prominent Chicagoans. The event and its leaders instructed visitors that their visit
represented their assent in an ongoing conversation between allied governments and publics on the
purpose of the war. Speaking at the exhibition’s opening, Samuel Insull, chair of the State Council
of Defense of Illinois noted the event offered “a better understanding of the needs of your
Government and above all for a better understanding of your duty.”3 Insull and Illinois’ State
Council of Defense (a branch of the National Council) worked tirelessly beginning in 1917 to
oversee those needs, and to instruct the citizens of Illinois on how to carry out their duties in
support of the war. The former’s efforts reflected the centralizing efforts of the U. S. government
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to define the mission of the war (a “civilized” allies defeat of the “barbarous” Germany and
its supporters), and balance between coercion and vigilantism in support of the cause. 4
Speaking at another event on February 23, 1918, Insull articulated a “civil” American war effort
as anti-German by definition. He proclaimed “those who question the righteousness of America’s
cause…speak with a German accent,” and “there is no god but power, and Prussia is his profit”
remained the creed of Germany. 5 Thus, public and private groups at the exhibition hoped visitors
would view their displays as defense of that “righteousness.” The YMCA, YWCA, Training Camp
Association, and other voluntary organizations had booths at the exhibition to model their
contributions to the allied war effort. “Appendages of the nation-state,” these organizations aligned
their war efforts with reflecting the civilizing mission of the U. S. in the war. 6 Their stalls featured
young women in service roles like YWCA hostesses, Red Cross nurses, and Food
Administration/Women’s Committee workers; juxtaposed against the efforts of male soldiers
reenacting battle scenes of the western front, their positions reinforced the message that the natural
innocence of those soldiers through the horrors of war was preserved through their volunteering.
Representing the “voluntarism” that President Woodrow Wilson demanded, these organizations
segregated members and thoroughly supported the gendered notions of the war’s objectives. 7
A vast historiography exists on a variety of aspects of the Great War, with recent forays into the
American home front experience emphasizing anti-Germanism, forms of violence, and the
relationship between the citizen and the state in the process of the war (mainly David Kennedy
and Christopher Capozzola).8 Scholars have examined Great War commemoration and cultural
4
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reclamations of memory in earnest since Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory
(1975), and since the same period scholars have more frequently included gender in the
analysis of those memories. 9 While scholars have examined commemoration, home fronts, gender
and the state—such examinations in the United States are lacking. This paper seeks to fill that gap,
placing the process of the Allied War exhibition within the context of these discussions of
masculinity and state authority in the U. S. Voluntarism and vigilantism intersected at the
exhibition, demonstrating an America committed to war with its allies, and prosecuted by a “civil”
man committed to maintaining a civilized anti-German world.
The pageantry of the fair offered its sponsoring organizations daily opportunities to engage in a
patriotic outreach effort to Chicago and the Midwest on the objectives of the war. In the posters,
art, singers and dancers, re-enactors, speeches, trophies and philanthropic displays, American
“masculinities” emerged in the service of that mission. Exhibition organizers gendered the war’s
objectives on display at the fair, “effectively embodied in the identity of the individual soldier as
a national masculinity that attenuates masculinities of class, region, and ethnicity.”10
Discrimination and at times violence plagued Germans living in Illinois during the war. The State
Council of Defense worked during the period with the American Protective League (APL) to
observe German organizations and monitor their loyalty. Volunteer groups that worked with the
government to sponsor the exhibition (members of the APL gave four minute speeches across the
Chicago area advertising the event) created a culture in the state whereby “many Germans
experienced nearly as extreme a form of racialized disadvantage as African Americans did in
Georgia. In particular, they might be lynched merely for having a German surname.”11 Illinois’
home front culture during the war constructed an ideal of manhood dependent on many factors-one’s ethnicity (race) especially; you could not be a “hyphenated” American. 12 The rhetoric of the
10, no. 2 (Fall, 1999): 307-352; Michael Willrich, “Home Slackers: Men, the State, and Welfare in
Modern America,” The Journal of American History 87, no. 2 (September, 2000): 460-489.
9
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Indiana University Press, 2006.
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German-Americans, along with immigrant groups nationwide in 1917 faced a campaign to “remove the
hyphen.” However, such groups did not dictate the terms of removal, and German Americans still faced
daily discrimination. In the case of Robert Prager, a Collinsville, IL miner lynched in April, 1918,
3B1–3

PAPER 3B1 – JOSH FULTON

Governor of Illinois “appealed to current ideals of racial purity, notions of women’s proper
function in society,” and constructed masculinities for American men to embody,
demonstrating an objective of the government’s collective war effort meant to denude Americans
of their European racial or ethnic heritages (German especially). 13 Through the platform of the
exhibition and its sundry media, visitors to the exhibition saw war duties differentiated by gender
and a masculinity that embodied a variety of images--virile, civil, and anti-German--for the
American serviceman.
While this conversation with the public to convey “proper” patriotism and American manhood did
not begin until entry in the war in April 1917, its start reflected the core conflicts in prewar society
and demonstrated that Americans would need to assent to a vision of unity conveyed in many
forms. Since the 1890s, progressives had given federal, state and local governmental authorities
an increasingly activist approach to legislation. Americans grappled with immigration and
nativists, ethnic and racial division, economic downturns, labor unrest, and periodic imperial
conflicts (the Spanish American War of 1898) that furthered masculine ideals in the years before
the Great War. 14 Historian Christopher Capozzola argues that such themes articulated a spectrum
of vigilance and vigilantism Americans already were familiar with when President Wilson called
for a declaration of war on April 2, 1917.15 Wilson articulated his call for war in terms of
reluctance, and historian David Kennedy notes many Americans did not feel a threat of “imminent
peril of physical harm.”16 Couching the US effort in the rhetoric of progressivism and the necessity
of unity in the cause of international peace, the President proclaimed “The world must be made
safe for democracy,” and “we have no selfish ends to serve.”17 Wilson portrayed a civil collection
of allies seeking to halt the expansion of a barbarian power.

civilians demonstrated the acceptability of communal violence to enforce the boundaries of American
identity.
13
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between such imperial conflicts and masculinity in the U. S. and U. K. , see Kristin Hoganson, Fighting
For American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and PhilippineAmerican Wars (1998); John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian
England (1999).

15

Capozzola, 1357.

16

David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 46.

17
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In order to halt that power however, federal authorities needed to work with state and local
governments, and numerous voluntary organizations to “create a ‘correct’ public opinion in
1917-1918.”18 Created in Chicago in April 1917, the Committee of Public Information served
President Wilson’s administration as its propaganda arm. Led by George Creel, it disseminated
the administration’s war message through advertisements, artwork, posters, even a corps of public
speakers known as the “Four Minute Men.” Its Division of Films sponsored the war exhibitions,
and in Chicago worked with state and local officials, the State Council of Defense of Illinois, the
American Protective League (APL) and branches of national and state aid organizations. Each
group espoused the Wilson administration’s message of a conflict to preserve liberty against a
savage enemy. The rhetoric of masculinity and manhood permeated the speeches of the Four
Minute Men, and the government’s message of a war preserving an ideal America and its gender
roles was displayed at the fair. 19 A spectrum of prewar movements that had advocated “muscular
Christianity” and an ideal male who reflected a Victorian image of medieval chivalry characterized
the images on advertisements, posters, and overall exhibition experience. 20 Chivalry, constructed
by Allen J. Frantzen in Bloody Good, took many forms. Sacrificial chivalry, for the nouveau
knights of the allies engaged in its practice, involved “use of force as revenge for Christ’s death,”
volunteering “to suffer,” and education. 21 The images of the exhibition reflected an intersection
between such sacrificial chivalry and George Mosse’s “hegemonic masculinity,” an ideal of
masculinity “as of one piece from its very beginning: body and soul, outward appearance and
inward virtue.”22 Soldiers, aid/reform societies, and public officials’ constructed an ideal of
manhood as naturally polar—boyish yet virile, civil yet martial, American not German.
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“Of course, to make a perfectly good war of it, there must be Germans.”23
Illinois’ responses to the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 varied depending on community
ethnicity and labor alliances, and anti-Germanism exploded after America’s entry in the war. A
sizeable minority of Chicago’s two and a half million residents in 1914 identified as first or secondgeneration German immigrants (nearly 400,000), and communities of more than 100,000 Poles,
Irish, Russians, Czechs and Serbs existed in the city. 24 Many first and second generation German
immigrants actively supported the German war effort from the outset of the war until 1917, holding
public rallies, raising aid funds, and offering volunteers for the German army and Republican
mayor Bill Thompson “urged traditional American isolationism, the kind favored by his core of
supporters in the Protestant middle class.” 25 Thompson supported a preparedness movement in
the city during 1916, but his opposition to American troop deployment to France in 1917 garnered
him widespread public disapproval with most of the city embracing the war.
Most municipal and state government officials in Illinois did not follow Thompson’s approach
after entry in the war. Governor Frank Lowden created the State Council of Defense of Illinois to
coordinate home front activities from aid organizations, state harvests, and social hygiene, to
liberty loan drives. The State Council “was intended to be, The Government of Illinois in relation
to all matters affecting the state and its citizens, directly or indirectly, in connection with support
and prosecution of the war from every conceivable angle.”26 While a single woman held a
leadership position with the overall State Council, there was a separate Women’s Committee to
coordinate home front programs related to women for the war and reinforce roles as dutiful
housewives (ranging from educational outreach in homemaking activities to social hygiene
exhibits and lectures—a thousand lectures between July 24-August 24, 1918). 27 The executive
committee, based in Chicago and led by Samuell Insull coordinated statewide efforts, but county
councils coordinated many local wartime efforts (sometimes with disastrous results). According
to Tina Brakebill, the State Council worked within individual counties “to remedy this perceived
lack of war enthusiasm,” and “acted as an agent for some of the larger national groups, such as the
American Protective League.”28 County councils responded to local dictates on the war, supporting
anti-Germanism or anti-labor (IWW) efforts and vigilante citizens groups that forced citizens to
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swear loyalty oaths publicly, and seeking to abolish the use of the German language in
schools, churches or the press. 29
With the German offensives in the spring of 1918, and the resulting allied counterattacks that
summer and fall, Illinois’ war government agreed to the Committee of Public Information’s efforts
to host an Allied War Exhibition in the city of Chicago. Planning for the exhibition began in late
July, with the beginning of the fair to coincide with Labor Day celebrations in the city. 30 In
collaboration with Insull and the State Council, a local Citizens Committee put up initial funds of
over $125,000 for the exhibition, and donors from across Chicago’s business community pledged
funds. 31 Eventual receipts of the fair totaled $577,693. 24, with $388,506. 65 in pre-exhibition
ticket sales of 1,570,877 tickets. 32 A further 255,132 tickets were purchased at the gates during
the exhibition, and additional funds from boat excursions, meal tickets to a soldier’s mess, parking,
programs, and a French war photograph catalogue contributed to an operational profit of $305,524.
11 after expenses. 33
Ticket sales took place across Chicago, available at post offices, businesses, and through the public
schools. Twenty-five cents paid admission for one adult (or two children), and the organizers made
discount tickets of fifteen cents available for “poor dependents” and to the Chicago Public Schools.
34
Daily events for ticket sales en masse occurred; as when the beef packers Armour & Company
and Swift & Company used exhibition trucks and women as ticket hawkers to sell thousands.
Covering the event, the Chicago Daily Tribune included a photograph of a fresh-faced young
soldier, J. Ogden Armour, and three “war dogs” named Medusa, Terval, and Vulcan to convey the
martial nature of the upcoming fair. 35 In a separate story, the paper highlighted the efforts of the
29
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foreign language press in the city to support ticket purchases and the exposition. 36
Highlighting “tenacious England with hard hitting Canada, indomitable France, spectacular
Italy, and martyred Belgium,” the rhetoric in support of the event drew on themes of innocence
and unity in the face of the “Hun.”37

“ALL MEN must harken to my message … My appeal inspired the Great Crusade … I
breath the flame of true American Patriotism … I am a Soldier … I am the Mouthpiece of
Democracy … I am a Four-Minute Man.”38
Backed by its gendered creed that advocated a chivalric link between crusading and 20th century
democracy, the “Four Minute Men” advertised for the exhibition throughout Chicago. According
to its own postwar history, the “Four Minute Men” originated in Chicago in the march towards
war in March-April, 1917. Led by Donald M. Ryerson and supported by Senator Medill
McCormick, the group wanted to “send speakers to motion picture theatres to urge upon the public
an appreciation of the importance of military preparedness.”39 Folded into the US government’s
Committee of Public Information on June 16, 1917, the organization claims its speakers provided
over 750,000 speeches during the war—on numerous topics nationwide. 40 The Chicago branch
operated on local funds, and worked in concert with the State Council of Defense of Illinois to
project the message of the war.
Speaking topics were directed nationally and distributed across the country to each branch for use.
“Four Minute Men” applied for the volunteer position, and went through an evaluation process.
Speakers were taught to keep to four minutes, and “speak with earnest conviction” while
recognizing “you are the Government’s man; speak as if with this backing.”41 During the period
of the exhibition, national speech topics were “Where Did You Get Your Facts?” and “Register,”
an exhortation on Selective Service. 42 In the period leading to the fair however, they incorporated
attendance at the fair as part of the exhortation of patriotic duties they provided to Chicagoans.
George R. Jones, a Chicago branch leader in July 1918, was invited by State Council Chairman

36
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Samuel Insull to serve on the local War Exposition Committee. 43 Four Minute Men included
information on the exhibition with their bulletin speech on “Where Did You Get Your
Facts,” imploring attendance at the fair. 44 The bulletin’s rhetoric offered instruction on forms of
German propaganda, and the benefits of rumor avoidance. Counseling the public on vigilance
against Germans and German culture in American society and playing on the gendered nature of
the war, it dispelled a rumor that the U. S. engaged in “drafting of ‘dancing partners’ for the
soldiers in training,” and confirmed “Germans have acted as leaders in Sunday school and Bible
classes, with the sole intent of sowing dissension.”45 The Chicago branch estimated that at the end
of the war, they had reached an estimated 25,000,000 people with 50,000 speeches and 451
speakers at countless venues. 46
With the opening of the exhibition September 1918, the Four Minute Men shifted their focus to
incorporate the new topic of selective service registration. Proclaiming the war a gendered struggle
between the manhood of nations and arguing that American men would voluntarily register for the
draft (unlike Prussia), the new bulletin noted “the manhood and practical sense of American
citizenship is now going to match itself against the Prussian military detective system.”47 In service
of advertising the war exhibition and the government’s war mission, the Four Minute Men actively
characterized the civic duty of American citizens during the Great War through a gendered lens—
patriotism’s cheerleaders, they constructed an ideal innocent American male. He was devoid of
Germanness, and on display for the Midwestern viewing public at the fair.

43
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Newspapers like the Chicago Daily Tribune, along
with the Chicago Daily News and other dailies in
the city represented a key advertising platform for
the exhibitors. Along with the speeches of the Four
Minute Men, the rhetoric and images of the papers
before and during the exhibition reinforced to the
public the German savage “ideal,” and the
civil/chivalrous yet virile American manhood
ready for war. “If you can once get yourself around
to the point of view of the Prussian mind you will
have no qualms about tossing a bomb into an
orphan asylum on your way home from church.”48
A chivalrous American could not conceive of such
an act.
In an article titled “Hun Kultur and American
Antidote” on September 1st, the Chicago Daily
Tribune included photographs of preparation for
the exhibition that reflect the many masculinities
of the allied war mission. One with a subtitle of
“Youthful Patriot with Signal Gun” featured a
young boy named Harold LaRue dressed in a Navy
Uniform, looking ready to fire the weapon.49
Another featured a church cross from Revigny,
France. “Desecrated by Germans,” and surrounded
by youthful looking American sailors, the image of Figure 1. “Hun Kultur and American Antidote,” Chicago
Tribune, September 1, 1918, 3.
the damaged cavalry suggests the mission of
American men in the war as necessary to prevent
such atrocities from occurring further. 50 Reflecting the veneration for youth, male camaraderie
and discipline of the chivalry movement in the years before the war, the image supports Allen J.
Frantzen’s definition of chivalry as a process that exists in many forms, of which the anti-sacrificial
variety “seeks to bring the cycle of violence to a halt,” and is evident in the photograph. 51
When a bomb exploded at the federal building on September 4th, two days after the exhibition’s
opening, the press seized on the event with by now established anti-German and anti-International
Workers of the World (IWW) tropes. Suggesting blame lay with the IWW, the Chicago Daily

48
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6, 1918, 8.
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News also included a cartoon on page one the next day titled “The Enemy at Home.”52 It
depicted someone climbing in a window in a brick wall, with “Loyal America” emblazoned
on the wall, “Anti-American” on their suit, a blue star in the window, and a bomb in their brutish
left hand. 53 One story from September 3, 1918, lamented the failure of the Chicago Public School
District to fully end the teaching of German, and school curricula now embraced preparation for
war according to prescribed gender roles. “Vocal drills for boys will give way to drills with guns.
Color studies for girls will be replaced by practice in making doughnuts and coffee.”54 “Militant
Mary” appeared as a cartoon figure, prim with glasses and lecturing “I will not purchase German
goods when this mad conflict’s O’ER. No cash of mind shall help the HUNS TO PLAN
ANOTHER WAR!”55 Such cartoons and anti-German rhetoric reinforced the State Council of
Defense’s mission of a civil, loyal man and industrious woman doing their duty for America.

“It is an exhibition planned to interest and educate, and, we hope, to inspire.”56
Intended as “inspiring” images for the fair, war exposition posters played on themes of battle, loss
of innocence in war, and the angelic phoenix emerging. “THOUSANDS of GERMAN TROPHIES
FROM THE FRONT at the US GOV’T WAR EXPOSITION” offered attendees the thrill of
viewing “ACTUAL Army and Navy Battles, Tanks in Action, Flying Battle Planes, Trench
Warfare, Captured German Aeroplanes and Guns” while showing a drawing of a young solider
with a cigarette, sitting and holding a German helmet. 57 The soldier looks longingly to one side
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amidst the material of war, with
“HOW THE MIGHTY HAVE
FALLEN” written across the
bottom of the poster. 58
“See Our Boys in Action at the U.
S. Government WAR Exposition”
shows three well supplied soldiers
manning a machine gun post,
helmets and gun gleaming, poised
for combat. 59 In a poster with no
clear title, just “U. S. Government
WAR EXPOSITION” along the
foot of the image, an angel rises
looking upward from the fire of the
tools of modern warfare. 60 The
posters
conveyed
haughty Figure 2. Poster images, file 517/028, State Council of Defense (WWI):
American manhood experiencing
Committee on Public Information/Special Citizens’ Committee of
Chicago Photo Album, September 2 1918, State of Illinois Archives.
war’s
transformative
nature.
Gendered newspaper rhetoric,
image advertisements in the press, and posters fair-goers encountered collectively reinforced
masculinity as martial, chivalrous and not German in wartime.
Chicagoans immersed themselves in marches and celebrations for the war effort on September 2,
1918, the day the exhibition opened to the public. It coincided with the city’s Labor Day activities,
and a grand labor parade down Michigan Avenue next to the fair occurred—with an estimated
250,000 people participating as marchers or spectators. 61 A 1,300 piece band played patriotic
music for the unveiling of a giant memorial arch near Michigan and Monroe Avenues, an
experience the Chicago Daily Journal’s coverage noted caused a woman to faint but demonstrated
Chicago’s unity in the war “to a man.”62 Parade spectators could then head to the exhibition
grounds in and around Grant Park (east of Michigan Avenue and overlooking the lake), where a
wealth of war ephemera awaited them. After passing through one of the entryways, visitors
encountered a scene designed to place them in either a vigilant America preparing for war
(complete with a mock soldier’s mess hall, soldier’s camp, and a towering replica of the Statue of
58
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59
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Liberty), or a conceptualized France through a “no-man’s land” and war relics. Using rail to
transport the war trophies, “seventeen carloads of it at least,” from “wherever the rugged
fighters met the Hun” immersed visitors in the ephemera of the war. 63 In surveying the breadth of
“trophies” and “booty,” the Chicago Daily Tribune remarked on the French shrine to be displayed
“remembering their beloved cathedral of Reims,” and firmly placed the conflict in chivalric tones.
64
Thus, the efforts reflected the government’s gendered war mission in a transnational conflict
seeking through the exhibition to excite the public to its “civilizing” mission.
Attendees could purchase programs or a souvenir collection of war photography selected from an
ongoing exhibit of French war art and Italian photography at the Art Institute (a ticket to the war
exhibition included admission to the Art Institute’s collection). 65 A long series of exhibit halls
dominated the Western areas of the exhibition, each for the allied nations participating (Belgium,
France, Britain, Canada, and Italy) with the American armed forces, government and volunteer
organizations that aided in the war effort. These organizations included the Commission on
Training Camp Activities, the YMCA and YWCA, the American Red Cross, the Liberty Loan
Committee, the War Recreation Board of Illinois, the National War Savings Committee, the
Illinois Tuberculosis Association, the Woman’s Committee Council of National Defense, the U.
S. Food Administration, the Knights of Columbus, the Fort Sheridan Association, the Western
Relief Fund, the American Fund for French Wounded the Fatherless Children of France, the
Daughters of British Empire War Relief, and the Salvation Army. 66 The State Council of Defense
of Illinois operated the exhibition under the aegis of the Chicago organizing committee. Branches
of the Committee of Public Information, Women’s State Council of Defense, American Protective
League, and other agencies (government or auxiliary) also attended the event. The center of the
exhibition grounds resembled a “no-man’s land” in miniature, with the ground built up around it
to provide a viewing area for daily reenactments. Southern areas of the exhibition grounds
provided bivouac for soldiers participating in the exhibition, and parking for spectators. The
southwest portion of the grounds contained a pavilion known as the “Liberty Forum” for speeches
and concert performances near a statue of an angel in a ship’s bow armed with a sword in one hand
and a dove in the other.67 The statute symbolized the justice of the allied cause through a feminine
63
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angel, yet also the duality of America’s
image of its own war efforts as the
statue is depicted gliding across a body
of water flanked by two more angelic
figures
kneeling—one
with
its
outstretched hand downwards to
suggest aid. 68 The spatial experience
constructed by the exhibition organizers
intended to overwhelm their visitors in
their projection of this gendered war
effort.
Each day of the exhibition offered
spectators a bevy of tours and
reenactments, along with a variety of
participatory experiences around a
common theme—many of which linked
“One of the Statues U. S. Govt War Exposition,” file 517/028,
civilians directly to the war effort, and Figure 3. State
Council of Defense (WWI): Committee on Public
reflected the gendered nature of the
Information/Special Citizens’ Committee of Chicago Photo
Album, September 2 1918, State of Illinois Archives.
allied mission. Opening day of the
exhibition began at 12pm, after the
Labor Day festivities, and included a community sing, band concerts, tours of exhibit halls, an
afternoon and evening reenactment, and a speech from Simon O’Donnell (in charge of the Labor
Day parade). 69 Speaking at the opening, Samuel Insull noted the exhibition represented “the
brutality and destructiveness of war waged by a ruthless conscienceless nation, thereby compelling
better peoples to emulate their destructiveness.”70 For Insull, the “better peoples” of the U. S. , its
allies, and their advocates in the form of government, auxiliary, and volunteer organizations were
not naturally violent. Nations of “conscience” were compelled to war and the exhibitors projected
this duality. In an image from the opening day of the exhibition titled “A Pageant of All Nations,”
the allies take the form of young women or boys— some holding flags, and dressed in a variety of
ethnic ensembles standing in a pyramid at the base of the replica Statue of Liberty.71 The pyramid,
capped by a youthful and innocent American soldier and sailor with a feminine figure of justice

68

Ibid.

69

United States Government War Exposition, “Labor Day: Program for September 2, US Government War
Exposition Chicago,” September 2 1918, United States Government War Exposition Photograph
Album, Research Center, Chicago History Museum.

70

Insull, “Mr Insull, Opening of War Exposition, September 2, 1918,” 1-2.

71

“A Pageant of All Nations,” file 517/028, State Council of Defense (WWI): Committee on Public
Information/Special Citizens’ Committee of Chicago Photo Album, September 2 1918, State of Illinois
Archives.
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in-between, signifies the nature
of the allied war mission—youth
at a war not of their choosing,
nations represented in feminine
figures offering innocent men in
their defense.
Following the opening, the
exhibition offered days devoted
to the major participating allies,
and core themes of the war effort.
On
Children’s
Day,
the
exhibition featured a special
parade of children (some in baby
carriages), organized by their
families’ connections to military
service. 72 Major allies typically
sent diplomatic or military
envoys who spoke on their day,
and
musical
performances
centered around specific nations.

Figure 4. “A Pageant of All Nations,” file 517/028, State Council of Defense
(WWI): Committee on Public Information/Special Citizens’ Committee
of Chicago Photo Album, September 2 1918, State of Illinois Archives.

September 3rd, Belgian Day,
included speeches from diplomatic minister E. de Cartier de Marchienne, a Belgian envoy; and
Belgian Major Leon Osterrieth. 73 They praised the American effort in the war, and the next day
visitors witnessed aerial combat reenactments overhead from U. S. military pilots and the
International “Flying Circus.”74 British day included speeches from Geoffrey Butler (Director of
the British Information Bureau) and Lord Reading (Britain’s U. S. Ambassador). Each cemented
the relationship between the U. S. and Britain in their speeches, with Butler noting “that the
Declaration of Independence ‘has been adopted into the British Constitution’.”75
French Day coincided with the anniversary of the Marquis de Lafayette’s birthday, and featured a
poetry reading that highlighted the gendered nature of the war. The Chicago Daily News included
a photograph of a French “High Commission” of officers and the French Consul M.A.
72

Helen Wethrell, “Women’s Varied War Duties,” Chicago Daily Journal, September 9 1918, 11.

73

United States Government War Exposition, “Program for September 3, US Government War Exposition
Chicago,” September 3 1918, United States Government War Exposition Photograph Album, Research
Center, Chicago History Museum.

74

“‘Battles’ in Air Will Thrill War Exposition Crowd Today,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 4 1918,
3. http://0-search. proquest. com. library. morainevalley. edu/docview/174397798? accountid=1977.
Accessed 8 May, 2015.

75

“War Show Talk Links Britain and U.S. Closer: Geoffrey Butler Declares Union of Two Peoples Must
Never End,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 5 1918, 17. http://0-search. proquest. com. library.
morainevalley. edu/docview/174416145?accountid=1977. Accessed 8 May, 2015.
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Barthelmy.76 The Chicago Daily Journal described “girls gathered en masse” not for one of
the day’s speakers, William Jennings Bryan, but besmitten by the Legion of Honor on the
chest of twenty-three year old French Lieutenant Marcel Levie, a wounded combat veteran and
former prisoner of war.77 The admiration for Levie shows the desire to construct such a masculine
glory across the boundaries of the allied nations against Germany. The day included constant
singing of “La Marseillaise,” and the paper noted public admiration for French officers—soldiers
of America’s “most dramatic ally.”78 Scheduled just after 2pm, a reading of Dr. Henry Van Dyke’s
“The Name of France” contextualized the mission of the war in a tone of chivalric masculinity.
Read by Donald Robertson, the poem highlighted France’s leadership
of the human race to win its way
From the feudal darkness into the day
Of Freedom, Brotherhood, Equal Right…
A name that speaks of the blood outpoured
To Save mankind from the sway of the sword—
A name that calls on the world to share
In the burden of sacrificial strife. 79

Van Dyke’s words reflect the forms of chivalry within the mission of the war for the allies, and
one of the versions of masculinity on display at the exhibition. Coupled with a host of images
(including the desecrated cavalry) and Frantzen’s conceptualization of the sacrificial nature of
some chivalric responses, visitors to the fair saw an allied war effort of culturally ennobled 20th
century “knights” arising to righteous service against a barbaric German foe.
Speaking at Canada Day on September 10, 1918 Samuel Insull placed the service of the Canadians
in line with the gendered themes of the overall allied war mission. Stressing the voluntarism of a
nation that committed to the war before asked by Great Britain, Insull painted a gendered rhetorical
portrait of a U. S. neighbor doing more than its part in the conflict. A nation built in wilderness,
he noted that “the able bodied Canadians have gone to the war and the weak and the women are
carrying on the struggle, uncomplainingly, at home.”80 Insull and the exhibitors projected an image
of necessary and industrious women, but mostly bordered by the home front in their ability to serve
unless with an organization like the Red Cross. Over 100,000 spectators turned out on Red Cross
Day, which featured a parade of more than 12,000 Red Cross workers (the Chicago Daily
Tribune’s photo covering the exhibition that day included two innocent and young-looking women

76

“French High Commission Here,” Chicago Daily News, September 6 1918, 3.

77

“Today’s Programs at War Exposition,” Chicago Daily Journal, September 3 1918; 4.

78

“French are Heroes of Day at War Fair,” Chicago Daily News, September 6 1918, 3.

79

Dr. Henry Van Dyke, “The Name of France.” https://archive. org/details/name_of_france_ librivox,
accessed 18 April 2015.

80

Samuel Insull, “War Show September 10, 1918,” September 10 1918, series 6, folder 20-5, Papers of
Samuel Insull, Loyola University Chicago Archives, 3.
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as Red Cross workers). 81 News of American success in the St. Mihiel salient dominated
coverage of Pershing Day (September 13th) at the exhibition. Speaking at the event, General
Pershing’s brother James noted according to the Chicago Daily Tribune, “‘When heaven gets
ready to make peace with hell, then it’s time for us to begin making peace with Germany. ’”82 The
paper’s coverage of the day included a photo of a resolute James Pershing with two young girls
who marched in a parade at the exhibition, holding a banner with a star titled “Fathers in Service.”83
On All-America Day (September 15th), the program featured folk songs, dancing, and speeches
from contingents of Lithuanians, Lettonians (Latvians) Poles, Russians and Ukrainians. Most
evenings featured films in no man’s land, but All-America day included a “Living Picture” from
the Foreign Language Division of the Liberty Loan Committee titled “The Nations of the Earth
Paying Homage to Liberty.”84 With the use of “homage” marking the reliance on feudal rhetoric,
the picture represented another manner in which the exhibitors sought to define the mission of
their war in chivalric terms.
The exhibit halls for the volunteer organizations and government auxiliary agencies offered
opportunities for these groups to project an image of support for the war mission placed firmly in
gendered terms of men volunteering to fight and women aiding their effort at home and abroad.
The military’s Commissions on Training Camp Activities incorporated work from the YMCA,
Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, American Library Association, YWCA, and War
Camp Community Service. At the Commissions exhibit, a frieze from artist Willy Pogany titled
“The Spirit of the Commissions” hung. It “portrayed America as a beautiful young woman sending
out a soldier with fixed bayonet and a sailor carrying a magnificent flag—fit to fight for the
freedom of the world.”85 That fitness, according to the Commissions, improved measurably by the
environment they provided for soldiers and sailors in new camps for the war. Visitors entered a
model of a Mexican town, designed to replicate the perceived immoral social position men faced
while on the Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916. Passing through the model to examples of
current accommodations soldiers and sailors had, the goal “to surround the men with an
environment clean, wholesome and inspiring” occurred. 86 Visitors could eat in a military mess,
view a Liberty Theater, see a camp library, athletic facilities, and club rooms for letter writing.
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“Nurses Parade on Red Cross Day at the War Exposition,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 6 1918, 3.
http://0-search. proquest. com. library. morainevalley. edu/docview/174421077? accountid=1977.
Accessed 8 May, 2015.
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“Yanks in France Make Music for Pershing Day: Friday the Thirteenth for Huns’ Celebrated at War
Show,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 14 1918, 3. http://0-search. proquest. com. library.
morainevalley. edu/docview/174441359?accountid=1977. Accessed 8 May, 2015.
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“Daughters of Stars,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 14 1918, 3. http://0-search. proquest. com.
library. morainevalley. edu/docview/174441359?accountid=1977. Accessed 8 May, 2015.
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United States Government War Exposition, “All America Day Program for September 15, US
Government War Exposition Chicago,” September 15 1918, United States Government War Exposition
Photograph Album, Research Center, Chicago History Museum.
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With hostess houses to provide “for the soldier’s visiting mother, sister, wife or sweetheart,”
the Commissions felt they properly aided a new model army of men “untainted by vice or
liquor.”87 Such Commission models demonstrate the manner in which organizers of the exhibition
presented America and the allies as gendered societies immersed in a Great War. Wholesome men
served on the battlefront for civilization, women acted to facilitate their innocence.
Viewed against the fair’s many evident masculinities, roles constructed for women emphasized
voluntarism, and either service to the process of sending men to war, or acting industriously to
preserve the home front. In a Salvation Army dugout with a sign “Soldier’s Rest Room” across it,
a woman pours what appears to be coffee in a fresh-faced soldier’s mug while another soldier
holds a plate of donuts and looks on. 88 A local Khaki and Blue Club worked with the Camp
Commissions to host dances for soldiers and sailors, and coordinate with Soldiers and Sailors clubs
in the Chicagoland area. Women’s clubs in Chicago in September 1918 announced a new initiative
to create a cohort of young hostesses available for such dances. Restricted to women already in
volunteer organizations (such as the YWCA) and over eighteen years old, they were “required to
take a pledge ‘to treat every young man in the uniform of the United States as a brother in the
service, to honor him for his gift to his country, and not to lower his ideal of womanhood by
frivolous or insincere conduct. ’”89 Manhood at the exhibition thus linked with womanhood by
association: women must preserve the expected social ideal to appropriately “honor” the service
of men and maintain men’s “fitness” for war. As a component of that “fitness,” the U. S. Food
Administration and the Women’s Committee of the State Council of Defense of Illinois had a joint
exhibit of a model kitchen to demonstrate proper conservation efforts during the war in the
household. 90 Industrious canning and refashioning of clothing efforts projected women’s
commitment to preserving the gendered household ideal in wartime, an ideal that called men to
service in the public sphere.
Over 100,000 people turned out daily to witness the exhibition from September 2-15, 1918 and its
efforts to excite citizen morale behind the war succeeded, but did not constitute the only goal. The
Chicago Citizens Committee and State Council of Defense of Illinois worked in collaboration with
the U. S. military, federal agencies, voluntary organizations, and government/military contingents
from Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium and Italy to put on the event. It featured
reenactments, performances, exhibit halls of relics and trophies of war, and demonstrations of the
missions of a variety of organizations committed to allied victory. A victory of civilization over
barbarism, liberty and Christianity over “kultur,” and innocence over savagery—the organizers
placed the war in overtly masculine terms, constructed daily through the ephemera of the
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exhibition. That masculinity took many forms, reflecting the chivalric nature of the allies’
view of the war. American soldiers existed as innocents; virile certainly, but thrust into a
war and willing to sacrifice for civilization. War’s violence did not hold glory for the Americans
engaged in it—the act of participating in the service of that effort constituted both a glorious and
masculine act. For the “fritzies” of the exhibition’s reenactments, voluntary sacrifice for the nation
(and civilization) in battle remained the only avenue for them to reclaim their masculinity in a state
that could not equate it with Germanness.
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The Allied Expositionary Forces in WWI:
From Encouragement to Commemoration of War
Steven A. Walton
Michigan Technological University
It is common to see a cannon in front of many courthouses or city halls, town squares, or cemeteries
across America. Similarly, military planes are often on display at airports (often on a stalk to
simulate flight) and tanks and helicopters can be seen at Veterans of Foreign Wars or American
Legion posts as well. But the display of the military hardware at each of these sites carries a
different valence: civic honor at a government building, remembrance at a cemetery, or sacrifice
at a veteran’s post. Inquiring how this diverse use of commemorative weaponry came to be is more
complex than may at first appear, and when our attention is narrowed to World War I and its
immediate aftermath, even more interesting situations of display become apparent.
This paper explored the other “AEF” during WWI—the Allied Expositionary Forces—and the
interest in displaying war relics and trophies back at home. In particular, it asks how and why this
was done, and how the attitude and meaning of these objects changed from wartime to the postwar
period.

Introduction – the Local Story
In August 1919, local Houghton County papers recorded the arrival of a captured German field
piece with great ceremony.1 Captured by the 32nd “Red Arrow” division made up of Wisconsin
and Michigan recruits, the gun, it was said, was taken at the [Second?] Battle of the Marne. When
it arrived, the locals beheld a quite pristine example of a camouflaged Prussian 77mm Feldkanone,
that resembled the French 75mm gun of the day with which American doughboys would have been
very familiar, as we mostly used French guns once we got “over there.”
The gun arrived at the Copper Range station drawn by one of the fire teams of the Village and was
escorted to the college by the soldiers themselves, some of whom had served in Europe during the
conflict, as well as local Civil War Veterans and the home guards, and led by the Houghton Band
conducted by Maj. Ralph Loveland of Calumet as Marshall. All members of the 107th Engineering
battalion, which was raised and based at the then Michigan College of Mining, were asked to report
to campus by 1:30, and then all veterans were to assemble at the Amphidrome [now Dee Stadium]
at 2:00pm. Interestingly, the assembly was largely in civilian garb, the veterans being explicitly
told not to trouble with their old uniforms, it being “more convenient for them to get away from
their work in civilian clothes.”
1

From 4 newspaper articles from unidentified newspapers dated 26, 27, 29, and n.d. Aug. 1919 [Michigan
Technological University Archives and Copper Country Historical Collections, Houghton, MI, vertical
file: “World War One”]. Subsequently, it was confirmed that these were from the Daily Mining Gazette
[Houghton, MI] and the Calumet News [Calumet, MI].
3B2–1

PAPER 3B2 – STEVEN A. WALTON

Figure 1. German FK16 77mm artillery piece on display on the Michigan College of Mines Campus. Source:
1924 Keweenawan Yearbook, pp. 6 and 147.

When it arrived on campus, Capt. Andrew T. Sweet, MCM Class of ’16, professor of metallurgy,
and until recently the head of the 107th, received it on behalf of the college. C. Harry Benedict
(1876-1963) of Lake Linden, representing the Board of the Federal Reserve of the Northern
District, gave a speech at 3pm. After Sweet spoke about the struggle in Europe, the band struck up
“The Star-Spangled Banner.”2 Although the newspapers note that the gun was placed on its “final
resting place” that afternoon, to later be made permanent by the installation of a concrete base,
there is no indication where it actually was displayed. Further research has found that it was
installed on the lawn in front of the Metallurgy Building, though it had been (re)moved by 1930
and its subsequent history is unknown. (Figure 1)
As to why it was displayed here, the immediate and obvious answer is that the 107th Engineers
were raised and trained here and took part in a number of significant actions during the war. In
addition, MCM provided considerable vocational training in mining and mine rescue for the
Committee on Education and Special Training throughout 1918. At the dedication, John W. Black
of the Ninth District of the Federal Reserve in Minneapolis, who was instrumental in the
distribution of trophies in 1919, sent a letter for the dedication (See Appendix A). He wrote that
the MCM gun “will rest fittingly upon the side of the engineers training camp and upon the grounds
of an institution that was devoted unreservedly to the winning of the war.” He added the
commonplace that such a trophy would be “a constant reminder of the sacrifices that the U.P. made
of her sons to the mighty struggle overseas.” But Black went further and politicized it to say that
the gun stood for “Hun domination, Hun principles of government and a Hun attitude towards the
peoples of the world, should hereafter control the nations of the earth” and that “It represents right
which is conquered might. It represents the preservation of democracy, liberty, freedom and
opportunity, through a crisis that but for a victory, might have engulfed these precious heritages
and forever buried them under the heel of the Prussian war god.” (His comments are made with no
sense of the fact that we and the Entente powers, of course, used virtually the same hardware).
2

This song had only become the most widely-recognized patriotic song in America during WWI, being
officially recognized by President Wilson in 1916 but only made the official National Anthem in 1931.
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On the other hand, C.H. Benedict, a local metallurgical engineer for Calumet & Hecla
mining company3 but also on behalf of the Ninth District, gave a presentation address that
offered a different perspective (See Appendix B). He emphasized that,
the past war was above anything else a technical and scientific one. Not only was soldier
pitted against soldier, nation was pitted against nation and for every warrior on the firing
line there were 10 civilians at home striving with the implements of the arts of peace to
forge a more effective weapon for the sterner art of war. And if there is to be no next-door
as all the peoples hope and pray it will be because science and engineering and industry
has constructed a weapon so destructive of life and property to invoke its use as an arbiter
of national dispute is to imperil the very foundations of civilization itself.

Further, he took the high road and noted that “the world needs production and producers, and not
destruction and destroyers.” His speech continues in the sort of laudatory campus commencement
speech style you would expect, but closes, “though it stand here a thousand years may it never
behold an American sword drawn, save in a righteous cause, nor if drawn, sheathed unless the
cause be victorious.”
Ultimately this local story raised a number of questions. First, there is the question of how is it that
the MCM received a gun in August 1919, when the general distribution of war trophies after WWI
did not happen until the first half of the 1920s. But the contrasting yet not conflicting approaches
of Black and Benedict raise the question of what sort of rhetoric surrounded a war trophy, and, in
particular, an artillery piece, at the time. More broadly it raises the question of why we display
military hardware, whether our own or captured, at all.4

Displaying War Trophies
There were examples of the Allies exhibiting captured German war materiel as early as November
1914 and the Canadians, as part of the BEF with more immediate access to trophies, began
collecting objects from the French as early as Spring 1916; the first show back at home was
mounted in Halifax in October 1917 and later in Toronto in late 1918.5 Some war trophies were
sent for their sheer novelty—such as the “strange… crude, but … effective” German water purifier

3

C. Harry Benedict (1876-1963) was chief metallurgist for the Calumet & Hecla mining company for 47
years and published Red Metal: The Calumet and Hecla Story (1952) and Lake Superior Milling
Practice: A Technical History of a Century of Copper Milling (1955). See MS-043, Keweenaw
Historical Society Collection, Michigan Technological University Archives and Copper Country
Historical Collections, Houghton, MI.

4

What became of the gun remains a mystery. It most likely disappeared in a scrap drive for World War II,
yet if that was the case, it is strange that there are no other pictures of it in the 20+ years it would have
stood on campus. It is also possible that the gun was recalled and redeployed to some other city
considered more deserving, although this last possibility seems unlikely given the Michigan College of
Mines’ participation during the war and its links to the 107th Engineers.

5

See Michael J.K. Walsh and Andrekos Varnava, The Great War and the British Empire: Culture and
Society (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 186-188. Catalogue of war trophies captured by Canadian
Forces on the Western Front ([Toronto?]: n.p, 1918?), but title page notes, “Shown in the Armouries,
Toronto, November 2 to 9, 1918.”
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discovered near the town of Jaulney6—and others taken for what appears to be spite that still
carry tense resonances—such as the three church bells from the Balangiga Massacre during
the Philippine Insurrection on 28 Sept. 1901.7
In one sense, the Michigan Tech gun was simply a tiny example of a much larger phenomenon.
Consider the scene in Boston in May 1919, when the city hosted the “artillery train”:
On a month-long tour of the country, the train comprised seventeen cars loaded with thirty
pieces of artillery and other military equipment. A military band led the procession of
cannons, trench mortars, anti-aircraft guns, and eight-inch howitzers through the business
district, attracting large crows. Individual guns were exhibited at prominent locations,
along with other war gear, such as a thirty-six-inch spotlight, a field radio outfit,
ambulance, and a carrier pigeon vehicle. Fifteen of the heavy guns went on display on
Boston Commons, making frequent firings that reverberated throughout the city.8

Because World War I was at such a scale and because it dragged on well beyond that hoped-for
Christmas by which everyone would be home, all the Allied nations had to turn to fundraising to
continue fighting. And in that era where radio was in its infancy, and the newsreels that
accompanied silent films still relatively rare, the display of captured enemy equipment aroused
great excitement throughout the land. Local shops would often mount a small window display of
war relics in order to both lure in customers and to sell Liberty Bonds, but the more novel and
considerable the hardware, the better.
For example, there were already subs on display in 1917—captured by the British and sent to the
US (in this case on display in Central Park and ceremoniously rechristened from “UC-5” to “UBuy-A-Bond”)9 and then also displayed alongside a British tank that had supposedly seen action
in France to raise money—and they played on the novelty of their technology to lure visitors. At
the close of the war, the U.S. received a considerable share of the now forfeit German war
equipment that included 161 submarines. Eight of these “Hun devil boats” came to the U.S. in
1919 and considerably advanced American submarine engineering.10 The captured subs also
toured the country as both curiosities and profit engines for the government. One, the German UC97, even came into the Great Lakes (getting as close to Houghton as Escanaba on July 30-31, 1920)
6

U.S. Army Engineers Regiment, History of the Twenty-Sixth Engineers (water supply regiment) in the
World War, Sept. 1917- March, 1919 (N.p.: Published by the Regiment & New England Water Works
Association, 1920), 41.

7

Alton Latson, et al., “The Philippine Insurrection. ‘US retaliates’,” USASMA Digital Library, 2005, p. 12,
online
at
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getdownloaditem/collection/p15040coll2/id/5185/filename/
5186.pdf/mapsto/pdf/type/singleitem, accessed 2 May 2018.

8

Chris Dubbs, America's U-Boats: Terror Trophies of World War I (Lincoln; London: University of
Nebraska Press, 2014), 103-04.

9

Emily Nonko, “100 years ago today, a German U-Boat submarine ended up in Central Park,” 6sqft [blog],
Oct. 25, 2017, online at https://www.6sqft.com/100-years-ago-today-a-german-u-boat-submarineended-up-in-central-park/.

10

“Japan Sends for Hun Submarines as War Trophies,” The Honolulu Advertiser, 18 Dec 1918, p. 1.
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on her way to Chicago and the Great Lakes Naval Training Station. Audiences thrilled at the
“German sea murderer …. menacing in aspect with her decks almost awash, her steel, gray
conning tower rising high above the water and the four-inch gun forward,” as she sailed into
various ports from April to August 1919.11 She was sunk by gunnery practice on June 7, 1921 and
still lies on the bottom of the lake, somewhere off Kenosha, WI.12
Even more substantial was the Allied War Exposition (AWE), which toured two dozen cities in
1918 and 1919.13 (Fig. 2) The Committee for Public Information (CPI) was organized in April
1917 by Wilson’s Executive Order No. 2594, empowering the Secretaries of State, War, and the

11

“German U-Boat Arrives Here,” Detroit Free Press, 30 Jun 1919, p. 3.

12

Dubbs, 162-67, 98-200.

13

Although the AWE was widely noted in papers of the day, there are but four archive holdings about it in
all of ArchiveGrid and none of note in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),
Washington, DC. The only consolidated holdings of AWE material is at Norwich University:
http://archives.norwich.edu/digital/search/searchterm/Allied%20War%20Exposition%20Photographs/
field/all/mode/exact/conn/and/order/nosort/page/1.

In 1943 there were 3ft. of records in the National Archives, but the finding aid for RG63 compiled in 1962
no longer includes them, noting, “Transfers of records to other agencies and disposals of useless papers
have resulted in a reduction of the records to less than one-fourth of the volume that the Council for
National Defense reported to be in its custody in 1920.” However, the finding aid for RG 63 in the
Research Consultation room at Archives II at College Park, MD has penciled annotations of current
recorded locations for the items in the 1938 classification scheme noted, and shows that the entire
subseries on the Expositions Bureau (CPI 10B) had been discarded by 1962. It is also worth noting here
that when the record group was organized in the National Archives in the 1930s, the catalogers were
also unable to locate any records of the Division of Exhibit at State Fairs run though the CPI. Quote
from Handbook of the Federal World War Agencies and their Records 1917-1921 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1943), p. 95. See Council for National Defense, “A Report Concerning Papers, Files, Records,
Public Property, Assets and Liabilities, etc. of the Committee on Public Information” June 9, 1920,
(manuscript in the files of the Committee); Roscoe R. Hill and Frank Hardee Allen, Classification
Scheme: Records of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919 (Washington, DC: National
Archives Division of Classification, 1938), 32-34; Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their
Records 1917-1921, National Archives Publication No. 24 (Washington: USGPO, 1943), 610; and Janet
Weinert, Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-19
(Record Group 63) (Washington, DC: The National Archives, 1962).
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Figure 2. Covers of catalogues from various stops of the AWE: Cincinnati (poster), San Francisco
(program), Chicago (poster), and Chicago (program). Sources (L to R): Cincinnati Museum
Center; eBay; Chicago History Center; author’s collection.

Navy to work with George Creel, formerly an investigative journalist, who promptly asked for
$100,000 directly from the White House to run numerous projects under five divisions: External
Communications, Publicity, “Vise” (i.e., vice, that is, for its suppression), Pictures, and Foreign
Affairs (i.e., what we would today call “soft power” through public information [propaganda]).
Creel initially assumed that most of the outreach to the public would be through the monthly (and
ultimately) daily printed, subscription-based, Official Bulletin.14 At first he neglected to consider
the power of film, though he included “photo plays” in his initial request, and he had to modify
the organization as 1917 went on. The CPI’s most well-known contributions were the organization
of the “Four-Minute Men,” propaganda posters, and considerable censorship enforcement—or “to
make the fight for public opinion both in this country and in other countries of the world” as their
charter proclaimed.15
The War Expositions Bureau (WEB) was set up in May 1918 under the CPI films division to
arouse the interest of the public in the war through exhibits showing armaments and captured war
trophies. Chester I. Campbell, a major New England commercial exposition planner, served as its
14

The CPI Official Bulletin was issued daily from 10 May 1917 – 31 Mar. 1919 and amounts to 12 linear
ft. in the National Archives and was followed by the weekly United States Bulletin from 3 Apr. 1919 –
14 Feb 1921 (NARA, RG63 E49 and E50).

15

NARA, RG 130, Records of the White House Office, E 18 Records Relating to the Committee on Public
Information (hereafter CPI-WH). Alfred Emile Cornebise, War as Advertised: The Four Minute Men
and America's Crusade, 1917-1918, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 156 (Philadelphia:
American Philosophical Society, 1984) and J. Michael Sproule, “The Four Minute Men and Early
Twentieth-Century Public Speaking Pedagogy,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 13, no. 2 (2010): 135–147.
The Committee also issued How the War Came to America in 1917 (and printed it in multiple languages,
including 100,000 copies in German, 75,000 in Bohemian, 50,000 each in Polish and Italian, and 15,000
in Spanish) to sway public opinion (see orders from Thomas K. Claffey, Chief Clerk of CPI to the U.S.
GPO in CPI-WH).
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first director.16 It absorbed the Bureau of War Photographs on September 1 and was
discontinued on June 30, 1919. The WEB organized the expos but did so with the direct
involvement of the various host cities who had to post a very large bond to get the travelling show
to come to their city, provide the venue, and most of the helpers to pull it off. While some towns
had it in their fairgrounds, others brought it inside. Cincinnati, for example, held it at the Music
Hall and the Chamber of Commerce posted a $25,000 bond against losses on the event. So sure
were they of the appeal of the event, local businesses posted a total of nearly $200,000 in bonds to
bring the AWEs to their towns. Although attendance was depressed by the influenza epidemic,
Cincinnati, for example, did manage to attract 160,000 visitors and posted a small profit for the
government over and above this amount.17 In other cities, an advance agent from the CPI engaged
local bankers to distribute and pre-sell tickets. In Cleveland, for example, fifty men from the
American Institute of Banking marshalled twenty-five motor cars to deliver tickets for sale to 600
stores across the region, netting sales of 75,000 tickets and a profit of $7,500.18
The WEB spent just over $1 million to mount the shows, and gate receipts alone totaled over $1.4
million (Fig. 3), a clear profit for the government. Samuel Insull, the electrical systems magnate,
oversaw the most successful stop in Chicago and it alone netted nearly $584,000 from over two
million visitors (with a quarter million in one day alone!). “Parades and other special events helped
stir enthusiasm, and there was a daily sham battle on land and in the air, employing the services of
3,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines, and a British-American squadron of fourteen war planes.”19
In most cases, the central government exhibition was augmented by local and regional attractions.
Cincinnati added displays by the Commission on Training Camp Activities and the Commission
on Volunteer War Agencies, band concerts by the men of Great Lakes Naval Training Station,
motion pictures (still quite a rarity in 1918), and even speeches by various foreign representatives.
Other societies like the Knights of Columbus, the American Library Association, the Red Cross,
and even the Humane Society mounted booths to both encourage and capitalize on the war fervor.20

16

“Chester I. Campbell,” The Boston Daily Globe, 10 August 1926; “Death Claims C. I. Campbell,” The
Boston Daily Globe, 21 Jan 1933.

17

Seventieth Annual Report of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and Merchants’ Exchange for the
Year Ending December 31, 1918 (Cincinnati: The Robert T. Morris Printing Co, 1919), 57–58.

18

Frank B. Mellen, “Cleveland Chapter,” Bulletin of the American Institute of Banking 1, no. 3 (Jan. 1919):
276–277.

19

James Robert Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War; The Story of the Committee on Public
Information, 1917-1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), 69-70.

20

“Our Field Correspondents,” The National Humane Review 7, no. 4 (April 1919): 76, noting that a quarter
million visitors saw the Red Star Animal Relief Society booth in Cincinnati, distributing thousands of
leaflets and “tagging” nearly 11,000 children(!).
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Figure 3. Allied War Exhibition 1918 Receipts.

The exhibition hit the major cities from Los Angeles and San Francisco to Chicago, Cincinnati,
and Cleveland, but also stopped in convenient places like Waco, TX and Waterloo, IA when the
Des Moines show fell through. It is also clear, given the expositions’ dates, that the show divided
itself into two parallel expos. (Table 1 and Fig. 4) The expos were marketed with such slogans as,
“Like going over the battlefields of Europe. Like visiting the War Museums of Paris, London and
Rome,” and exhortations to
Go to the War Exposition as a matter of interest. You may never have another chance! It
will give you several of the most interesting hours of a lifetime. But go, primarily, to learn
more about the war and the things you can do personally to hasten our inevitable victory.
The admission price is fifty cents. You can buy your tickets at half price in advance from
your employer, drug store, department stores, banks, clubs, theaters, in fact almost
anywhere. Don’t miss having the children see the war exposition.21

The core of the objects on display were captured war materiel, and some stops included a British
tank and a battle re-enactment. Some cities like Cincinnati posted nearly 6,000 photographs of the
men who were serving—or by the time the Expo there actually happened, had served—in
Europe.22 Other eclectic war trophies were sometimes included, though it is not clear whether these

21

“Like a Trip Into ‘No Man’s Land’” [advertisement], The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1 Dec. 1918, p. 21.

22

Margaret Breidenbaugh, “Ludlow Luther: Cincinnati Area’s First African American Casualty of WWI,”
Off the Shelf! [blog], Cincinnati Museum Center, 28 June 2017, online at
https://www.cincymuseum.org/blog/ ludlow-luther-cincinnati-area’s-first-african-american-casualtywwi, accessed 20 May 2018.
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Figure 4. The Travelling Road Show of the A.W.E.

came via the CPI or other sources: Cincinnati displayed a bronze statue of St. John the Baptist as
a child “which the Germans in their haste had to leave behind, but attempted to destroy by heaping
rubbish upon it and setting fire to it.”23 In Kansas City the American war dog brigade made an
appearance where cross-breeds of an Airedale and an English sheep dog were shown that had been
taught not to bark but were “taught to hate the Germans” (“in the course of their training German
uniforms have been put on dummies and the uniforms saturated with a … disagreeable [odor that]
they will associate [with] a German soldier”).24
Whether one sees the AWE as propaganda or entertainment is a matter of perspective. Creel, head
of the CPI, argued that,
Disunity and disloyalty tear at the very heart of courage. The Committee [for Public
Information] fights ignorance, misunderstanding, and disaffection. It works for the
maintenance of morale by every process of stimulation. We do not call it propaganda, for
the word in German hands has come to be associated with lies and corruptions. Our work
is educational and informative, for we have such confidence in our case that we feel that
no more than a fair presentation of its facts is needed to win the verdict.25

Much like air shows today, the line between displays of military hardware being marketing and
diversion gets rather blurry. It is, however, no coincidence that the AWE opened in San Francisco

23

A picture of the statue and this text featured prominently on the cover of Souvenir Catalogue. United
States and Allied Governments War Exposition, price 10 cents, clearly playing on the emotions of how
horrible the Germans must have been to do this (and note that if they were retreating, it was probably in
a French or Belgian church before they took it).

24

United States and Allied Governments War Exposition at Convention Hall Kansas City (Kansas City,
MO: n.p., 1918), 6.

25

Ibid., 2.
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in direct and planned conjunction with the annual conference of the Associated Advertising
Club of the World.26

Table 1: Tracing the Allied War Exposition Across the U.S.A.
Cities in red indicate simultaneous expos. Dates in purple and green are what appear to be a Midwestern
and Great Plains traveling circuits, though there is no necessary reason to think that they remained
entirely insulated from one another as cars could be shifted at will and newly captured materiel from
Europe could be added or exchanged.

26

Dates
July 7–21, 1918
Aug. 1–11, 1918
Sept. 2–7, 1918

City
San Francisco, CA
Los Angeles, CA
St. Paul, MN

Sept. 2–15, 1918
Sept. 24–27, 1918
Oct. 1918 (Not held)

Chicago, IL
Great Falls, MT
Des Moines, IA

late Sept.–
early Oct., 1918
Nov 2–17, 1918
Nov. 3–17, 1918

Waterloo, IA

Nov. 16–24, 1918

Cleveland, OH

Nov. 23–[30?], 1918

Little Rock, AK

Nov. 28–Dec. 8, 1918
Dec. 7–15, 1918
Dec. 14–22, 1918
Jan. 4–13, 1919
Jan. 11–19, 1919
Feb. 1–9, 1919
Feb. 1–9, 1919
Feb [5?]-12, 1919
Feb. 20–[27?] 1919
Feb. 26–Mar. 5, 1919
March ? 1919
March 20–27, 1919

Pittsburgh, PA
Kansas City, MO
Cincinnati, OH
Buffalo, NY
St. Louis, MO
Liberal, KS
New Orleans, LA
Toledo, OH
Detroit, MI
Wayne Gardens and Arena
Houston, TX
Oklahoma City, OK “At Third and Elgin”
Milwaukee, WI
Civic Auditorium

Waco, TX
Jackson, MI

Location
Golden Gate Park?
Exposition Park, 18 carloads
MN State Fair, big steel machinery bldg.
(came from LA and arr. 24 Aug.)
Grant Park
Milwaukee Depot
Planned for Coliseum or Auditorium. Initially planned for
14 carloads filling a 400x250 ft. space in mid-August; then
shifted to begin on 6 Oct but was postponed so as not to
conflict with the 4LL, held there from Sept. 28–Oct. 191
At the Dairy Cattle Congress. 5,300 attendance on opening
day.
Texas Cotton Palace
Four carloads of recently returned materiel plus existing
carloads.
Wigmore Coliseum? Originally scheduled for Nov. 9-17,
but postponed a week due to influenza. 47 car loads.
Municipal Auditorium / Board of Commerce Bldg.
Delayed until 25 Nov due to transport delays.
Exposition Building at the point
Convention Hall
Music Hall
Broadway and Elmwood Music Hall
Coliseum Building
Heineman Ball Park
Heinemann Park. 25 carloads.

“Ad Men Will See Allied War Show,” The Atlanta Constitution [Atlanta, GA], 7 Jul 1918, p. 12.
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Returning to our initial topic of this paper, the local Chicago paper headline blazed, “Go and
see the ‘German 77’s,’ the favorite field piece of the Hun army, captured in battle, battered
and made useless by allied shells.”27 After enticing readers to see the torpedoes (“mate to the one
with which the Germans sunk the Lusitania”), a 3-ton anti-aircraft gun, “official French
photographs of Hun atrocities” (“official photographs,” they repeated, “which cannot be denied”),
and the mockup of the trenches, the paper pronounced:
Go down to the War Exposition and picture to yourself that hail of shell, that smudge of
poison gas, that shower of machine-gun bullets, all the atmosphere of treachery and hate
and unfair fighting our boys had to face.
When you get that realization you will be readier to do your full share here at home. And
THAT is the sole reason for the exposition.

After the AWE wrapped up, there were also “special war trophy trains” that travelled the country
as part of the Third Liberty Loan campaign in mid-1918,28 and then the Victory Loan program—
that is, the fourth Liberty Loan—to continue raising money for the money we had already spent
on the armed forces.29

War Trophies for Sentiment
The AWE maintained a strong theme of the sacrifice of the soldiers in France. The great triumphal
arch that was constructed in Chicago (Fig.5), for example, read, “Our Heroic Dead. There is no
death. They all survive,” and listed the major offensives of the war. The Kansas City program
proclaimed it was for “the members of the ‘Army at Home’ who through days of toil and nights
of anxiety pray for the safe return of those who ‘Over There’ have been fighting humanity's battle,”
and added that “Surely no one can witness these priceless trophies bought with the blood of those
who have died in the Battle for Humanity without being stirred to the depths of his heart and
aroused to a determination to do all in his power ‘over here’ to bring victory to America and her
Allies ‘over there’.”30 The back of a ticket for the Cincinnati show read “Do not pass lightly by
these trophies; study them, and when you leave the Exposition Buildings, do so with your heart
filled with gratitude for the brave men who have fought, and are fighting your battles, for THIS IS
YOUR WAR.”31

27

Herald and Examiner [Chicago], 1 Sept 1918.

28

The Daily Ardmoreite [Ardmore, OK], 7 Apr 1918, p. 1. “War Exhibits in Green Bay Tuesday Noon,”
Green Bay Press-Gazette [Green Bay, WI], 23 Sep 1918, p. 1, which was also accompanied by a lecture
by Prof. Kowaike on “Science and the World War—Wisconsin’s Contribution,” at the Bijou theater.

29

“Local Briefs,” Medford Mail Tribune [Medford, OR], 29 Mar 1919, p.2. “War Trophy Train Will Open
Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign in Indiana,” The Indiana Gazette [Indiana, PA], 26 Sep 1918, p. 7.

30

United States and Allied Governments War Exposition at Convention Hall Kansas City (Kansas City,
MO: n.p., 1918), cover and p. 4.

31

Ticket stub, in “Remembering Those Who Served: The WWI Servicemen Portrait Collection,” Off the
Shelf! [blog], Cincinnati Museum Center, 19 April 2017, online at https://www.cincymuseum.org/blog/
remembering-those-who-served-wwi-servicemen-portrait-collection, accessed 21 May 2018.
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Figure 5. Example tourist snapshots from Chicago A.W.E. Source: Author’s collection.

Today, of course, war equipment on display tends to be associated with war memorials and
cemeteries, not fundraising. This shift from one to the other is not as straightforward as one might
expect. After the war, local garrisons that had received both our own war surplus as well as
captured German materiel for training purposes would occasionally bring it out for public viewing,
and small local exhibits of trophies brought home by troops also seem to have remained in fashion
into the mid-1920s.32
This shift from fundraising to memorialization began in 1921. In the spring of that year, the Senate
passed a bill (S.674) and the House a resolution (H.R. 3160) that facilitated the equitable
distribution of war trophies across the country, apportioning them according to the number of men
from each state and territory that served, and appropriating $400,000 to facilitate the process.33
When the bill went to the floor in August of that year, it was objected to on two grounds: the
Secretary of War said it was his right to distribute the war trophies, and the amount of the
appropriation was considered far too high in its sum or too low in its estimate (initial discussions
had proposed a $1 million appropriation), as well as that receiving sites had to pay the
transportation costs for their trophy. The bill then stalled for six months.

32

For example, Camp Grant in Rockford, IL provided exhibits for the Mc Henry Co. Fair: “New Features
of 1919 Fair,” Marengo Republican-News [Marengo, IL], 14 Aug 1919, p. 1. Classified Ads, The Dayton
Herald [Dayton, OH], 7 Jun 1924, p. 14.

33

Unless otherwise noted, the information on the life of this bill comes from “Equitable Distribution of
Captured War Devices and Trophies,” 76th Cong., 1st Sess., U.S House of Representatives, Report 171
[H.R. 171], 13 June 1921 and “A Bill to Provide for the Equitable Distribution of War Devices and
Trophies to the States and Territories of the United States and to the District of Columbia,” 76th Cong.
2nd Sess., U.S. House of Representatives, Bill S.674, 29 Aug. 1922 [this is the House reading of the
Senate Bill]. See also H.R. 979, H.R. 14105, and bill S.643.
3B2–12

PAPER 3B2 – STEVEN A. WALTON

Table 2: WWI War Trophies for Distribution.
Guns and Howitzers
77 mm
88 mm
100 mm
105 mm
120 mm
135 mm
150 mm

404 (+83)
10 (+15)
3 (+6)
449 (+702)
7 (+1)
10 (+9)
427 (+72)

Trench mortars
76 mm
170 mm
240 mm
245 mm

418 (+34)
141 (+15)
10 (+10)
161 (+9)
730 (+68)

Total
captured
guns,
3,206
howitzers and mortars:

210 mm
144 (+43)
4.2 in.
13 (+10)
Other vehicles
Total:
1,467 (+941)
Source: House Report 171 (1921), pp. 4-5

4,000

Note: numbers in parentheses are the number of additional guns issued to the service and retained
by the Ordnance Dept.

Although a great deal of materiel was captured (Table 2), the competition between the 11,000
American Legion posts (who argued that it was their members who captured the guns, after all),
parks, museums, and public squares, left the Committee on Military Affairs at loggerheads. In fact,
when the bill went to the House, they so seriously rewrote it that in effect nothing survived. Part
of the objection was that to display war materiel was tantamount to encouraging war, and some
member(s) wanted to recall all materiel already on display throughout the country and destroy it:
The Socialist Representative from New York, Meyer London, wanted to put it all on a battleship
and scuttle the lot at sea.
On the matter of transportation costs, state leaders of the American Legion appealed to their
governors, but only three of the forty-five that replied said that their state was willing to pay those
costs, noting the inherent unfairness of, say, California having to pay ten times as much for the
same number of trophies as New Jersey (captured materiel was stored at the Raritan Arsenal and
Fort Newark) due solely to transport costs. In addition, at least half of the captured materiel,
especially the wheeled pieces, were in such a state as to be unfit for outdoor display. Most needed
to be painted (“The cannon, carriages, and vehicles are all stored in the open and are rapidly
deteriorating, and present an unsightly appearance and, to avoid undue criticism or unfavorable
comment, should be painted before distribution is made”)34 but even the Legion realized that this
would destroy their historic state at the time of capture (“will spoil their effect as trophies”)35 as
well as cost the government another $30,000-60,000 (depending on whose estimates one
accepted). It was estimated that they could reduce the overall cost to only $250,000, but that would
still leave the trophies to each state to distribute from their capitols.
34

H.Rep. 171, p. 12.

35

S.674, p. 5
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Part of the problem lay in the geography of the situation. As early as 1919, Congress had
acted to get trophies of the war to various localities around the country, though how certain
smaller towns were favored with such actions while larger cities might be ignored is a curious
question of influence. Rep. John Gordon Cooper (R-OH), for example, introduced three separate
resolutions (H.R. 4409–4411) to have the Secretary of War donate a German cannon each to the
small Ohio towns east of Cleveland of Mesopotamia, Andover, and Orwell. Rep. Joseph
Wellington Byrns (D-TN), not to be outdone, introduced five resolutions to donate 12 captured
German guns to Stewart, Springfield, Clarksville, Cheatham and Nashville. Rep. Thomas Sutler
Williams (R-IL) was modest in his resolutions, requesting only one for Norris City, IL, a farm
town in the southern part of the state which still only has a population of 1,244 (in 2016), while
Andrew James Hickey (R-IN) proposed eighteen separate resolutions for towns and especially
colleges in Indiana. Edward Campbell Lyttle (R-KS) was much more efficient, proposing a single
resolution (H.R. 4388) to seven cities and the University of Kansas. And so on.36
As John Franklin Miller (R-WA) argued on the floor of the Senate on August 3, 1921:
We realized, as every Member of this House must realize, that some of the congressional
districts and some of the States are situated near the source of supply, near where these war
trophies are stored. ...Are you going to take the State of California, which was exceeded by
only eight States in the American Union in the number of soldiers contributed to the war
[applause], and force its citizens to pay the cost of the transportation of these war trophies
to the Pacific coast? ...Can you conceive of a man being in favor of this bill, knowing that
these war trophies are stored in the eastern part of the United States, who pretends to be
honest with himself and with the American people, saying that the folks of this country
shall not receive these war trophies unless they go down into their pockets and pay the
expense of having them sent to the places where the people live? ...Out yonder in Utah and
California and Oregon and the Pacific Northwest, and down in New Mexico it is not fair
to expect those people to pay for the transportation of these war trophies, because the cost
would be so great in comparison to the transportation cost in the States nearby where the
trophies are stored.37

Localities, too, took it in their own hands to demand—well, formally and politely request—
trophies from the newly-created War Distribution Board [WDB], as when Staunton, VA resolved
“Whereas, Staunton furnished over four hundred volunteer troops to the war, in addition to her
draft quota, etc.,” therefore “the War Distribution board be requested to recognize [its] claims and
award Staunton a fair share of the war trophies allotted to the state of Virginia.”38
Debates continued in Congress in 19121, 1922, and 1923, under CMA secretary John W. Weeks
(R-MA; Wikipedia calls him a “competent, honest, and respected administrator and adviser who
guided the Department of War through its post-World War I downsizing”) and it was not until
May 1924 that an act was passed “To provide for the equitable distribution of captured war devices
36

All of these are from one day in the Congressional Record for the House, June 2, 1919, pp. 546-547.

37

Congressional Record, House, 3 Aug 1921, p. 4616.

38

“Chamber of Commerce is after Hotel,” The News Leader [Staunton, VA], October 10, 1922, p. 1. “Show
13 Reasons for War Trophies,” Reading Times [Reading, PA], 19 Aug 1920, p. 5. “Relics of War to be
Distributed,” The Bee [Danville, VA], 4 Oct 1922, p. 7.
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and trophies” across the country.39 In it the simple solution turned out to be that the captured
guns, howitzers, machine guns, and the like—other than those reserved by the U.S. military
for use or experiment—should simply be apportioned by the relative number of men who served
from April 11, 1917 to Nov. 11, 1918 from each state or territory. Congress appropriated only
$39,000—“or so much thereof as may be necessary,” and they added a proviso that that money
could not be used for “Cleaning, etc.”, apparently leaving that problem to the states—for the
distribution of the materiel, however. Within a month the House had to amend the act to put the
decision more firmly in the hands of the Secretary of War and extend the period in which all this
was to happen from one year to approximately three. In theory, then, by July 1, 1928, all the
material should have been distributed, sold or destroyed. Still, Congress had to pass yet another
separate resolution in 1926 to explicitly order the Secretary of War to deliver examples of captured
materiel not yet distributed to the national museum of the American Legion in Indianapolis.40

Conclusion
Which brings us back to the German 77 that arrived in Houghton in the summer of 1919. Why did
we get one? Part of it is clearly a matter of connections. There were only three distributed to all of
the Ninth Federal Reserve District from Montana to the UP that summer, one to us, one to Montana
and one to South Dakota, though who was directly responsible for these choices has yet to be
determined. But as our speech-givers here said, one can claim a war trophy as a symbol of power
or a symbol of loss; of power or of humility. During the war they were clearly symbols of might—
either ours if it was our equipment running about in mock battles in the local arena or park, or
39

Public Law 68-234, ch. 312 (amended in ch. 362), 68 Congress, Session 1, An Act: To provide for the
equitable distribution of captured war devices and trophies to the States and Territories of the United
States and to the District of Columbia, U.S. Statutes at Large vol. 43, no. Main Section (1924): p. 597599 [43 Stat. 597]. HeinOnline, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.statute/sal043&i=631.

See further:
61 Cong. Rec. 402 (1921) legislation dealing with pensions, private claims, distribution of war trophies,
etc.
62 Cong. Rec. 354 (1922) Res. 1-Providing that legislation dealing with pensions, private claims,
distribution of war trophies, etc., be initiated by petition on suitable furnished forms.
63 Cong. Rec. 31 (1922) Res. 247-Providing funds for the maintenance of public order United States certain
war trophies captured by or surrendered.
63 Cong. Rec. 32 (1922) Res. 244-To donate to the American Legion certain war trophies.
63 Cong. Rec. 37 (1922) Res. 398-To donate to the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States certain
war trophies captured by or surrendered to the armed forces of the United States in the World War.
64 Cong. Rec. 190 (1923) Res. 250-To donate to the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States certain
war trophies captured by or surrendered to the armed forces of the United States in the World War.
40

Public Resolution 69-19, ch. 187, 69 Congress, Session 1, Joint Resolution: Directing the Secretary of
War to allot war trophies to the American Legion Museum. The Senate actually made more or less the
same resolution in 1922 (Senate Joint Resolution 244) for the American Legion, and a parallel one (S.
J.R. 250) for the VFW, but they must never have come into effect.
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theirs if it was the twisted wreckage of captured equipment—and they were explicitly
displayed to get Americans to support the war. After the war Congress sent them across the
country (and this is a poorly studied process) to recognize the sacrifice of towns to the horror that
is war.
Whether war trophies can have other valences is a broader question that cannot be dealt with here.
On one hand, it is clear that trophies after WWII were quite different in their associations, given
the values for which the Axis stood (attempts to dehumanize the Germans in WWI
notwithstanding, the propaganda of suspected “German atrocities” could never equal the clear
atrocities of the Nazis or Japanese).41 Personal war trophies are another element of the question
which reminds us that there are personal values and societal values that come into play in the
repatriation of war trophies. But since individuals can’t repatriate a 77mm German field gun, that
does not play into our story here. Still, it will be interesting to find out what happened to the
trophies on display at the AWEs as they travelled around the country, just as it will be interesting
to try to find out what happened to Michigan Tech’s German 77.

41

Lyneyve Finch, “Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the
Twentieth Century.” Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 3 (2000): 367–86.
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Appendix A.
Letter of John W. Black as reported in “Captured German Gun Escorted to College by Soldiers,”
Daily Mining Gazette [Houghton, MI], Aug. 28, 1919, p. 2.
“Only three of these guns are to be placed as permanent memorials in the Ninth Federal Reserve
District. One is to signify Montana’s support for its government in the recent conflict, one will
remind South Dakota of its part in the war, and one will rest fittingly upon the site of the engineers’
training camp and upon the grounds of an institution that was devoted unreservedly to the winning
of the war, as Northern Michigan’s constant reminder of the sacrifices of her sons, and their valiant
and heroic part in the mighty struggle overseas for the right.
“I trust that every man who looks upon this captured trophy in the future, will remember that it is
not simply an evidence of the conquering power of a free army, fighting for the maintenance in
the world of the right of men to be free and equal, and for the preservation of the ideals which are
the present hope of humanity, but will reverently recall the heroic devotion, the hardships and the
sacrifices of our men who insofar as their part went, did their full measure of service and helped
make victory possible. This gun represents not military power, but the triumph of free government
over the most terrible autocracy with which civilization in its history has had to contend. It
represents right which has conquered might. It represents the preservation of democracy, liberty,
freedom and opportunity, through a crisis that but for our victory, might have engulfed these
precious heritages and forever buried them under the heel of the Prussian war god. It presents to
us a permanent reminder that power that is not based on right principles, justice and equity cannot
permanently endure in the world. It recalls many of our bravest and best, who lie under the
flowered fields of France and did not come back, because they believed in these things. I am
thankful for my life among such men. Their record in the war will be an inspiration so long as we
shall live.
“We might have placed a shaft, or a skillfully wrought bronze memorial, in the place of this
weapon. I think, however, that this captured trophy is the best and the most fitting reminder of
Northern Michigan’s sacrifices and of its devotion to government and the principles upon which
this great nation was founded. This mechanism of iron and steel meant to the men who designed
it, to those who fabricated it, and to those who took it into action, that Hun domination, Hun
principles of government and a Hun attitude towards the peoples of the world, should hereafter
control the nations of the earth. Its very efficiency as an agency of destruction marks how great
was the fall of the German empire, and how terrible a fate the world has been saved. It is therefore
a proper memorial and I think that we shall not forget its great significance.”
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Appendix B.
“Address of C. H. Benedict at Presentation of German Gun,” Calumet News [Calumet, MI], 28
Aug. 19, p. 3.
On the occasion of the presentation of a captured German cannon at the College of Mines yesterday
afternoon, C.H. Benedict, on behalf of the Federal Reserve of the Ninth district, spoke as follows:
“As I understand it this cannon is one of many others captured by American forces and now
distributed to various localities in further recognition of the part they played in the great war. If
each locality that did its part were to have one there would not be found enough in the whole
German line from Antwerp to the Argonne and so Houghton is very fortunate to be able to claim
one of these pieces for its own. Its resting in this city and on this campus can be justified only if
Houghton shall truly represent the progressive spirit of the upper peninsula and if this campus, and
this college shall truly exemplify all that is best in the industrial and the technical life of this
district.
“For the past war was above anything else a technical and a scientific one. Not only was soldier
pitted against soldier but nation was pitted against nation and for every warrior on the firing line
there were ten civilians at home striving with the implements of the arts of peace to forge a more
effective weapon for the sterner art of war. And if there is to be no next war as all the peoples hope
and pray it will be because science and engineering and industry has constructed a weapon so
destructive of life and property that to invoke its use as an arbiter of national dispute is to imperil
the very foundations of civilization itself.
“Who shall say how close to the brink of destruction civilization was on November 11 last or how
much we have moved away from that brink since that date? Consider Germany in 1914 and then
consider her again in 1919. Let the mute brass lips before us have the power of speech and what a
tale they could tell of a flourishing people on that earlier date, alive with industry and filled with
hope and then on that later date fallen so low that none could do It homage. And what about Austria
and Bulgaria and Turkey? These fell from their highest state you may say because of the enemy
without. Who shall say there is less danger now to us from the enemy within? Not the traitor, nor
the pro-German do I mean but that more insidious enemy called ease or sloth or luxury; the desire
to reap without having sown; the desire to consume without having produced; the desire to enjoy
without having labored. ‘As ye sow, so shall ye reap' is as true now as it was 2,000 years ago and
it is just as true physically as it is spiritually. If you do not produce you may not consume and you
may consume only as much as you produce.
“Ninety per cent of the ills that inflict us now as a nation would disappear within a fortnight if we
each of us practiced the homely virtues of thrift and hard work, practiced them ourselves, mind
you, and did not preach them for the other fellow. What the world needs is production and
producers, and not destruction and destroyers.
“And so the lesson of this brass instrument of war placed upon this spot must come by contrast.
As surely as it stands for desolation and destruction so surely shall this school stand for peace and
construction. More iron and more copper, therefore more plows and more thrashing machines and
more motors, therefore more food stuffs and more of all those products that go to make up modern
human life.
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“I have met many of the young men within the last fifteen years who have graduated from
this institution and I do not know which is the cause and which is the effect—whether this
institution has in the past attracted men of high calibre or whether it has attracted the average run
of students and has molded them into a finer form. But this I do know, that the men who left this
institution have been men who have been able to take a leading part in the mining industry and its
allied branches and so it is not at all strange that the engineering companies which may claim the
School of Mines of Houghton County and the Upper Peninsula as their training ground should
have played a distinctive part in the struggle now happily passed. And so to the perennial youth
that may come to this institution in the future this bronze cannon may stand as a symbol of the
valor of American manhood in 1918, the year in which it was wrested from the Germans.
“May it forever give mute testimony to the noble type of men who made possible its capture and
though it stand here a thousand years may it never behold an American sword drawn, save in a
righteous cause, nor if drawn, sheathed unless the cause be victorious.”
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Boy that’s the Girl:
The Androgynous Nature of WWI Propaganda Posters
Sarah F. Price
University of Alabama
During World War I, propaganda posters played a major role in perpetuating national unity and
pride, while simultaneously dictating cultural norms of wartime practices. Martha Banta explains
that these propaganda posters were the “single most important visual means for promoting national
values during the war” (560). The posters visually represented and structured the rules by which
society should function, incorporating themes of nationalistic pride, guilt, and responsibility to
coerce citizens to contributing to the war effort either through enlistment, buying government
bonds, food conservation, volunteering, monetary donations, etc. These images represented what
was culturally acceptable and expected within American society during 1917-1918, and therefore
the figures within the posters became emblematic of what was expected from men, women, and
children of the era. These figures were an inescapable element of life during the war, and covered
all surfaces: glanceable material infiltrating the psyche of all Americans. Carolyn Kitch explains
that, “During 1917 and 1918, the two years of American involvement in the war, more than twenty
million copies of some 2,500 recruitment and home front-fundraising posters were displayed in
stores, at theaters, in train stations, and at post offices” (102). Throughout these posters, gender is
simultaneously portrayed as fixed and fluid. With the development of women’s rights and
women’s suffrage campaigns, as well as a need to incorporate women within the war effort, these
posters create an androgynous approach to gender through visual representation of men and
women, as well as shifting the expected roles of men and women at the time.
During this era, gender began taking on new shape as women began entering the workforce and
asserting their rights outside of the home. Kitch explains,
At no time did lasting change in gender roles seem more likely than in the 1910s, the final
decade of the suffrage drive. The vote was not the only potential gain for women during
this era: radicals who called themselves "feminists" pushed for reforms in the institution of
marriage, the American popularity of the works of Freud prompted a public
acknowledgement of women's sexuality, and a new birth-control movement enabled
woman to express that sexuality more freely and safely (1).

Leading up to World War I, women began asserting themselves into the public sphere, creating a
shift in the traditional gender roles. This movement was met with resistance by the patriarchal
dominant culture, and WWI created an opportunity for the reassertion of traditional gender roles.
Michele Shover states that, “In the World War I posters, the combatant governments attempted to
expand the feminine role to meet the wartime needs of public policy. At the same time,
governments attempted to preserve the traditional passive feminine role. This poses a neat and
revealing contradiction to current studies of how government policies affect sex roles” (Shover
460). In other words, the beginning of the women’s rights movements prior to WWI created a shift
in the understood roles of men and women. Throughout WWI, these posters both attempted to
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reassert strict gender roles while encouraging both men and women to actively engage in
the war effort. While these posters often emphasize the traditional role of women as situated
solely in the realm of the home, to be protected and defended, they simultaneously defy this
traditional categorization of women in the need to encourage them to join in the war effort either
by volunteering for the Red Cross, providing supplies, and generally engaging in practices that
place them in the direct sphere of warfare. Clémenine Tholas-Disset states that, “The propaganda
campaigns portrayed female characters endowed with a double identity, both masculine and
feminine” (Tholas-Disset 67). This double identity can be seen through the androgynous nature
within many of these posters. Numerous scholars acknowledge an androgynous component to
WWI imagery, but it is underthought and often mentioned as an aside or brief observation rather
than a point of interest or study (Alonso, Bockting, Banta, Capozzola, Craig, Foreman, Gubar,
Havelock, Kitch, Moore, Patterson, Roberts, Schreiber, Segal, Shover, Snider, Tholas-Disset).
In this paper, I first ask the question, “How is androgyny portrayed in these posters?,” and then,
“How do these posters portray the shifting gender roles throughout WWI and beyond?” In
answering these questions, I will first discuss the definition of androgyny with regard to this paper,
and how androgyny was at play in World War I; then I will discuss how the portrayal of androgyny
was emblematic of larger cultural shifts. Lastly, I will analyze a number of these posters looking
at androgynous representations of men and women, and how they impacted the understanding of
national engagement in the war effort. In representing the shifting of gender through androgynous
appearance and agency, these posters reinforced and re-instilled androgyny within the quotidian
life of World War I.

Androgyny Defined
Images in day to day life inform cultural norms and help create our social reality. WWI posters
both reinforced and deconstructed gender norms, as they forcibly placed women within the roles
assigned to them, yet due to wartime necessities, these roles became grounded in the grotesque
landscape of death and destruction. Carolyn Heilbrum states that androgyny “seeks to liberate the
individual from the bounds of the appropriate” (xi). Ellen Lenney explains that,
A very common flaw in androgyny research, … is that many researchers and writers make
the dubious assumption that androgyny is a single entity with one agreed-upon definition
and, further, many tend to fall prey to an ‘overinclusion of meaning’ in that definition.
Instead, there are several overlapping, but far from identical, operational definitions
currently in use, and each of these definitions has a more limited meaning than is often
attributed to it. (708)

Within this paper, I will focus on androgyny from a socially constructed standpoint meaning that
the social environment and depictions of androgyny created the cultural impact of the gender roles
and power dynamics of the era. In this respect, personality and identity are made up of different
aspects of masculinity and femininity. They are not therefore opposites, but rather parts of a whole.
As a practice and discourse, androgyny incorporates, shuffles, and blends gendered attributes
commonly associated with masculinity and femininity (Lenney). This is not to say gender identity
is entirely socially constructed, but for the purposes of this paper, the definition of androgyny will
focus on how cultural depictions influence gender roles and power dynamics, and thereby the
simultaneous rejection and reassertion of strict gender roles through androgynous imagery. In this
regard, Havelock Ellis states that “human identities are social constructs that are not only defined
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differently but also experienced differently, depending on historical and sociological forces.
Biological underpinnings may be influential but do not necessarily determine directionality,
and they are always mediated within social milieus” (Ellis and Baldwin 115). With regard to the
WWI propaganda posters, Bockting asserts, “If challenging gender stereotypes is a major
component in theorizing about androgyny, then few events provide a more concrete and historical
instance of such need for revisioning than the Great War” (21). In this respect, the propaganda
posters of WWI allow us to see the ways in which physical representations of androgyny served
ironically to inadvertently undercut strict gender roles of the era while attempting to re-solidify the
gender binary.

Gender in Context
By 1910, a crisis in gender identity had reached a fevered pitch as women were beginning to make
considerable inroads in places historically reserved for men. Women were attending college,
earning wages, receiving access to birth control, and demanding the right to vote. WWI was
promoted as a chance to reassert traditional gender norms and elevate the importance of
masculinity through combat. Androgyny was one strategy used by modernist authors to subvert
traditional representations of gender difference. Bockting makes the point that male violence at
the time was rooted in Darwinism. Men were said to be naturally more courageous and powerful
than women, and war was a way to encourage these tendencies (Bockting). When early feminists
challenged these sentiments, they were widely villainized, as doing so was thought to make victory
in war less likely. In many of these discourses, killing was the mark of manhood, and thus, a
threshold of exclusion for women. Men had to kill to prove that they were not women Lynne Segal
explains that gender analysis can be an
indispensable tool for critiquing militarism and its endless cycles of war … Both the
rhetorics of domination, and the training in the uses of coercion necessary for producing
military cadres, still connect us almost immediately with images of men and masculinity.
It is men who are associated with all that is tough, assertive, stoical, obedient and heroic.
Moreover, men's traditional monopoly of institutionalized force, whether in the military or
the police, has helped secure men's dominance both over women, as well as securing
existing hierarchies between nations and differing classes and ethnic groups. (30)

Kitch furthers this understanding in that, “World War I poster imagery presented a rejuvenated
American masculinity while naturalizing various ideals for womanhood through exaggerations of
them: beckoning beauty, angelic healer, avenging warrior, sacrificing mother, supportive wife”
(120). In regard to gender within WWI, Christopher Capozzola asserts that women were essential
to the war campaign through their contributions in food conservation and administration,
fundraising, and working directly within the differing campaigns, often on the frontlines with the
soldiers. Women were themselves warriors on the homefront even if they were not directly able to
enlist. And thereby through their contributions, they forced their way into the political sphere
(Capozzola).
Before the start of the war, gender roles were beginning to shift and become less rigid through
women’s assertions into previously male dominated publics. Prior to the United States entering
WWI, women had already begun the fight for equal rights and suffrage. The women’s liberation
movement “called into question the role divisions of male and female, stating that the differences
between males and females were culturally determined, not bound by either biology or theology.
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Feminism embraced the ideas of social leaning theorists and used them as underpinnings to
examine the institutionalization of sexism” (Ellis and Baldwin 126). Popular portrayals of
women were already beginning to shift. Publications called Little Magazines were published in the
1894-1898 to reject mainstream culture and art posters as a rejection of then mainstream literary
culture. Disassociated from middle class concerns, the portrayals of women within these
magazines were both empowering and demeaning. Women were portrayed as sexually liberated
and independent, yet had no real economic or political power. Their sexuality was their power,
and the beginning of this empowerment was visually portrayed through the images within the Little
Magazines, depicting the independent and liberated woman (Knight). Rachel Schreiber explains
that women’s suffrage publishing used representations of men and women as equals and working
within the same environments (Schreiber). Images of women’s empowerment often depicted them
as larger than men in order to establish a sense of power and dominance (Bockting). Therefore, in
advocating for equality, women’s rights advocates depicted women as equal or more powerful
than men, often framing them in an androgynous light through physical appearance as well as in
action and agency. In response to these depictions of women as strong and independent, antisuffrage supporters depicted suffragette women as overtly mannish and unattractive, often with
Adam’s apples and harsh thuggish features. Those who opposed women’s rights defined
suffragettes “in their fundamental challenge to femininity and the traditional ideals of womanhood,
[as] socially deviant,” if not sexually suspect: all "...large handed, big-footed, flat-chested and thinlipped," as one anti-suffragist declared” (Moore 231). Kitch expounds that “women were drawn
to be not only ugly but also unfeminine, as signified by their masculine Adam’s apples and thick
necks” (Kitch, 83). President Woodrow Wilson was in direct opposition to women’s suffrage, and
used masculinity as a way to undermine their creibility. Capozzola states, “As late as 1913,
Woodrow Wilson openly opposed women’s suffrage, and a journalist close to the president
recalled that Wilson thought, ‘the only women interested in woman’s suffrage were aggressive
and masculine with harsh voices’ (Capozzola 108).
The Gibson Girl became a popular image throughout this era, as an ideal of the new kind of
independent woman. This iconic figure embodied many of the dichotomous issues of femininity
versus power and independence as she was “one of the first representations of the independent
woman, her independence was frequently presented in the form of cold and cruel power over men.
Gibson's beauties quite literally played with men” (Kitch 3). The Gibson Girl was simultaneously
an embodiment of women’s fight for independence, while continuing to constrain the
independence to that of acceptable femininity. The Gibson Girl fought against the suffragette
image of the New Woman as an unattractive and masculine figure. Martha Patterson explains that
As a suffragette, the New Woman might be called unattractive, barren, and manly, doomed
to the rank of spinster or shrewish wife. Working as a self-professed artist, the New Woman
might be found wanton and a traitor to the delicacies of her sex, or subject to the same
criticism as the suffragette. If she advocated female sexual expression and freedom, she
might be accused of being licentious and immoral. As a college student, the New Woman
might be accused of exercising her mind at the expense of her reproductive capabilities.
Active in women's clubs or social reform movements, she could be found guilty of
disavowing the heterosexual union by forming lasting alliances with other women… Not
only did the "New Woman" risk becoming "unbalanced," she also risked becoming an
androgyne, a manly woman continually brow-beating her husband (if she had one) into
docile submission. (Patterson 1)
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The Gibson girl then became the attractive and feminine response to this masculine figure
of the suffragette. Patterson further articulates that the “Gibson Girl images embodied the
values necessary to sustain a consumer-based economy--discernment, purchasing power, and
insatiable demand--thereby harnessing and transforming the "New Woman's" desire for social and
political change into a desire for new goods” (Patterson 3). The Gibson Girl thereby became both
a symbol for women’s independence while further confining them to the defined spheres of
acceptable for women. Androgyny then appears as a response and symptom of early 20th century
gender battle.
Women’s rights advocates of this era “were among the first American women to grapple directly
with a central feminist paradox of the twentieth century: how to rationalize the creation of groups
that exclude men while simultaneously advocating the removal of gender barriers preventing
equality” (Craig 374). In trying to break down gender roles and gain political rights and power,
feminists of the era drew upon the traditional roles of mother and nurturing in order to argue for
equal rights and peace… while trying to break down their barriers, they were reinforcing traditional
gender tropes (Craig). Though women’s rights activists were establishing themselves within this
era, they were simultaneously asserting themselves within the confines of traditional gender roles
while attempting to break into traditionally male dominated spaces.
Differing factions within the women’s movement created different approaches to feminism and
gender fluidity, often working against each other while trying to advocate for similar goals
(Alonso). Peace advocacy became one of the primary means for women to enter into the discussion
of war. Peace advocacy developed as a form of feminism, allowing women to enter into the
national debate on war, arguing that once women have the right to vote, war will no longer exist
as women will never choose to send their loved ones to their deaths. In this assertion, there
developed a redefining of the mothering image, expanding from that of the single home and mother
of one into a mother of society. This imagery both reinforced gender roles while trying to gain
more ground and political power for women. During WWI the rhetoric and propaganda of the era
reinforced and reiterated this female identity as mother of all. Red cross nurse imagery defined
women as the mother of all soldiers and the ideal female embodiment for the wartime campaign.
Furthermore, male soldiers were bred and trained to be subservient and obedient to orders,
simultaneously reasserting the manly virility in volunteering in the army, while instilling a sense
to subordination, servility, and “blind obedience.” Thereby peace advocacy groups argued that
becoming a soldier was in fact demasculinizing: “Don’t be a soldier! Be a Man!” (Snider). These
cross gendered assertions of masculinity and femininity are portrayed throughout the war
campaign, as women worked to assert their strength and independence, while men were forced
into roles of fragility and subservience.
The introduction of WWI into American society allowed for the reassertion of gender specific
roles of masculinity and femininity. Elizabeth McKillen asserts that it was “the outbreak of World
War I that afforded those concerned with deteriorating gender mores their most promising
opportunities” (394). Kitch points to the publication of magazines at the time and their shift from
pre-war to wartime publishing, explaining “Though suffrage and sex-role-reversal imagery
continued to appear in American media through the end of women’s drive for the vote, the more
radical messages [disappeared] … in 1917, the year the United States entered World War I.
Throughout popular culture, the emergency of war prompted a return to more traditional images
(101). The war then created an environment in which men could reassert their masculinity through
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hardship and physical prowess, while preserving women in the home. Conversely, Schreiber
explains,
After the US entry into the war in 1917, the most common theme used in the suffrage press
to argue for the vote built on the fact that, rhetoric aside, women’s wartime roles, both at
home and at the front, did sideline the tired dictum that enjoined women to remain in the
home and obliged women to take over many male roles (49).

The war called for more than simply male contribution within the fight. Women were called into
the war through the need for female dominated roles such as the nurse and care-giver, directly
calling them to the frontlines of battle and placing them within the realm of physical hardship and
virility. Many of the ideologies behind the images of the WWI propaganda posters began with an
attempt at reasserting femininity as a fragility in need of protecting, calling men to enlist and be
manly men, strong and battle-worthy, yet as the campaign went on, women were called upon as
saviors and protectors of men, entering the very same battles as nurses and leaders, while men
were placed in situations of fragility and subservience through their need of protection and
guidance as well as their training in obedience. These shifts are readily represented through the
images portrayed in the war posters as the figures are both feminine and masculine, often
interchangeable and undifferentiated at first glance.
Androgyny during this era of gender upheaval is not simply represented through the women’s
liberation movements and popular images, but through the literature and dress of the era as well.
In her war novel, One of Ours, Willa Cather depicts a male protagonist (Claude) suffering from a
crisis of masculinity due, in large part, to the independence of his female love interest. Cather’s
character Enid is paradigmatic of the “New Woman,” whose independence was understood as
threatening to men. Pearl James asks why writers such as Cather were less dismayed by the
violence done by men, or the woman who stayed home, than newly independent women, many of
whom participated in the war. James states that,
What is most curious… is that her narrative frames the fight against modernity as a war
between the sexes, as a fight for sympathy between Claude and the New Woman. One of
Ours conflates a nostalgia for ‘natural’ preindustrial frontier life with a nostalgia for
traditional femininity and a traditionally heterosexual union and division of labor. (103).

Similar to Cather, Virginia Woolf’s work Orlando plays with the shifting of gender definition.
Orlando is celebrated as one of the most important literary works on gender and androgyny. In the
book, Orlando experiences a sex change when he wakes up as a she. Woolf states, “Different
though the sexes are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one sex to the other
takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the male or female likeness, while underneath
the sex is the very opposite of what it is above” (189).
As it permeated the literature of the time, androgyny was also present within shifting fashions and
clothing styles. Because women began to work in previously male-dominated field during the war,
“the issue of work, specifically war work, is what first signal[ed] the significance of men’s clothing
for women” (Gubar 480). Fashion began to shift as raised hemlines, utility wear, and short hair
became increasingly common. Due to shortages, color was muted and accessories were distasteful.
When the war ended, women were reluctant to return entirely to the former way of dress
(Foreman). Androgynous representation allowed for the permeability of traditional gender roles,
while also reinforcing them. Androgyny brimmed with emancipatory potential (Heilbrum). It was
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a tool for female empowerment as well as a for those fighting to reinforce traditional gender
roles. At the end of the war, the discourse focused on these shifts in gender. Mary Louise
Roberts states that, “One striking characteristic of this post-war discourse on civilization was the
way in which gender was used as a central metaphor for cultural crisis” (52). Shifting gender roles
represented through androgynous imagery and agency played a vital role in United States culture
during WWI. These shifts allowed for the entrance of women in previously male dominated
spheres and ultimately began the fight for the equality of genders that is still at work today.

Propaganda’s Visual Representation
The shifting gender dynamics and attempts to reassert the strict gender binary are nowhere more
present than within the WWI Propaganda posters themselves. Recruitment posters “sought to
exploit viewers’ feelings of insecurity about sexual identity. A number of posters constructed the
war as a male initiation rite or the defense of helpless women and children” (Bockting 25-26).
They created images of hyper-masculinity and femininity while also being forced to allow for
changes in gender in needing to appeal to both men and women in recruitment to new spheres of
work. Given the need for more women nurses within the Red Cross, these posters were tasked with
making the position seem both appealing and necessary, while appealing to gender-specific
markers. This meant that the images of nurses especially called upon women to both welcome
entering into hazardous and strenuous spheres generally reserved for men, while also keeping the
women within the role of fragility. Similarly, in recruiting men to join the army, posters spoke as
well about women socially pressuring young men to enlist. Tholas-Disset explains, “The image of
the ‘she-soldier’ was present in war propaganda… in the United States, enrollment in the Navy or
in the Marines was propelled thanks to young women dressed in uniforms, often rather
androgynous and resembling young determined soldiers” (67). Both men and women thereby were
portrayed as androgynous in order to allow for their recruitment in differing areas and to increase
social pressure by questioning the sexual identity and strength of both genders. These posters
“were the product of a stereotyping process that had begun in an established mass medium and
that was played out against the historical backdrop of first-wave feminism. They were a powerful
invocation of visual icons whose meaning was already in place” (Kitch 102).
Furthermore, rather than simply personifying shifting gender relations at the time, the androgyny
within these posters, despite their intention, actually worked to further deconstruct gender roles
within society itself. Dwight Brooks and Lisa Hébert explain that, “Media are crucial in the
construction and dissemination of gender ideologies and, thus, in gender socialization” (298). John
Sloop develops this idea, stating that, “Mainstream discourses illustrate the rhetorically material
ways that those who do challenge dominant ideology are ideologically disciplined, the ways
gender normativity is upheld” (169). Within this understanding of cultural media, it is clear that
the gender dichotomy at play within the posters furthered the gender dichotomy of the era. These
images reinforced the fluidity of gender while working to re-instill strict gender norms, thereby
further confusing the debate. Capozzola explains that within the era, American citizens were
inundated with these images:
The visual media environment of 1914-1918 was, like our own, revolutionary in the way
it changed and expanded over a short period of time. We live in an era of media saturation
in which many previously blank surfaces …have been transformed into display spaces and
in which public screens proliferate…, subjecting us to images out of our direct control. (45)
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This led to an inescapable climate of visual patriotism and identity through association with
these media. Because of the necessary roles of both women and men within the war effort,
the posters propagating American pride and recruitment inherently delved into the necessary
shifting representations of gender and androgyny as a means to enforce participation and
contribution by all. McKillen furthers this notion stating that “Gendered images … can be a
particularly effective form of propaganda during times of relative gender consensus because they
persuade by symbolic association” (393). That being said, these posters create a space for the
existence and perpetuation of androgyny within gender identity and gender roles, allowing for the
shifting gender binary through physical appearance as well as agency and action.

Gee!! I wish I was a Man: Propaganda’s Androgyny at Work
Within these posters, androgyny was not simply portrayed from the angle of women as men, but
as well in the portrayals of men as women. The masculine and the feminine intermix and mingle
through both physical representation, action, and environment within these images. The figures
within these posters depict a mixing of the gender roles and identifications. As the artists attempt
to identify women’s roles within the war, they end up placing women in armor and battlefields,
and men as effeminately bright eyed, and rosy cheeked. James explains that “Questions about
women’s proper sphere repeatedly find their way into war posters, many of which provide far from
simplistic messages.”
For example, in Howard Chandler Christy’s poster, “Gee!! I Wish I Were a Man,” there is the
figure of a young woman wearing a naval uniform, exclaiming that she wishes she was a man so
that she could join the navy (Christy). Ann Heinrichs describes this image as “a boyish, playful
young lady in a sailor outfit with plunging neckline wishes she could enlist. She seems to challenge
men with her androgynous, cross-dressing look and the hint that she might take a military role”
(8). Not only is the woman dressed as a man, her cropped haircut and noticeably flat figure imply
that she is more than able to join the navy herself. Kitch explains, “By putting young women into
men’s clothes, the artist suggested the boldness of the modern woman, while also making reference
to the gender-identity anxieties in popular culture of the years just before the war. Yet these images
did nothing to contradict the wartime norms that placed women in inspirational or supporting
roles” (113). The young woman in this figure shifts from a sexual recruitment tactic for men to
join the navy to that of questioning her own identity as female as she physically represents the
short hair, flat figure, and confident stance of a young man joining the navy. This shift further
questions not only the agency of the woman in the picture, but the sexuality of the men being
recruited, as Gubar explains, “Such seductive cross-dressers can function as sex symbols for men,
reflecting masculine attitudes that range from an attempt to eroticize (and thereby possess) the
independent woman to only slightly submerged homosexual fantasies” (482). She becomes a
symbol of both sexuality and androgyny as she characterizes the desires and agency of gender
fluidity. James explains that, “Christy’s female figures flirt with androgyny. Christy’s posters work
primarily through an erotic charge generated by woman-as-object, but they also allude to female
independence. This contradiction generates the posters’ success” (James).
One of the most important elements in the analysis of these posters is the importance of the firstglance factor. These posters were designed to be eye-catching and informative, but the majority of
the time, passersby would merely experience the posters at a glance, rather than focusing on them
in the same manner that a scholar might in trying to find new elements within them. This is
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significant as many of the images become recognizably male or female upon closer
inspection, but many of them are androgynous and discernable from the first glance. Going
back to Christy’s image, from a distance or from first glance, the short-cropped hair, lack of curves,
and naval uniform would indicate that the figure is in fact a young man, and it is only through
inspection of her posture that the viewer is able to see that it is in fact a young woman. The text
itself could further imply that the figure is a young boy wishing he was old enough to join the
Navy like his father. In attempting to create an essence of sexual appeal to naval enlistment, this
image creates an all-encompassing androgynous figure whose sole desire is to enlist in the navy.
Furthering the idea of the first-glance is the double-take, as the viewer then turns something
familiar in passing into something different and new. These posters would be images seen over
and over again, becoming part of the norm and cultural psyche. Accordingly, the double-take is
the realization of something new that was previously unrealized or unrecognized.
Androgyny representation in these posters can be placed in two main categories: women as
masculine and men as feminine. Within the category of women as masculine, this masculinity is
portrayed through agency, physicality, and environment, as women are inserted into spheres
previously reserved for men. The artists attempt to both empower and restrict the women within
these spheres in making them both appealing to women in order to encourage them to contribute,
while also placing them in masculine spheres of agency and power. Within the category of men as
feminine, this femininity is portrayed through physical personification as well as a lack of agency
in relation to the female figures. In placing these themes in dialogue, androgyny is personified
through the simultaneous masculinization of women and feminization of men.

Woman as Man
Within many of these propaganda posters, the female becomes a figure of independence and
strength as she enters into the war campaign. Tholas-Disset states that “Far from defeminizing
women, the propaganda campaigns portrayed female characters endowed with a double identity,
both masculine and feminine” (67). In this dichotomy of masculinity and femininity, physical
representations of these genders manifest themselves through the feminine figures. In becoming
masculine-esque warriors, these women defy the elements of seduction that may have been their
original intent and rather become military images of honor and strength (Tholas-Disset). In
general, women were often portrayed in these posters as broad shouldered with larger hands, shortcropped or hidden hair and stern angular features, dressed in male attire, armor, and weaponry.
These figures are often placed within the environment of battlegrounds and darkness. Women are
often drawn as larger than the men in the figures, dominating the frame and indicating the action
and agency within the image.
These figures of female masculinity were frequently portrayed in the Red Cross propaganda
posters geared towards recruiting women to become Red Cross nurses. James states that, “During
the war, the profession of female nursing confounded gender difference by merging categories of
soldiers and civilians and by reversing its opposite, the other popular plotline in propaganda:
women in need of male rescue.” In Milton Herbert Bancroft’s poster, “WANTED- 25,000 Student
Nurses,” the poster is taken up completely by the image of a nurse. This nurse has large hands,
broad shoulders, a strong brow and nose, and can be conceived at first glance as having an Adam’s
apple, based on the shading of the image. This figure is surrounded by the silhouette of bayonets
and soldiers, presumably rushing right into battle, as the nurse looks calmly at the viewer. The
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black and white shading of the image creates a dichotomy of action in the poster, as the
nurse stands strong, calling to the viewer, and the background moves onwards into battle.
The jawline, hands, shoulders, and neck of this image, paired with close-cropped, largely hidden
hair, indicate strength and masculinity in its composure, while the background of war implies that
this figure is indeed on the frontline and in the midst of battle (Bancroft). Without the habit of the
nurse, this figure could easily be construed as male by both physical attributes as well as placement
in battle. It is only at the very base of this image, in small hidden text that there is any reference to
woman or femininity at all. Even within this text, “Enroll at the nearest recruiting station of the
Woman’s Committee of the Council of National Defense,” there is little reference to the need for
the volunteer to identify as female. Nursing was a definitively female role within this era, yet this
poster portrays the nurse as a strong masculine warrior on the forefront of battle.
Similarly, Albert Sterner’s poster, “We need you,” also focuses on women as nurses for the Red
Cross (Sterner). As in Bancroft’s image, the nurses in this poster are depicted in black and white
androgyny. The image shows one nurse sitting over a wounded soldier in the forefront, and another
nurse standing, pointing down to the soldier while directing a young woman into the frame,
presumably as a new recruit. The two nurses tower over the other two figures, of both the wounded
male soldier and the young woman new recruit. The attire of the standing nurse erases all features
of femininity in her figure and face, hiding her hair and any curves she would presumably have as
a woman. Further, the standing nurse holds her arms open at her sides in a welcoming, Christ-like
image of acceptance and grace, bringing the new recruit into the fold. This tall figure is the director
of the image as her gestures indicate the direction of the viewer’s eye in first looking towards her,
and then down to the nurse and wounded soldier at the base of the frame. Both of the nurses share
the same heavy brow and sharp nose of the wounded soldier, with large strong hands directing and
protecting the other two figures in the frame. The nurses are framed by a dark and smoking
background, where the flames of battle can be seen between the two of them. Susan Zeigler
expounds upon this idea of the woman in the battlefield stating, “Women’s work at the front was
much more than a simple extension of their participation in the civilian labor force. It was also
military or quasi-military service and therefore had profound implications for a society grappling
with questions about the nature of women and their place in the public life of the nation, in war
and peacetime” (3-4). In framing the nurses as the larger and directive figures, Sterner places them
in the position of strength and power. He names them as the protectors and saviors in battle, as
they stave off the darkness and smoke of war.
Beyond Red Cross images of nurses as physically masculine, the iconic forms of Columbia and
Joan of Arc present the viewers with a new element of female androgyny through both their
masculine dress, as well as their placement as warriors and leaders in battle. Images of Columbia
in particular are often hyper-feminine verging on the sexual. Columbia may be framed as an
enfeebled woman in need of protection by the strong efforts of her soldiers, but she is also
portrayed as an inspiration for strength and direction as she sounds the war-cry and calls upon
American soldiers to join her on the battlefield. Schreiber claims, “In keeping with the ways that
the socialist press tended to use normative gender roles in its arguments against capitalism, here
we see a world turned upside down, where skeletons are reaped from the earth, and woman must
perform men’s work” (52). These figures took on not only the appearance and attire of men, but
the roles generally reserved for men of leader and warrior in battle.
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In “Over There,” another poster by Albert Steiner, Columbia directs a young man in a navy
uniform to battle. At the center of the image, in a white uniform, a young man stands holding
an American Flag that billows darkly behind the two figures. To his right, and leaning over his
shoulder is the figure Columbia pointing, sword drawn in her right hand, her left hand pointing
him towards the battle. These two figures are surrounded by smoke and fire, as a battleship smokes
ominously on the horizon. At the bottom of the image are the large words “OVER THERE”
indicating Columbia’s direction and voice guiding the man into battle. The image of Columbia is
dark and foreboding with a heavy brow shielding her eyes and strong muscular arms engaging in
the fight at hand. She towers over the man, dressed in armor, with feet that dominate the bottom
right corner of the image (Sterner). At first glance, she is portrayed as a male soldier, through her
armor, agency, and the sword in her muscular hand, but on closer inspection she has a slight
feminine figure and is clearly the iconic female character Columbia. Each of her features engulfs
the features of the man, as he stands at the forefront of the image, small in comparison to her
presence. Her large hands direct the movement and eyeline of the frame, as she holds a giant sword
in her right hand and points towards battle with the other. This figure is clearly dominant within
the image, both physically imposing as well as giving direction and portraying agency. Columbia
moves both the eyeline of the soldier as well as the eyeline of the viewer with her left hand, creating
the movement of the image and harkening to battle. She takes on the masculine qualities of strength
and physical prowess, as well as the masculine role of leader and commander within this
battleground.
On the other hand, the figure of Joan of Arc brings together softer boyish qualities within her role
as soldier and guide. In Haskell Coffin’s poster, “Joan of Arc Saved France,” Joan of Arc is
depicted front and center in her armor, raising her sword up in front of her towards the heavens.
Helmeted and depicted on a vibrant blue backdrop, Joan of Arc’s head is framed in a beam of light
descending from above (Coffin). Unlike the Red Cross nurses and Columbia, Joan of Arc is
portrayed with a distinctly female figure, however the softness of her face and short cropped hair
are marked by armor and framed by her sword. Joan of Arc in and of herself inherently represents
androgyny in her history and action, as she died for the right to dress and fight like a man (Wilchins,
Bowen and Ellis). At first-glance, this figure of Joan of Arc can be seen as a young boy in armor
raising his sword high, calling others to join him in the fight. Joan creates an androgyny of agency
and action as she fought alongside men in battle and the depiction of this figure implores women
and men of the United States to similarly join in the fight, in this case by buying U.S. savings
bonds. Her action and warrior imagery are intrinsically androgynous in their strength and direction.
Although these are by no means the only images portraying female androgyny, these specific
propaganda poster figures illustrate an array of androgynous elements within the posters. Placing
women into previously defined male environments and roles and developing them as images of
strength, command, and virility, depict the shifts in gender roles and expectations of the period.

Man as Woman
Although androgyny is strongly depicted through the female figures within these posters,
potentially more important are the ways in which these posters depict the male as feminine.
Although women were beginning to enter into the spheres of men, the male was still dominant and
directing the rules of society. This is referenced in the fact that almost all of these propaganda
posters, even the ones meant to appeal to and recruit women, were designed and created by male
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artists. Therefore, the femininity and androgyny within the male figures becomes more
significant as it represents the ways in which androgyny and shifting gender roles was
becoming an inherent and subversive element of the era’s psyche.
Men were largely depicted as feminine in two ways: 1) through their fragility and lack of agency
and 2) through soft feminine features. Male fragility and subservience are often clear within the
Red Cross nurse images. In contrast to the large, strong masculinized female nurses, the men are
pictured as enfeebled and in need of protection, aid, and guidance. As previously stated in Sterner’s
“We Need You” poster, the female figures are all large protectors of the wounded soldier in the
image. The male is seen as unconscious, with his features almost completely obscured by bandages
and the kneeling nurses’ arms and hands (Sterner). Similarly, Gordon Grant’s “What Are You
Doing to Help?,” a young nurse leads a heavily bandaged man by the hand. The soldier’s head is
completely ensconced in bandages, wrapping around his eyes and head, leaving only his nose and
mouth open. Further, his arm is in a sling and bandage that covers the majority of his body. The
soldier in this image fades into the background behind the young nurse leading him forward and
imploring the viewer. He is clearly unable to conduct himself and has lost all agency and direction
without the aid of the female. These soldier figures, along with other images of wounded soldiers,
shift the masculine role from that of strength, action, and leadership, to that of the feminine
attributes of fragility, seeking guidance, and in need of direction. One of the major themes of these
propaganda posters as a whole is the effort to save those serving overseas, as they are the damsels
in the distress of war.
Within the realm of the physical, men in these images were often depicted with soft figures and
features, curly showy hair, round faces, and full lips. These physical elements were often
synonymous with the female figures featured in similar posters. Whether this points to a lack of
ability to differentiate figures by the artist or it was an intentional action is unknown, but regardless
it points to male femininity and shifts of gender dynamics. One of the most notable examples of
this gender shifting is George M. Richards’ poster, “Oh, Boy! That’s the Girl!” (Richards). Within
this image, a young man takes up the forefront of the image, smiling and holding a donut in one
hand, while the other hand points behind him at a young woman holding a plate of the donuts. The
young man in the forefront, helmeted and dressed in his green army uniform, looks directly out at
the audience while gesturing back to the girl. The girl is similarly helmeted and wearing a green
army uniform, with a very similar large smile on her face. The two visages mirror each other as
they both look out at the audience from dark eyes and shadowed, but happy facial features. Their
large rosy-lipped smiles invite the viewer to share in their happiness and cheer. One of the only
differences in the depiction of the two visages is the short-cropped hair peeking out from
underneath the female’s helmet. At first glance, it would likely be unclear as to which character
was the “boy” and which was the “girl.” This physical androgyny is further confused by the text
itself, as the phrase “Oh, boy! That’s the girl!” can easily be read as a statement of disgust or
confusion at which figure represents the female. The next text of the image, “The Salvation Army
Lassie – Keep her on the job” continues the gender confusion as it frames the face of the male
figure, either implying that he is the lassie needing to stay in work, or that he is the speaker asking
the audience to keep the other figure employed. From a distance, the only text of the poster that
would be easily read would be the phrase, “Oh, Boy! that’s the Girl!,” placing the term boy on top
of the term girl, lining up the identification with boy as the higher figure in the image and the word
boy with the lower figure in the image. The colors and figures themselves become completely
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incongruous with one another from this distance, as the colors and markings meld in the
blurred shapes of two people, clearly smiling from large rosy lips. James draws upon this
gender equivocation as becoming a game of interpretation for the viewer to discern the masculine
from the feminine (James). Within this image, both female and male become fluid and interjoined
as neither figure necessarily portrays one gender or the other, rather drawing and confounding
gender identification through the text in relation to the image.

Looking Forward
In focusing on specific World War I propaganda posters, a clear theme of androgynous visual
rhetoric appears throughout the images. Many of these posters were originally designed to make
clear individual gender roles within the war, but through the androgynous imagery of physical
representation as well as agency and action, these gender roles become further confused and
intertwined. Within female representations, clear elements of masculine physical appearance
including strength and rigidity become apparent. Women were by necessity placed within roles
upon the battle field, directing and leading the soldiers into war, or otherwise caring for and saving
fallen soldiers. Within male representations, there are clear elements of feminine appearance and
fragility, both through the portrayals of softness and weakness, as well as a loss of agency and
power through military service and by extension subservience. Through the pervasiveness of these
posters, these images became ensconced within the dominant psyche of the era, forcing a
representational shift of gender dynamics and identity within hegemonic culture. The pervasive
androgyny of these posters becomes apparent in the literature, styles, and actions of the time, as
women continued to figure out their fight for equal rights and reinforce their place in maledominated spheres.
These propaganda posters became emblematic of shifting gender roles and the ways in which
androgyny is used as a tool to both break down as well as reinforce a gender binary both then and
now. McKillen asserts that, for the era,
The debate over gender and citizenship also helped lay the intellectual groundwork for
labor party activists and Socialists to develop alternative visions of how to make diplomacy
more democratic, which competed with Wilson’s international reform agenda during the
postwar period. The successes and failures of labor and Socialist dissidents in counteracting
the gendered propaganda of pro-war activists and in developing alternative models of
citizenship offer a rich intellectual legacy for today’s peace activists. (418)

World War I created an environment for the war over gender rights and identity that is still
manifested in our society today. Androgyny continues to represent the ways in which gender can
be rejected and redefined as incorporating all gender markers or none. The androgyny of WWI
thereby opened the doors to gender fluidity within American culture, pulling it out of the closet,
as it were. In relating the images as either masculine or feminine, we are inherently reinforcing the
gender binary as the overall construct, yet in placing these gender roles within the realm of
androgyny of the era, we are able to reject that binary as androgyny breaks free of the confines at
work within the period culture. We must thereby encourage the incorporation of androgyny as a
tool for deconstructing societal definitions of gender in order to develop a more equal and
encompassing understanding of gender identification and fluidity.
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The Great War and Modern Homosexuality:
Transatlantic Crossings
Chet DeFonso
Northern Michigan University
In June 15 1918, Captain Edward Brittain was killed at Asiago, on the Alto-Adige front in northern
Italy, leading a small number of British troops in what appeared to be a hopeless, full-frontal attack
upon numerically superior Austrian and German forces. Just the day previously, Brittain had been
informed by his superior officers that he was being investigated on account of allegations that he
had engaged in sexual relations with men under his command. Edward Brittain was the beloved
younger brother of Vera Brittain, the remarkable young woman whose service in the war as a VAD
nurse formed the core of her remarkable and successful memoir, Testament of Youth. Later in her
life, Vera Brittain would wonder if her brother had purposely exposed himself to reckless danger
as a way of courting death, in effect committing suicide, in an effort to avoid the disgrace and
shame that would come to him—and to his family—were his homosexuality to be publicly
revealed (Bishop and Bostridge).
Brittain’s experience as a soldier whose life was shadowed and ultimately darkened by society’s
rejection of his sexual orientation was not unusual. For the most part, early twentieth century
European and American societies rejected the concept that same-gender sexual orientation should
be regarded as a normal, healthy, moral, legal, and acceptable mode of existence. Queer individuals
paid the price by being forced to live hidden lives, often with the guilt of censure and rejection
weighing heavily upon them. Only in Germany did a nascent legal and cultural rights organization
for these people exist. There, in the lands of the social and medical scientists who had coined the
very term homosexuality, a small but growing number of men and women worked to achieve legal
rights for homosexuals, believing strongly that once official governmental discrimination ended,
cultural and social acceptance would soon follow. (See the discussion of early twentieth Century
homosexual rights activism in Gay Berlin, Robert Beachy, especially Chapter 3, 88-119).
World War I had a deep impact upon the development of gender relationships in the Western
World, and was especially significant in the way that it fostered the development of homosocial
and homosexual identities among its participants. Many men and women who were involved in
the war effort formed profoundly deep emotional and physical same-gender relationships.
Observers and participants alike have attested that World War I encouraged a kind of incipient
“gay solidarity” among some of its survivors—for example the British war poets such as Siegfried
Sassoon and Wilfrid Owen, as well as the German-American Henry Garber, founder of the first
American gay rights organization in the 1920s. At the same time, however, the war inspired intense
concerns about policing same gender desire. In the United States, there were several large scale
incidents where dozens of inducted soldiers were suspected of engaging in homosexual activity,
resulting in mass trials and convictions of those accused. In Britain, likewise, “homosexual panic”
manifested itself through the demagogue Pemberton Billing’s insistence that the German military
command possessed a “Black Book” of 47,000 Britons who were homosexual and thus subject to
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blackmail and betrayal. In both countries, some homosexuals were regarded as “sick” and
were treated accordingly in various mental health facilities; others were regarded as
“criminal” and were subject to punishment in civil or military prisons.
By contrast, in Germany homosexual rights activists were inspired by the war effort to work at
increasing the visibility of homosexuals. Military experiences of homosexual soldiers led to
homosexual rights activists strengthening their efforts to accomplish war reforms. But antihomosexual writers blamed the community for weakening the fiber of German masculinity,
presaging the line of attack that would be employed in the terrible NAZI-era persecution of
homosexual men in the 1930s. In Britain, the USA, and in Germany, the experience of World War
I played a formative role in helping shape later twentieth century gay attitudes and identities.
In the United States, the relatively late entry of the country into the conflict meant that antihomosexual purges of the military did not really have a full opportunity of developing on a
widespread scale. But especially in urban areas, the effort to recruit and enlist hundreds of
thousands of healthy men was accompanied by a general campaign directed at “cleaning up” what
was perceived to be rampant “vice” and immorality in America’s urban centers. These “morals”
campaigns had the effect of making homosexuality—like venereal disease and prostitution—seem
to be a factor in an underlying social malaise. As George Chauncey writes in his masterly account
of Gay New York,
World War I was a watershed in the history of the urban moral reform movement and in
the role of homosexuality in reform discourse. The war embodied reformers’ darkest fears
and their greatest hopes, for it threated the very foundations of the nation’s moral order –
the family, small town stability, the racial and gender hierarchy—even as it offered
reformers an unprecedented opportunity to implement their vision. It also led them to focus
for the first time on homosexuality as a major social problem (141).

One of the best examples of the new kind of “moral crusade” directed against homosexuality in
the United States was the “purge” of homosexual sailors in Rhode Island, in 1919 and 1920. In
March 1919, the Office of Naval Intelligence created a new task force consisting of 14 recruits—
volunteers—based in Newport Rhode Island. Their mission was to entrap other sailors who were
suspected of being guilty of a variety of homosexual acts. Not quite a month after the task force
was commissioned, 20 naval personnel were arrested and detained pending trial and a nearly
guaranteed conviction. Naval historian Sherry Zane notes, “Anxious and afraid, the suspects
remained in solitary confinement for three months and 21 days before they received official
charges of sodomy and scandalous conduct” (Zane 280). Ultimately, all of the accused were court
martialed, found guilty, and sentenced to maximum sentences of between three and ten years of
hard labor.
Having suffered the shame and humiliation of courts of inquiry, unfair and misguided
court-martial proceedings, and severe prison sentences, they were finally released and
dishonorably discharged between December 1921 and March 1922. Their lives would
never be the same. They did not receive any military benefits, nor were they buried with
the honor of military funerals (Zane 305).

Zane concludes that,
World War I, not the Cold War, marked the beginning of a national security state that grew
out of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Great War provided government officials
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new opportunities to expand notions of America’s core values as national security
concerns, and the Newport scandal demonstrated the extent to which the construction of
gender and sexual norms shaped national interests in the development of a security state
(306).

The Newport scandal also inspired a general re-evaluation of the entire American military’s
treatment of those deemed “sexually deviant.” Some American political leaders were themselves
sympathetic to the new, scientific understanding of same-sex desire, even while this did not lead
them to advocate for it being accepted or even tolerated. Perhaps it was true that homosexuality
was a disease, and not a crime. It was still a condition that needed to be isolated, treated, and
repelled from the official military organism, much like a dangerous disease or ailment. Henry
Keyes, Senator from New Hampshire, was one who adopted this view: "Perversion is not a crime,
but a disease that should be properly treated in a hospital." The idea was flatly rejected by the new
Naval Secretary, Edwin Denby. Sexual dissidence was too dangerous for the survival of the race
for it to be accepted as a mere health-released variety of human life. Only through stern vigilance
and adherence to god-given and long-accepted social norms could the moral rot of relativism and
decadence by extirpated from the social discourse. The Secretary expressed his satisfaction at
knowing that the fall of morality in the USA would not occur under his watch (Zane 305-306).
By contrast, Great Britain, America’s close ally in World War I, did not use professional “decoys”
to entrap homosexual soldiers. Individual soldiers might be “noticed” and then made subject to the
strict disciple of the armed forces, but their superiors did not devise elaborate internal sexual
policing units such as those which existed in the American services. Still, in Britain not only was
homosexuality illegal, strong social currents as well as the lingering memory of the famous trials
of Oscar Wilde meant that homosexuals was much on the mind of some social leaders, especially
among those in the moralistic middle class opposing same sex relationships. Moreover, during
wartime, at least 230 British soldiers were court-martialled, convicted and sentenced to terms of
imprisonment for contravening military discipline with homosexual acts OR behavior (Harvey).
Strong emotions targeting men suspected of “effeminate loving” motivated harsh attacks on known
and suspected homosexuals. One British MP, Noel Pemberton Billing, served as the most vocal
scourge of homosexuals. In an article in the appropriately named Vigilante magazine, he claimed
that the German secret intelligence possessed a list of 47,000 blackmail-able British individuals,
men and women from high ranks of society, including even members of the Cabinet and the high
military command. They were “perverts” of “moral and sexual weakness” whose lack of human
decency reflected the utter degeneracy of the governmental elite:
. . . incestuous bars were established in Portsmouth and Chatham. In these meeting places,
the stamina of British sailors was undermined. More dangerous still, German agents, under
the guise of indecent liaison, could obtain information as to the disposition of the Fleet. . .
Wives of men in supreme positions were entangled. In Lesbian ecstasy the most sacred
secrets of State were betrayed. The sexual peculiarities of members of the peerage were
used as a leverage to open fruitful fields for espionage (Hoare).

Strict moralists and public adventurers like Pemberton Billing used the prospect of blackmail and
the vague sense that homosexuals were anxious to betray their own country to unleash a frenzy of
innuendo and scurrilous gossip in his news magazine, The Vigilante. At the same time, however,
it was certainly true that in the modern metropolis of London, some homosexuals and lesbians
were indeed taking advantage of wartime license to lead their lives more freely than any previous
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generation. One Captain of the Flying Corp, Leo Charlton, was especially emblematic of a
new spirit of liberation that was stalking the land. He opened his sumptuous London home
for parties that attracted airmen of all nations who were stationed in or near London, as well as
officers from the other branches of service, and an interesting array of cultural leaders of all
generations. His parties witnessed officers flirting with other officers, enlisted men flirting with
other enlisted, and perhaps most shockingly, officers flirting with enlisted men. “It cannot be
claimed that the scenes which were enacted late at night were uniformly decorous. Much license
was allowed, especially to those who had just come from, or were immediately returning to, an
agony of life at the war” (Charlton).
Another angle of attack upon these queer Britons was that they failed the nation and the race by
entering into liaisons that could not bear offspring. To be a homosexual was not only illegal and
immoral, it was also a patriotic shirking of the responsibility for all good Britons to “go forth and
multiply.” Some Britons took pride in perceptions of their nation’s moral rectitude, as evinced by
the continued strength and glory of the British empire. Contrasts were also drawn with the
perceived effeminacy and lack of manly convention found on the continent, especially among the
German military leadership, whose espousal of bright shiny metallic helmets and fascination with
elaborate displays of courtly etiquette were suspect. Popular novelist John Buchan exploited this
view in his wartime novel Greenmantle, originally published in 1916. The hero Richard Hannay
“penetrates” Germany, posing as a Boer from South Africa. He enters Germany via the
Netherlands, posing as an anti-British exile itching to fight for the Germans. He meets the powerful
and sinister Colonel Ulric von Stumm, and persuades him he can help persuade the Muslims to
join the Germans' side. Von Stumm is an overweight voluptuary, addicted to scented cigarettes,
French perfume, and purple linens. “At first sight, you would have said it was a woman’s drawing
room. But it wasn’t. I soon saw the difference. . . I began to see the queer other side to my host,
that evil side which gossip had spoken of as not unknown in the German army” (Buchan 217-18;
see also Robb).
Things were indeed quite different in Germany. There, sexologist Magnus Hirschfield cited the
positive contributions of homosexuality to the German war effort. He praised the patriotism and
loyalty of German homosexuals, who he claimed served in large numbers and were frequently to
be found in the most dangerous and exposed positions. In Hirschfield’s view, modern homosexuals
were the equivalent of the Spartan band of brothers. Hirschfield and his followers were much more
organized, much more involved in public discussion and debate than their counterparts in Britain
or the US. They argued that modern war actually demonstrated the fitness and appropriateness of
homosexuality, and that therefore homosexuals should be “legally emancipated” from the shackles
of social disapproval and legal harassment. But after Germany faced defeat and occupation in 1918
into 1919, forces opposed to homosexuals became louder and more organized. On the far right of
the political spectrum, some journalists grouped homosexuals along with “greedy Jewish bankers”
and “rabid socialist agitators” as prime culprits in their conspiracy theories of “stab-in-the-back”
and internal betrayal. One writer, H.A. Preiss, published a small book, entitled “The Sexual
Cruelties of Love-Crazy Men,” in which he argued that certain coteries of homosexuals in high
position had consciously undermined the proper masculinist foundation of German society.
Memories of a notorious sex scandal which had touched the inner circles of the Kaiser in 1908,
the Eulenburg affair, were raked over once again to re-familiarize German readers with the
pernicious treachery of the homosexual elite. Writers for the “Die Freundschaft,” (The Friend), a
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newspaper that supported homosexuals in Berlin and other large German cities, countered
the stab-in-the-back claim. “Homosexuals were exceptional only in their goal to emancipate
themselves from legal discrimination. Otherwise they were committed to protecting the nation, as
evidenced by their war experience” (Crouthamel).
Given the fact that Germany was at the forefront of sexual liberation, that German speakers had
invented the word homosexual, and that the world’s first organized homosexual rights organization
was based in Berlin, it is not surprising that the first US rights organization was founded by a
German immigrant living in Chicago, Henry Gerber. Gerber was a Bavarian by birth, but he and
his family had moved to Chicago before World War I, when Gerber was still in his 20s. In 1917,
he did not have US citizenship—or even permanent resident status—when the United States
declared war on his home country, so he was effectively forced to enlist and seek work in the US
Army. Ultimately, he was found to be in possession of excellent reading and writing skills and was
trained as a journalist and printer, skills which he would later put to use as an activist in the 1920s.
In 1919 and 1920, Gerber was part of the US Army of Occupation in western Germany, based in
the industrial city of Coblenz. There he came to terms with his own homosexuality, but also
became familiar with that town’s community of homosexual rights activists who urged him to
regard his own sexual orientation not as a burden but as a gift. On leave, Gerber and his friends
went to Berlin where they were exposed to what was then the most active and vibrant homosexual
culture in the world. When, in the early 1920s, Gerber returned to the United States and the
restrictive sexual regime of Midwestern America, he was determined to share with his neighbors
and friends in Chicago the liberated experiences of living in a relaxed and more tolerant society.
Gerber found employment as a clerk with the US Post Office, and support from a network of
moral reformers and social activists. Some approached issues from the perspective of socialist
thought, other were inspired by religious zeal, some by a desire to improve the condition of life
for Chicago’s large immigrant population. All were united by a shared critique of the existing
complacency and intolerance which they found in many areas of American life. Gerber made allies
with a small but well-experienced group of locals who were like-minded and persistent, some of
them sharing a homosexual orientation but not all. He created an organization which he called
“The Society for Human Rights,” and he became its secretary and publicist. He filed an application
with the State of Illinois to register the group as an officially recognized non-profit community
group. The Society for Human Rights, he wrote, sought,
[T]o promote and protect the interests of people who by reasons of mental and physical
abnormalities are abused and hindered in the legal pursuit of happiness which is guaranteed
them by the Declaration of Independence and to combat the public prejudices against them
by dissemination of factors according to modern science among intellectuals of mature age.
The Society stands only for law and order; it is in harmony with any and all general laws
insofar as they protect the rights of others, and does in no manner recommend any acts in
violation of present laws nor advocate any manner inimical to the public welfare.

Illinois officials granted a charter to the Society on December 10, 1924, and so it has appropriately
been recognized as the first documented and recognized homosexual rights organization in the
Western Hemisphere (Sprague).
The Society for Human Rights lasted for only a year, and its story and legacy in Chicago, Illinois,
and the United States, is outside the purview of this paper. But it is entirely relevant to the story of
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homosexuality and World War I that this pioneering group in the Midwest was the result of
the experience of an American soldier in wartime, and not surprising either to find that many
of its first members and supporters were either themselves veterans in the war, or they possessed
family members whose lives had been altered or ended by American participation in the conflict
(de la Croix).
World War One was a shared experience for those who lived through it and the middle decades of
the twentieth would witness its continuing effects upon the lives of those who fought in the war,
those who sent relatives to die in the conflict, and the civilians at home who worked to make their
communities suitable for the survivors. Both for better and for worse, World War I caused public
attitudes about homosexuality to shift, as the “Great War” created a mind-set of danger, decadence,
and determination which would alter the lives of queer people irrevocably.
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Recalling the Trenches from the Club Window:
Contrasting Perspectives in Dorothy Sayers and P. G. Wodehouse
Laura Kasson Fiss
Michigan Technological University
British cultural historians often cite World War I as a pivot point in the advent of modernity and
Modernism. Despite pre-war works of Modernism (and Virginia Woolf’s famous tongue-in-cheek
statement that “On or about December 1910 human character changed”), World War I is a clear
landmark that seems self-evidently an event after which Nothing Would Ever Be The Same. In
fact, many works on the Victorian period use 1914 as a bookend when defining the period by
broad-reaching political events rather than a change in monarch. (You may have noted that this
makes the period longer—Victorianists like to colonize things.) The other end of this period is
often the 1832 Reform Act, which began an extension of the franchise to middle-class men. In
fact, universal male franchise only came to Britain at the close of the war in 1918, with the same
Representation of the People Act that began enfranchising women. While it is undeniable that the
First World War had a resounding impact on Britain, its effects, particularly on the literary scene,
can be overstated. The Victorians did not just go away in 1914. Particularly in middlebrow culture,
much stayed the same—which itself constitutes a response to the war.
Take, for example, humorist Jerome K. Jerome, whose 1889 hit Three Men in a Boat (To Say
Nothing of the Dog) has never been out of print. He continued writing until his death in 1927,
including a World War I novel, All Roads Lead to Calvary (1919). The novel contains a scene in
which a conscientious objector is killed by a mob, and Jerome drew on his own experience driving
an ambulance in the war (being too old for traditional service). Yet his Times obituary marked him
as irrevocably dated: “He had not, in fact, kept pace with the changes of public taste, and remained
to the end in the naïveté both of his laughter and his tears a typical humorist of the ’eighties.”1
Jerome and his close contemporaries, centered around the Idler magazine, established a mode of
joking about late-Victorian changes to the social landscape that relied on the club as exemplar of
the best and worst of Victorian sociability: convivial on the one hand and exclusive on the other.
I discuss this phenomenon elsewhere, but here I’d like to focus on the two youngest subjects in
my study: Dorothy Sayers and P.G. Wodehouse. Each employs jokes about the club in a post-war
context, but Sayers emphasizes the generational gap the war created, whereas Wodehouse
emphasized continuity. Nevertheless, both ultimately rely on the structures of the club, particularly
when cultivating a relationship with their own readers.
“Club” in this context has a fairly narrow definition: a social club for men in London’s West End,
known as “Clubland” for the proliferation of these institutions. The club in this sense originated in
the late seventeenth century but saw its high-water mark in the Victorian period. In the twentieth
century, the clubs saw a decline, although many exist to this day—and some continue to exclude
1

“Mr. J. K. Jerome,” The Times, June 15, 1927.
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women. Beyond their physical and historical presence, however, these clubs loomed large
in print culture, fictional and non-fictional. Fictional clubs in particular, I argue elsewhere,
offer an imagined community whose essential fictionality means that common readers have as
much of a right to belong as anyone else.
Dorothy Sayers’s The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club (1928) renders a Victorian joke horribly
real: that a member has died behind his newspaper and no one has noticed. The club and its rules,
written and unwritten, become a synecdoche for the pre-war social order. Lord Peter Wimsey,
Sayers’s detective, navigates a range of social contexts, using detection as therapy for his shellshock. The structure of the mystery, now well established, imposes a sense of order for both
Wimsey and perhaps also his readers, yet The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club also suggests
the limits of this kind of containment.
The joke practically opens the novel: the club is called a “Morgue” in the opening line, and
Wimsey’s friend George Fentiman, a First-World-War veteran with wounds visible and invisible,
follows the reference up: “Place always reminds me of that old thing in ‘Punch,’ you know—
‘Waiter, take away Lord Whatishisname, he’s been dead two days.’”2 Yet the joke is fulfilled:
Fentiman’s grandfather is discovered, behind a newspaper where all thought he was sleeping, in
full rigor mortis. When they discover the body, Fentiman hysterically recalls the joke:
Fentiman laughed. Peal after hysterical peal shook his throat. All round the room,
scandalized Bellonians creaked to their gouty feet, shocked by the unmannerly noise.
‘Take him away!’ said Fentiman, ‘take him away. He’s been dead two days. So are you!
So am I! We’re all dead, and we never noticed it!’3

The club is figured as the bastion of conservatism, the representative of the Old Guard—the
previous generation who doesn’t understand the young men who have fought in the war. On the
one hand, it’s an “old” joke—the age and reference to Punch makes it seem Victorian, at very least
pre-war. But the joke has changed: to the younger Fentiman, his grandfather’s death is indicative
of a larger social problem: “We’re all dead, and we never noticed it!” As an absurdist postwar
sentiment, this recalls T. S. Eliot’s evocation of malaise in The Waste Land: “Are you alive, or
not? Is there nothing in your head?”4 The body behind the newspaper becomes just that: not merely
a body from whence the mind engages in imaginative journeys of reading, but a corpse.
Indeed, the club is so ossified that George’s joke registers on a level comparable to his
grandfather’s death: “It is doubtful which occurrence was more disagreeable to the senior members
of the Bellona Club—the grotesque death of General Fentiman in their midst or the indecent
neurathenia of his grandson. Only the younger men felt no sense of outrage; they knew too much.”5
If the other young men, presumably who had also been in the war, don’t share George’s hysterical
laughter, they “get” his joke. The discovery of the body takes place on Armistice Day: the murder
of one old man contrasts darkly with the war deaths of millions of young men on all sides of the
2
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conflict. For much of the novel, George appears guilty of his grandfather’s murder, both to
a reluctant Wimsey and ultimately to himself: in the throes of a post-traumatic episode, he
even falsely confesses.
In fact, the novel itself turns on the joke that nothing changes in the club. After both Fentiman
brothers have been suspected of the murder, Wimsey proves that Robert tampered with the body
after death in search of an inheritance but that the doctor who examined the body—also a member
of the club—committed the murderer. Wimsey encourages him to write a confession, and another
club member provides him a pistol with which to shoot himself in the club library. The novel
closes with Wetheridge, a longstanding member, complaining about a slew of troubles,
culminating in corked wine, crying, “My God! I don’t know what’s come to this Club!”6 The dark
joke, after all, is what has not changed—both what has not materially changed after the war and
also the changes that clubmen refuse to acknowledge. Wetheridge blames the War, but more as an
indication of a social and cultural shift.
Meanwhile, in the writings of P. G. Wodehouse, the war makes much less of an impact. Some
critics claim neither World War registers in Wodehouse’s fictional world. 7 Literally, this is only
a slight exaggeration: in an oeuvre of about a hundred books, one has to hunt pretty hard for direct
references to the war (I’ve found about a handful). References to Hitler and Mussolini are more
common (especially in the inter-war period). But none of Wodehouse’s characters—certainly not
his main characters—are said to have served in either war. Certainly Wodehouse’s world, which
centers on the fictional Drones Club, is a far cry from Sayers’s, in which Wimsey’s war experience
defines him as a character and a detective. In fact, Sayers uses Wodehouse in her characterization
of Wimsey: in Murder Must Advertise (1933), when Wimsey goes undercover at an advertising
agency, his new colleagues describe him as “like Bertie Wooster in horn-rims.”8 But while
Wimsey’s frivolous exterior conceals a razor-sharp intellect, Bertie Wooster’s….does not.
Wodehouse does write clever and/or impecunious characters, but mainly in his pre-war fiction.
The name of the Drones Club suggests a bee metaphor, implying that these upper-class men idly
profit from the labor of others while waiting around to serve their only essential function: mating.
This reads like quite stark political commentary, but the Drones’s silliness makes the whole thing
seem more like a joke. In the Drones Club, members perpetually chuck dinner rolls at each other,
play practical jokes, and call each other by absurd nicknames. These antics often appear as
parenthetical asides leavening a moment that threatens to verge on the serious, such as the threat
of a renewed engagement with Madeline Bassett: “Only once in my career had I experienced an
emotion equally intense, on the occasion when Freddie Wigeon at the Drones, having possessed
himself of a motor horn, stole up behind me as I crossed Dover Street in what is known as a reverie
and suddenly tooted the apparatus in my immediate ear.”9 The Drones exaggerate some of the real
6

Sayers, Bellona 192.

7
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qualities of West-End clubs, such as absurd bets, including wagering on matrimonial
prospects or playing golf through the streets of London.10 An element of Thomas Hobbes’s
“superiority theory” of humor may be at play here. Yet I doubt most readers feel unmitigated
“scorn,” as Hobbes has it.11 The Drones’ general affability mitigates this effect. Bertie in particular
goes to great lengths to help his friends and relations, frequently putting himself into ridiculous
situations. Of course, one can never completely generalize about readers’ feelings, but I suspect
most readers feel fond of Bertie, even as they laugh at him.
In one instance from Uncle Fred in the Springtime (1939), Wodehouse writes directly against the
characterization of “post-war youth” as fundamentally troubled. After nerve specialist Sir
Roderick Glossop meets Pongo Twistleton in a railway carriage, “Sir Roderick carried away with
him an impression of a sombre and introspective young man. He mentioned him later in a lecture
to the Mothers of West Kensington as an example of the tendency of post-war youth towards a
brooding melancholy.”12 Pongo is, in fact, afflicted with a classically convoluted comic plot. His
Uncle Fred delights in involving him in outrageous schemes, for which Pongo lacks the
constitution. In this case, Uncle Fred is attempting to insinuate himself, his nephew, and Polly Pott
into Blandings Castle under assumed identities. To make matters worse, these identities hinge on
Uncle Fred’s impersonation of Sir Roderick Glossop—yes, the same Sir Roderick that they meet
in the railway carriage. Pongo thus has an obvious reason for appearing brooding and melancholy,
but by its nature he must keep it concealed from Sir Roderick.
Furthermore, Pongo has a host of other problems. His customary “anemia of the exchequer”13 has
been exacerbated by a series of bad bets, leaving him £250 in debt and in danger of both bodily
harm and expulsion from the Drones Club (one of the original purposes of clubs was as a group of
men whose bets could be depended on). Moreover, he has fallen in love at first sight—as he is
wont to do—with Polly Potts, who is engaged to someone else. To make matters worse, the very
scheme that brings Pongo and Uncle Fred down to Blandings is designed in part to facilitate Polly’s
engagement. But ultimately Pongo’s troubles are laid squarely at Uncle Fred’s door. When he
meets Polly, she “laughed--the gay, wholehearted laugh of youth. Pongo remembered that he had
laughed like that in the days before he had begun to see so much of Uncle Fred.”14 In this case, the
generational gap is ascribed to disposition rather than circumstance: no evidence suggests that
Pongo has been influenced directly by the war.
Wodehouse and Sayers each also depict an influential relationship between an upper-class
clubman and his valet, or “gentleman’s personal gentleman.” Jeeves, who fills that role for Bertie
Wooster, is Wodehouse’s best-known character [More recently, a search engine was named for
him]. Jeeves serves as a “Mayfair consultant,” extricating Bertie and his friends from scrapes, often
in ways that make them look ridiculous, and frequently for explicit compensation, monetary or
10
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otherwise.15 Bertie, who narrates their “saga,” hyperbolically describes Jeeves as almost
inhuman, particularly in the display of emotion: “One of his eyebrows had risen about an
eighth of an inch, and I knew he was deeply stirred, because I had rarely seen him raise an eyebrow
more than a sixteenth of an inch.”16 Even the verbs ascribed to Jeeves’s motion make him sound
other-worldly; in one early story alone he “float[s],” “flit[s]”, “filter[s]” and “shimmer[s].”17
Although Jeeves has several romantic entanglements (his elaborate plot in The Inimitable Jeeves
extricates Jeeves himself from one of two simultaneous “understandings”), he remains
fundamentally apart from his fellow characters. (I should note that Wodehouse has a range of
valets and butlers throughout his canon, many of whom are quite different from Jeeves.)
Lord Peter Wimsey’s valet, Bunter, on the other hand, is far less distant from his employer. They
have several overlapping roles in relation to each other. Bunter served under Wimsey as his
sergeant during the war, and he continues to assist Wimsey’s detective “hobby,” principally as a
photographer. Furthermore, Bunter helps nurse Wimsey through his shell shock, as seen in Whose
Body (1923):
Lord Peter allowed himself to be dosed and put to bed without further resistance. Mr.
Bunter, looking singularly un-Bunterlike in striped pyjamas, with his stiff black hair ruffled
about his head, sat grimly watching the younger man’s sharp cheekbones and the purple
stains under his eyes…. He peered at him anxiously. An affectionate note crept into his
voice. ‘Bloody little fool!’ said Sergeant Bunter.18

Bunter steps outside his valet role here, appearing “un-Bunterlike” and as a sergeant, regarding the
sleeping Wimsey with almost parental affection. The war makes the crucial difference here. Not
only did it create Wimsey’s shell shock, but it gives Bunter the role of “Sergeant Bunter,” who can
view his employer and superior officer with familiar affection—and common sense.
Wimsey solves crimes as direct therapy for his shell shock: both a productive use of his horrific
wartime experience and a way of making himself useful as a minor member of the aristocracy.
Wimsey’s actions are full of purpose, but what of his readers? In consuming middle-brow fiction,
they are, perhaps, as idle as a clubman (except, of course, those of us who read for Serious Work).
In her other writings, Sayers depicts Wimsey as thoroughly enjoying his membership of other
clubs, particularly the Egotists’. Despite their differences, Sayers and Wodehouse both use the
club and upper-class masculinity as an aspirational model for readers—even as both also critique
the club (Sayers directly, Wodehouse through gentle humor). In this way, they serve as less of a
break from their Victorian predecessors than the conventional narrative of the war’s effect would
imply. But in following their Victorian predecessors, especially the New Humorists, in humorously
re-defining the club space as one imaginatively accessible by readers of wider class and gender
backgrounds, these twentieth-century, middle-brow novelists were radical in their own way.
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Rather than completely rejecting Victorian spaces of exclusivity, these novels re-define
them—and open them up to common readers.

This paper is an extract from:
Fiss, Laura Kasson. Clubs for the Unclubbable: Humor and Mass Readership from Jerome K.
Jerome to P. G. Wodehouse. Book MS in progress.
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Men, Military, and the Law:
An Examination of Conscription During World War I
and Its Legal Challenges
Victoria Bryant Stewart
Northwest Florida State College
As noted in the case syllabus for the Selective Draft Law Cases 245 U.S. 366,
Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government not in conflict with
the constitutional guarantees of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the
very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the
citizen to render military service in case of need and the right of the government to compel
it.1

Mandatory military service, called conscription for the rest of this paper, was first used during the
American Civil War. It became clear that reliance upon volunteerism and the existing militia
system would not serve the military needs of the Union beyond 1862. Decades later, as the United
States again needed to quickly amass and maintain a sizable military, conscription was used to
quickly increase the size of the standing military through a federal form of conscription. Similar
to the American Civil War, the US Congress responded with a conscription bill in 1917 to create
another federally controlled system of manpower procurement.
Republican Representative Julius Kahn introduced the Selective Service Act. The members of
Congress, supportive of conscription, believed that men were required to serve the nation during
its times of need. They argued further of the need for an effective plan to muster and train the
requisite number of men into the military. In their view, reliance upon volunteerism would not
ensure the military would expand to the size required to participate in this current conflict.
Opponents of conscription expressed their concerns regarding the growing expanse of the military
within American society. In their view, conscription represented yet another extension of power
beyond what is granted in the US Constitution. David Hollingsworth (R-OH) was vocal regarding
his concerns of conscription since he viewed conscription as a step toward militarism within the
United States. Hollingsworth said, “I would rather resign and let the people back home send to
Washington a more subservient tool of militarism.”2 According to Hollingsworth, conscription
and its large standing military represented
The end of free institutions in America, destructive of that form of government which
Lincoln in his inspired words at Gettysburg said our forefathers had brought forth on this

1

Selective Draft Law Cases 245 U.S. 366 (1917).

2

Representative David Hollingsworth, speaking on Increase of the Military Establishment: Extension of
Remarks, 65th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (April 28, 1917): HR: 155.
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continent and which he and other sturdy, unflinching American patriots have ever since
maintained without foreign cooperation or entanglements.3

Hollingsworth’s caution was shared by other members of Congress since they feared conscription
created military fervor.
Despite its critics, President Woodrow Wilson supported the measure, then signed the bill into law
on May 18, 1917. Wilson additionally issued a proclamation on that same day. This proclamation,
Proclamation 1370, restated the requirements of self-registration of men, penalties for those that
did not register and comply with conscription, and penalties for men that committed fraud. Wilson,
in a similar tact to that of President Abraham Lincoln, made pleas to a man’s patriotism to
encourage compliance. Both of these presidents used patriotism to measure and determine loyalty
and obedience among the American male population. Wilson, however, took this idea a step
further, knowing that conscription was an unpopular policy. He discussed how compliance for
conscription represented unity within the United States. He likened obedience and compliance
with conscription to that of service in the military since the United States now united service of
soldiers and actions by civilians around compliance. While conscription had been used before,
Wilson explained the uniqueness of this time since it fostered a new requirement of service to the
nation and a duty for all Americans. Previously, Americans (including civilians) were not united
around a common purpose of service to the state and toward compliance for conscription law.
Assignment into their proper roles of service, according to Wilson, would take place through this
new legislation by the US Congress. “Congress,” as Wilson explained, “has provided that the
Nation shall be organized for war by selection, that each man shall be classified for service in the
place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him.”4 Wilson emphasized the
significance of this moment since “it is a new manner of accepting and vitalizing our duty to give
ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common purpose of us all”; further, “it is in no sense a
conscription of the unwilling” because it represented “selection from a Nation which has
volunteered.”5 For Wilson, this time represented “the day which the manhood of the country shall
step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to which this Nation is consecrated” since it
was vital “that there be no gaps in the ranks.”6 Wilson, in an effort to again stress the new
requirement of self-registration of men, referred to registration day “as a great day of patriotic
devotion and obligation” for America’s men.7 Registration, once completed by provost marshals
in districts at the state level, was called a man’s individual responsibility and deemed his “duty.”8
While this sense of duty was reserved for the draft eligible male population, all Americans were
expected to participate since the success of conscription relied on total cooperation and
participation of Americans. As Wilson explained, every man was being called on “whether he is
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himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated
ages is written on the lists of honor.”9
The Legislative and Executive Branches, as detailed in the US Constitution, are allocated different
powers regarding the militia. The militia system had been the primary system since militia units
were permitted to be federalized for specific objectives. According to Article I, Section 8, the
Congress has the right “to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”10 Congress, additionally, was permitted “to provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may
be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipling
proscribed by Congress.”11 As per the duties outlined in Article II, Section 2, “The President shall
be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
states, when called into actual service of the United States.”12 As shown through the US
Constitution, the raising, arming, and training of the militia was the power of the Congress.
Control of troops in active service of the United States was then the power of the President. This
demonstrates and affirms this separation of powers between the branches regarding the militia or
military.
The existing militia system and volunteerism were effective to provide for the military needs of
the nation until 1862. Several militia acts changed the requirements of presidents to require court
orders to summon militiamen for federal service, changed the requisite size of the standing
military, and expanded the president’s ability to federalize militiamen. In 1862, to compensate for
the small size of the Union military during the American Civil War, the Militia Act of 1862
lengthened the terms of service for militia. President Lincoln was then able to summon an
additional 100,000 militiamen for federal service by requiring states to muster in different quota
of men for federal service based upon their state’s population. This proved difficult since many
state governors often intentionally disrupted this process or did not supply their state’s mandated
quota. The US Congress responded with the Enrollment Act in 1863, which created a federal
system of conscription that was overseen by a network of federal agents. Opponents of the
Enrollment Act echoed concerns around its perceived abuse of personal liberty, that it violated
freedom of choice, and disagreed that the Congress had the ability to raise armies outside of using
the existing militia system. The creation of this federal system of conscription then drastically
changed notions of service to the federal state as it also changed notions regarding the requirements
of citizenship.
During the American Civil War, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard a case of challenge
regarding a draft summons. Conscription calls took place within districts of limited volunteerism.
The complainants of this case questioned Congress’s ability to bypass enrollment into state militias
by permitting men to be enrolled into the regular army. This raised questions about whether men
in militia units were to wait to be federalized rather than be directly conscripted into a federal
9
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system of manpower procurement. While the US Congress had the authority to use the
militia, Justice C. J. Lowrie wrote, “it is apparent that it is not founded on the power of ‘calling
forth the militia,’ for those who are drafted under it have not been armed, organized, and
disciplined under the militia law, and are not called forth as militia under state officers, as the
constitution requires.”13 These justices in Pennsylvania ultimately placed an injunction against
further conscription from taking place in the state. Despite these efforts to curb and restrict
conscription in the state of Pennsylvania, the injunction was soon lifted following a motion by the
US government. This turn of events resulted in part because the composition of the justices had
changed by the time the motion was received. These new justices determined that “the state court
could not interfere by injunction, even if the draft law were unconstitutional.”14 This remains the
only time when conscription was reviewed by the courts at this time. The US Supreme Court did
not hear a case on the legality of conscription during the American Civil War.
Despite the efforts of President Wilson to eliminate resistance, resistance against conscription
persisted during World War I much as it had during the American Civil War. While the tactics
and means of resistance differed, conscription remained a detested policy. Legal questions were
raised during World War I regarding the use of conscription to increase the size of the military at
this time of war and national emergency when troops would be sent overseas. Could the Congress
create another or new system of federal conscription? Would this violate provisions regarding the
Congress’s responsibility to the notion of militias? Would this mandatory military service violate
a man’s personal liberty? Does a man have a requirement of service to the federal state in this
time of war and national emergency?
By the end of 1917, just months after Wilson signed the Selective Service Act into law, the US
Supreme Court decided a case that dealt with many of these legal questions. This case, known as
the Selective Draft Law Cases, addressed legal issues from conscription cases in the states of New
York and Minnesota. According to the case, “The service which may be exacted of the citizen
under the army power is not limited to the specific purpose for which Congress is expressly
authorized, by the militia clause, to call the militia.”15 As Chief Justice White explained in the
opinion,
It is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does
not and can not [sic] include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This
however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no
sanction to it and which there can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its
exertion is in no substantial sense a power.16

Chief Justice White provided a historical explanation of how military expectations and regulations
had changed through history, which included a survey of military rules and regulations before
American independence. In this survey, White exposed the expectations of military service for all
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citizens “wherever the public exigency exacted, whether at home or abroad.”17 Following
independence, the Articles of Confederation rendered minimal powers to the unicameral
legislature. At this stage of American political development, “Congress had no such power,
as its authority was absolutely limited to making calls upon the States for the military forces needed
to create and maintain the army, each State being bound for its quota as called.”18 Despite this
limitation upon the legislature as designed by the Articles of Confederation, “The duty of the
citizen to render military service and the power to compel him against his consent to do so was
expressly sanctioned by the constitutions of at least nine of the States.”19
Justice White wrote,
We are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen
of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the
rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative
body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation
of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that
the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.20

In addition to legal issues being raised in relation to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment was also mentioned in the opinion. As White wrote, the Fourteenth Amendment
“broadened the national scope of the Government under the Constitution by causing citizenship of
the United States to be paramount and dominant, instead of being subordinate and derivative, and
therefore, operating as it does upon all the powers conferred by the Constitution.”21
There were several cases during the American Civil War, in the Confederate States of American,
that sought to determine the legality of conscription. The state supreme courts of Texas, Alabama,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia, in contrast to the state of Pennsylvania, upheld
the legality of conscription. In the state of Georgia, the court argued that the Confederate Congress
had been afforded the authority to require the service of men, and men were then expected to
serve.22 Unlike the case in the state of Pennsylvania, the courts in these Confederate States
affirmed their Congress’s ability to introduce a new federal system of conscription. It is worth
noting that service within the Confederate States of America’s conscription system was restricted
to white male citizens between a certain age range. In contrast to this, conscription in the Union
did not bear this same citizenship restriction. In the Union, by contrast, those that had begun the
process of naturalization were liable for service. This raises significant legal questions regarding
the requirements of service to a federal state devoid of citizenship.
We see the affirmation of requirements of mandatory service in the Selective Draft Law Cases
opinion. According to the Court,
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The seceding States wrote into the constitution which was adopted to regulate the
government which they sought to establish, in identical words, the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States which we here have under consideration. And when the
right to enforce under that instrument a selective draft law which was enacted, not differing
in principle from the one here in question, was challenged, its validity was upheld,
evidently after great consideration.23

This ruling reaffirmed the Confederate States of America state courts’ decisions from the
American Civil War. By upholding these earlier rulings, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed the
authority for the Congress to implement conscription. This text from the opinion showcases that
the rights and powers of the Confederate Congress are identical to those of the Congress in the
United States. Given that these branches of government were identical in structure and
responsibility, the US Supreme Court used these state cases to justify conscription during World
War I. While the US Supreme Court would hear other cases upon issues related to conscription
beyond World War I, the Selective Draft Law Cases opinion affirmed the legal grounding of
conscription in the United States.
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“This Mad Brute”:
Postwar Male Violence and the Pathological Public Sphere
Rebecca Frost
Keweenaw Bay Ojibwa Community College
The act of serial killing, in which a perpetrator—usually a male—murders more than one victim
at different times in different places with a “cooling off” period between them, is highly prevalent
in popular culture of the twenty-first century. From shows like CSI: and other police procedurals
both factual and fictional, to popular fiction novels and true crime books, the character of the serial
killer draws audiences and ensnares their attention. Serial killers are often thought of as modern
figures, usually American, with a handful of historical examples treated as outliers. An
examination of violent activity following World War I, however, indicates that more research is
needed to examine causes and instances of serial killing in the interwar period.

The Modern Serial Killer
The term “serial killer” was not coined until the late twentieth century, although credit for the
invention is generally disputed. American FBI special agent Robert Ressler is most often given
credit, dated to the 1970s (Seltzer 64). Even with a specific term, however, the definition was not
static. In general, a serial killer was thought of as someone who killed for personal pleasure or
excitement—as opposed to hit men who made money off of murder—with multiple victims in
multiple places. This helped to distinguish from other categories of killer, such as “mass” murder
in which multiple people were killed in a single location at the same time. A serial killer was so
threatening because he was able to engage in normal, everyday life and go unnoticed between the
murders.
The FBI and especially its Behavioral Science Unit—now the Behavioral Research and Instruction
Unit—positioned itself as expert on the subject of serial killing and thus took control of the serial
killer narrative, especially through their testimony to the Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent
crime in the early 1980s. Through multiple interviews with various violent offenders, special
agents Ressler and John Douglas had compiled a general biography of such types of criminal.
Although this was meant to assist agents in arresting violent offenders who had not yet been
caught, Mark Seltzer argues that this list of common traits was in fact “something like a job
description, a sort of ‘most wanted’ ad” for upcoming offenders (14). Instead of—or perhaps
alongside—allowing law enforcement officials to theorize about and therefore identify current
offenders, the creation of this category of serial killer allowed newly arrested suspects to craft their
own autobiographies around what was already known to those who had arrested them.
The term quickly permeated popular culture as well, likely assisted by what investigative historian
Peter Vronsky terms the “golden age” of serial killers (Sons of Cain 314). Famed true crime author
Ann Rule published her first book in 1980 documenting her now-infamous coworker Ted Bundy,
although the original text does not in fact refer to him as a serial killer. The figure of Bundy—
charming, good-looking, well-spoken, and intelligent enough to serve as his own defense lawyer—
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introduced the wider public to the idea of the serial killer who did not, in fact, appear to be
dangerous. While others who came after him were boring, or plain, or perhaps a bit stupid,
Bundy set the bar for serial killers. As Vronsky observed, “All roads in the empire of serial killers
lead to Ted Bundy,” although any factual serial killer seems to shrink when compared with this
original archetype (Serial Killers 102). Such descriptions of Bundy often, however, overlook the
most grisly details of his more than thirty murders, since this would mean acknowledging that such
an attractive all-American young man was capable not only of killing women, but of repeated acts
of necrophilia.
Where true crime might fail, however, crime fiction has risen to address this gap, further
developing public expectations surrounding the serial killer. The Silence of the Lambs, written by
Thomas Harris in 1988 and made into an Oscar-winning movie directed by Jonathan Demme in
1991, introduced audiences not only to the job of the criminal profiler, but also to Hannibal Lecter.
As an imaginary serial killer who cannibalized his victims—and invited others to dinner parties
where they partook of the same meals—Lecter was charming, good-looking, well-spoken, and
intelligent: a fictional rival for Ted Bundy who debases the bodies of his victims through
cannibalism instead of postmortem rape. In this way Lecter is also able to share the fun, so to
speak, and create more living victims in his dinner guests and therefore increase the horror in the
revelation of his crimes.
The collapse of the real and the fictional occurs not only in the presentation of characters within
the narrative, but in the plot points themselves. In Silence of the Lambs, Lecter has already been
imprisoned, but he is still useful to the Behavioral Science Unit. Another slew of murders,
perpetrated by someone who has been nicknamed Buffalo Bill, has stumped the agents to the point
where Jack Crawford—John Douglas’ fictional counterpart—sends someone to ask for Lecter’s
help on the case. In this interaction, Lecter fully becomes Ted Bundy, who willingly gave
interviews to Robert Keppel during the search for the Green River Killer. Keppel documented
these interviews and the process in his 1995 book The Riverman, which was later given the subtitle
Ted Bundy and I Hunt for the Green River Killer. Life and art intertwined until the point where
Michael Arntfeld and Marcel Danesi felt compelled to declare that, in their book dedicated to what
they call literary criminology, “we find it irrelevant to distinguish between a Ted Bundy (a real
serial killer) and a Hannibal Lecter (an imaginary one)” (140). The twenty-first century popular
perception of a serial killer, then, is based in both fact and fiction, often without the desire—or
even the need—to separate the two.
In the twenty-first century, audiences are accustomed to these intertwined representations of serial
killers and, according to Vonsky, “their novelty has worn thin” (Cain 302). The serial killer is
more likely to appear on an episode of a crime procedural during sweeps week than he is on the
nightly news, and those same television series including CSI:, its spinoffs, and those that jumped
on the popularity bandwagon have produced viewers who believe that they can not only identify a
serial killer at a glance, but also are capable of committing the perfect crime. Armchair profilers
who can quote serial killing statistics abound.
The innocent are not the only ones who have inundated themselves with crime narratives both
factual and fictional. Seltzer argues that “[s]erial killers read many books about serial killing” and
thus the tales they tell after their capture will likely align with what has already been learned and
disseminated (114). Criminal justice professor and author Steven A. Egger goes further to argue
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that, “when those interviewed have provided information inconsistent with already
established theories, the information obtained is dismissed as unimportant or irrelevant”; in
other words, the serial killer narrative has not been allowed to change even with the passage of
time or the collection of more data (39). The serial killer origin story, as it were, appears to be a
modern tale set in stone and requiring a setting of the late twentieth or early twenty-first century.

Labeling Historical Figures
The narrative of the common serial killer profile has even been accepted and used to explain crimes
and criminals of a prior century. A series of murders that occurred in London’s Whitechapel district
in 1888 and attributed to Jack the Ripper has led to numerous theories about the killer’s true
identity with the resulting biographies based largely on twentieth and twenty-first century
profiling. Often given the further sobriquet “the world’s first serial killer,” the Ripper made an
impact not just on the women he killed, but on the expected interaction of such a murderer with
the press. His influence came both through the headlines that reported the discovery of murdered
and mutilated women, and also because the killer, or at least various authors pretending to be the
killer, sent letters to various newspapers claiming responsibility and making threats of further
violence. It is one of these letters that led to the now-infamous nickname of Jack the Ripper.
Although the Ripper’s victims were confined to the lower classes and were all identified at the
time as prostitutes, the newspapers meant that the crimes not only “created a state of alarm in the
East End but also promoted a kind of moral panic among the upper social classes about the effect
of crime reporting on the young and on the working classes” (Tatar 23). The violent acts
themselves, especially if reduced to the Canonical Five victims, were restricted to a small
geographical area and a specific victimology, but the reporting meant that the panic spread beyond
the East End and beyond what was considered to be the lowest class of sex workers. This terror
means that, even though he went unidentified, Jack the Ripper has become the subject of over one
hundred nonfiction books, many of them focused on uncovering his identity.
Even though such psychology did not exist in the late nineteenth century, authors of the twentieth
and twenty-first are more than willing to use the psychological profile of the serial killer in order
to explain the Ripper murders and also to make the case for their chosen suspects. All serial killing
roads might lead to Ted Bundy, but it is Jack the Ripper, still unidentified more than a century
after his crimes, who is “the Mount Everest of serial killers” (Vronsky Cain 223). Reporters of the
day simply did not have the language to describe him, nor the psychological tools to understand
his actions. This lack of language has played a role in the Ripper’s designation as “world’s first.”
Since the term was only coined in the last quarter of the twentieth century, earlier criminals could
not have been branded as such in contemporary reports. It is thus impossible to identify serial
killers by looking for that specific designation prior to Vronsky’s “golden age” of serial killing.
There are multiple theories as to why the Ripper is often pegged as the “world’s first” and why the
twentieth century then experienced a veritable explosion of such criminals. As already mentioned,
the Ripper murders occurred at a time when mass media had recently expanded and played a large
role in the average person’s life. Thanks to the telegraph and the steam engine, both ideas and
people could cover distance at a much faster rate than previously. The combination of increased
literacy rates and lowering prices for newspapers, especially the penny press, meant that groups of
people might convene in order to purchase a single copy that one member read to the rest if they
could not afford or read their own. Although Vronsky made his observation about twentieth
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century crime, the Ripper murders are a prime example of the fact that “[s]erial murder
‘epidemics’ are as much about reporting as they are about killing” (Serial Killing 31).
Newspaper headlines carried tales of the events throughout the world when they might not have
reached much beyond Whitechapel if only passed along by word of mouth. Mass media
documented the events as they happened and then preserved them for future audiences to examine
through new lenses.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries also saw changes in the class system that likely effected
how crime, especially serial murder, would have been presented. Within the heavily stratified
system of Feudalism, those who were titled were nearly untouchable so long as they did not enact
their violent whims on their own class. Even if peasants believed that a lord or lady was murdering
servants, it would have been impossible for them to have spoken up in the name of justice.
Elizabeth Báthory de Ecsed, also known as the Blood Countess, is rumored to have murdered
hundreds of young girls in order to bathe in their blood so that she might keep her youthful beauty.
Since her initial victims were servant girls of the lowest class, their disappearance and likely deaths
went uncontested. It was only when Báthory was accused of killing daughters of the lesser gentry
that she was put on trial (Telfer 12). The dissolution of such class systems meant that it was more
difficult for one individual to be at the center of so many disappearances without others taking
notice and thereafter taking action, although, as Jack the Ripper’s victim selection demonstrates,
there is always a class of victims whose deaths produce less outrage than others.
The changes in population also included a shift in location as many moved to cities. Instead of
being located in a town where everyone knew everyone else and was dependent upon each other
for survival, many now lived in cities among the masses who had no impact on their daily lives.
Not only do “we have little control over these strangers,” but we no longer depend on every person
we meet for our livelihood (Egger 41). This works in two directions, assisting serial killers by
providing a larger pool from which to choose victims and also ensuring that not every person
would be immediately missed. The more time that passes between a person’s disappearance and
the discovery of that disappearance, the more likely it is that a serial killer would be able to escape
without being identified.
The increase in public transportation also helped in this shift. First, it meant that serial killers would
be able to remove themselves from the immediate area after they had committed a murder so that
any subsequent crimes would not be connected. This would be a problem that would follow those
attempting to track down Ted Bundy since his crimes occurred not only in different police
jurisdictions, but also different states. Without cooperation between various law enforcement
agencies, the fact of a serial killer might never be discovered since each discrete entity would be
confronted with a single crime. Again, this is a change that allowed for a serial killer to operate
with less fear of identification and also impacted his possible pool of victims, since a larger
transient population meant that others did not take as much notice when people came and went.
An absence no longer meant someone was dead or missing, since it could easily mean that someone
had simply moved on.
All of these factors lead to an increase in the population that Steven Egger has termed “the less
dead,” indicating victims whose “demise is experienced as the elimination of sores or blemishes
cleansed by those who dare to wash away these undesirable elements” (80). Egger’s examples
include the homeless, hitchhikers, runaways, and sex workers, although the designation of less
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dead stretches across race, gender, class, sexuality, and other factors. Historical categories
include servants and peasants, such as those Elizabeth Báthory was accused of having
murdered. Every time period and culture have categories of less dead that make up groups of
people whose absence is not only desired, but also somewhat encouraged. Letters to the editor in
1888, for example, praised the Ripper for helping to clean up the streets.
One final theory as to the rise of serial killing since the end of the nineteenth century is simply a
question of time. As Vronsky points out, “[o]ne of the early terms used for serial killers was
‘recreational killers,’” and a recreational activity requires a man to find the hours in which to
engage in it (Cain 74). When every waking moment of existence was devoted to tasks that worked
toward continuing that existence, one man could not murder another not only because of how much
every member of a community depended on each other, but because his days were full and he
ended them exhausted. Since “there is no documentary evidence of boredom until the nineteenth
century,” it seems that men were not left with too much time on their hands prior to that period
(Arntfield and Danesi 47). This is not to say that serial killers engage in murder simply because
they are bored, but that changing class structures, population densities, and working conditions
allowed serial killers the freedom and conditions in which to enact their murderous urges.
While these theories may in part explain the apparently sudden appearance of murderers such as
Whitechapel’s Jack the Ripper in 1888 or “America’s first serial killer” H. H. Holmes, perhaps
better known as the Devil in the White City, in the 1890s, they do not clarify why there then seems
to be such a lull between the end of the nineteenth century and Bundy’s launching of the “golden
era” of serial killers near the end of the twentieth. There seems to be a lengthy gap or lag time
between cause and effect, or between the changes that allowed for the birth of the “first” serial
killer and the prevalence of such a figure that required specific terminology in order to name him.

Serienmörder and the Weimar Republic
It is partially the continued popularity of the Ripper murders and the lack of identification of the
murderer himself that has allowed the Whitechapel case to eclipse so many other historical
examples. The fact that the FBI has taken on the role of the expert within serial killer narratives
also positions serial killers themselves as somehow uniquely American and situates the term firmly
within the English language. However, the term “Serienmörder”—German for serial killer—was
first used in print in the 1930s as a description of Peter Kürten (Cain 13). Kürten himself was more
often known as the Vampire or Monster of Düsseldorf, although clearly the fact that he perpetrated
a series of crimes had enough of an impact on the Berlin chief of police in order to lead to the use
of Serienmörder in an official description.
Peter Kürten went on record as having committed more than nine murders and attempted more
than thirty. He is said to have drunk his victims’ blood and even to have once decapitated swans
in order to drink theirs as well. Like the Ripper a few decades prior, Kürten saw his crimes written
up in various newspapers and even wrote to these papers himself in order to continue stirring up
fear in the readers. Since a reward was offered for his capture, Kürten confessed to his wife and
then told her to go to the police so she might collect it. While he did not deny having committed
the various murders and attacks, Kürten also made no attempt to explain his actions. Without the
psychological understanding of serial killers that was developed fifty years later, Kürten remained
inexplicable and quickly disappeared from the papers once he was captured and executed.
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Although he was the cause of the first known printed reference to Serienmörder, Kürten was
not the only serial killer to emerge in the Weimar Republic. To name but three more, there
was Fritz Haarmann in Hanover who assaulted, murdered, and mutilated at least twenty-four boys
in a six-year span; Karl Denke, who killed and cannibalized dozens of vagrants and travelers,
recording their names in a ledger; and Carl Groβman, who sold meat on the black market and had
a large number of constantly changing female companions of which he murdered more than
twenty. Harrmann was executed, although Denke and Groβman both hanged themselves in police
custody before they could offer excuses or explanations. They, like Kürten, received large amounts
of attention from the press concentrating on their crimes but not, it seemed, on the murderers
themselves once they had been identified.
In her investigation into the Weimar Republic and its relationship with Lustmord—murder for
pleasure, a term that has also been considered to be interchangeable with “serial murder”—Maria
Tatar emphasizes the role that the press played in all of these cases. “Again and again,” she writes,
“newspapers served up phrases about serial murderers as ‘beasts,’ as victims of the desperate
postwar conditions …, as persons tainted by their heredity …or as ‘mentally and morally
defective’” in their attempts to explain not only the series of murders but the fact that these men
engaged in vampiric or cannibalistic acts with their victims’ bodies (Tatar 44). Haarmann,
Groβman, and Denke were also rumored to have processed the corpses and sold human meat on
the black market. They apparently found this a successful means of supporting themselves through
the economic depression and because the agricultural situation meant that there was little meat to
be had.
Although the newspapers across the Republic certainly capitalized on the public’s fear following
the murders in Kürten’s case or the discovery of Haarmann, Groβman, and Denke’s crimes, they
did not in fact demonize the criminals or represent them as monstrous or Other. Instead of fixating
on the mental conditions of these men, Tatar argues that the fear was “focused on the pathologies
of the general population” as the public responded to the threat within their midst, since this meant
that those articles did not have to confront the issues of cannibalism and serial murder (46).
Assisted either by suicide or the court systems, the accused murderers were quickly apprehended
and no longer a living threat to the already terrorized reading public. The men themselves were
dead either through execution or their own hand, and, with the cause of the fear and panic
eliminated, the papers could move on without discussing the cases further and prolonging, perhaps,
the anxiety that another such a figure might exist among them, unidentified.
This approach was, in fact, unusual. “In nearly all instances the killer is asked why” he committed
his crimes especially when elements such as vampirism or cannibalism are involved and, when
the man himself is not available to answer, speculation is still the order of the day (Egger 18). All
the same, Tatar reveals that she found only two reporters who attempted to address the reason
behind these killers’ cannibalistic bent. They focused on the contemporary economic situation that
meant so many members of the German population were facing starvation, although they “had
evidently never stopped to ponder the fact that numerous other victims of the German inflation
had not turned to murder and cannibalism to ensure their physical survival” (Tatar 44). Even
though so many were starving, only a handful of men were willing to commit murder in order to
fill their stomachs and, possibly, their pockets.
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Murder with a Purpose
In their amusingly—or possibly horrifyingly—titled book, Eat Thy Neighbor, Mark P. Donnelly
and Daniel Diehl discuss practices of cannibalism both historic and contemporary. Although they
acknowledge that cannibalism has had a welcome and expected place in many cultures throughout
history, of interest here are their observations about the practice of cannibalism within societies
that do not allow for the eating of the dead as a respectful and respected occurrence. A bit
flippantly, perhaps, they observe that “in times of need, any meat is better than none” (Donnelly
and Diehl 11). This may be a comfort to those who unwittingly ate their neighbors through the
purchase of black-market sausage, but Denke and Groβman, the chosen focus points in Donnelly
and Diehl’s chapter on the Weimar Republic, willingly committed murder in order to procure their
wares.
Many examples of cannibalism throughout history, when enacted by members of a society who
would not normally eat their dead, do not also involve serial murder. In the famous example of the
Uruguayan rugby team stranded in the Andes after a plane crash, the resistance to eating their
already-dead fellow passengers was so strong that the choice was nearly in favor of starvation. The
majority of people, even the majority of those in such dire economic straits as those in the midst
of the German depression, resisted knowingly eating other human beings. Although Donnelly and
Diehl allow for such desperation to break down the normal morals of a society, Denke and
Groβman stand in their text as outliers who have refused to offer explanation for their acts.
The pair chosen for the case study seem to be near opposites, since Denke was gregarious and a
respected member of the community while Groβman “neither cultivated nor wanted friends”
(Donnelly and Diehl 86). Denke carefully recorded the names of all of his victims in a ledger,
which meant that the police who looked through his house were able to feel confident in their
statement that he had murdered thirty people. There were thirty-one names in that ledger, but
Denke’s crimes had only been uncovered when his final intended victim escaped. Groβman, on
the other hand, was discovered to have four victims in various states of “preparation” when he
came under suspicion, and the true number of women he managed to entice into his home and then
murder is unknown (Donnelly and Diehl 87). Each man, of his own accord, had decided to
supplement his income and likely his own diet with the meat he procured from these murdered
men and women, in spite of the social and moral taboos against cannibalism.
Like the two reporters Tatar mentions, Donnely and Diehl attribute Denke and Groβman’s acts of
murder and cannibalism to the economic and social conditions of the Weimar Republic. Yet, again
like the contemporary reporters, they do not address why the number of cannibalistic serial killers
that arose within such conditions was in fact so small. If desperation drove Denke, Groβman, and
some of their contemporaries to both murder and cannibalism, it certainly did not have the same
effect on the vast majority of residents in the Weimar Republic. Cannibalism was not normalized,
and yet those who chose to treat human beings as livestock were allowed to quietly disappear from
the newspaper headlines instead of being subject to further examination.
In her study of sexual politics during the Weimar Republic, Maria Tatar examines the
contemporary situation in Germany as she asks why so many paintings, photographs, plays, and
even movies represented the murder and mutilation of women. When the murderer is depicted, the
figure is represented as male. Although not all of the people murdered by the previously mentioned
vampiristic and cannibalistic serial killers were female, those responsible for killing, eating, and
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distributing the flesh of the victims were indeed male. Tatar argues that the interwar years
were especially trying for the men in the Weimar Republic, whether they were former
soldiers or not, due to the “the asymmetrical effect of the war on men and on women” (12). The
role of the man during the war was one of protection and sacrifice as he offered himself on the
front lines or otherwise worked to preserve the home life of the women and children, but this
position collapsed after armistice.
Tatar points out that the German term Opfer is translated into English as both “sacrifice” and
“victim” and suggests that, after the end of the war, German men, especially the German soldiers,
traded being one form of Opfer for another (67). Those who had been asked to sacrifice limbs and
even their lives for their countries during the war now became victims because they had been
defeated. They were asked to return home where the visual and physical aftermath of the war was
much more clearly inscribed on masculine bodies than on feminine. This imbalance, then, shifted
the man from sacrifice to victim and caused a movement during the Weimar Republic in which
male artists therefore turned to make women their own victims, either embodying or depicting the
soldier who “recovers his full powers by marking the bodies of women with the sign of mutilation”
(Tatar 175). The same socioeconomic situation that caused reporters to dismiss cannibalism also
made this space for the representative murder and mutilation of the female body in order for men
to feel a restoration of power in the social order. Depicting women as segmented, murdered bodies
was a tactic used by artists to manage various anxieties about being a man in the period after the
war, and thus those who resorted to murder and cannibalism in order to manage their own lives in
fact fit into this coping mechanism in real life instead of on canvas.

This Mad Brute
Although there was no English language counterpart to Serienmörder in the postwar period, and
although American men were not coping with the same situation of having lost a war fought on
their own soil, the United States had its own run of serial killers and at least one infamous cannibal
in the 1920s and 1930s. Earle Leonard Nelson, also known as the Gorilla Killer, was a prime
example of the argument that mass transportation aided a serial killer in fulfilling his murderous
urges, since Nelson took advantage of freighthopping in order to leave one town after he had
committed a murder and resurface many miles away. Of his twenty-two known murders committed
between February 1926 and June 1927, two were committed in Canada, where he was apprehended
and then executed. The fact that he was referred to as a Gorilla references both Poe’s “The Murders
in the Rue Morgue,” a short story in which the violent and brutal murders were in fact committed
by an orangutan instead of a man, and also the belief that, the less evolved and more apelike a man
was, the more violent he would be.
Shortly after Nelson’s execution, Carl Panzram was arrested for burglary and began a confession
that started with three murders and ended up encompassing more than twenty murders and over a
thousand acts of sodomy against boys and men. Panzram’s alleged murder spree began in 1920
and ended during his imprisonment when he beat the prison laundry foreman to death. Panzram
was hanged in 1930, although not until after he had written of his crimes and made it clear that he
wished to have no appeals and felt no remorse about any of his actions. A more colorful character
than Nelson, Panzram may be best known for taunting the slowness of his executioner.
Along with Panzram and Nelson, Albert Fish generally receives a brief mention in histories of
serial killing but, like the others, he is also no Ted Bundy. Fish was, in fact, an older man who
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seemed almost grandfatherly to those who had met him, a trait that likely allowed him to get
away with the kidnaping and murder of children. He was arrested under suspicion of having
murdered ten-year-old Grace Budd and later confessed to also killing two boys. In two of these
cases, including that of Grace Budd, Fish also admitted to having cooked and eaten parts of his
victims’ bodies. He had even written a letter to Budd’s mother informing her of her daughter’s
fate, echoing the taunting letters sent to the newspapers under the name of Jack the Ripper. Fish’s
cannibalism, unlike that of the German cannibals, was never attributed to starvation, but rather to
Fish’s religious mania (Donnelly and Diehl 89). Again, these are just a handful of examples of the
violent crimes enacted by men in the interwar period.
Peter Vronsky labels 1916-1934 as the Serial-Killer “Interlude” (Cain 283). When America was
involved in WWI, he argues, the number of sexual killings dropped as young men were given a
state-sponsored outlet for their violent urges. This contrasts with his declaration that murders in
the United States rose a full 77% from 1920 to 1933 (Vronsky Cain 283). Although not all of these
were cases of serial murder, male violence was no longer given a conduit to be directed overseas
at the enemy Other. During the war, the enemy had been depicted as inhuman, monstrous, or as
animals, such as in the 1918 propaganda poster that orders its audience to “Destroy this mad brute.”
Said “brute” is a gorilla, baring its teeth as it wears a German helmet labeled “Militarism” and
holding a bloody club inscribed with “Kultur.” Its other arm encircles a swooning, half-naked
blonde maiden as the gorilla steps upon the shore labeled “America.” This enemy brute is clearly
foreign, and the threat is that it will leave its homeland and invade our own.
When this monster surfaced in America in the form of Earle Leonard Nelson, he was still labeled
a gorilla, although his victims were not nearly so young as the woman depicted on the poster. The
imagery that had so recently been applied to a supposedly less-developed foreign people in order
to create the argument that the Germans were less evolved than Americans—and therefore not to
be considered human—was now employed to describe an American citizen. The atavisms
attributed to the Germans were recycled and redirected toward Nelson. Just as the “discursive
strategies developed from reflecting on killers like Kürten and Haarmann did not need to be
invented by the [German] press,” neither did the American reporters need to create a new narrative
for its own murderers (Tatar 56). The threat of violence from the under-evolved male figure
remained the same, but the origin of the man shifted. It would seem that the socioeconomic
situation in the Weimar Republic was not solely responsible for the postwar increase in male
violence.

Postwar Serial Killers and the Pathological Public Sphere
Mark Seltzer has theorized serial killing and the reporting of serial killing as having to do with
intersections between the public and private sphere. Seltzer sees media representations of violence
as evidence of “wound culture: the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and
opened persons” (1). For Selzter, wound culture exists within what he calls the pathological public
sphere, which complicates the public/private divide and turns private lives and private bodies into
the spectacle. Mass media plays a crucial role in identifying and directing this spectacle and,
although Selzer was writing at the end of the twentieth century, changes in mass media and
reporting during and after the First World War show evidence of this same fascination.
The first recorded instance of murder inviting the public into the private sphere has been named as
“A Narrative of the Life of William Beadle,” published in 1783. This pamphlet, which presented
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readers with the sermon preached at the funerals of Beadle’s wife and children, whom he
had murdered, also introduced the idea of the “body discovery scene” to the crime narrative.
Because all members of the Beadle family were found dead inside their home, the retelling of the
crime “opened up the Beadle home and its operations for popular inspection,” inviting readers
inside (Halttunen 138). The twentieth century, then, did not invent this intersection of the private
and the public sphere, but changes in media production and distribution allowed for wider
audiences and more intimate access.
The act of serial killing itself, due to the fact that the killer “intentionally chooses a stranger as his
victim[,] threatens our very social order” (Egger 4). The mediation of this act is thus able to invite
audiences to participate in the spectacle of the pathological public sphere and feeds wound culture
with words and images. Seltzer goes so far as to describe the mutilations inflicted by a serial killer
as being not only violence against the individual body, but also “an idealized and intact American
culture” (6). Once again, the threat against American culture and all that America is meant to stand
for has shifted from across the ocean in the form of the German enemy to being locally cultivated
in the minds and bodies of American men. Even though the war was over, America had emerged
victorious, and the media was no longer full of updates from the front or propaganda about the war
effort, the threat of violence still endured.
The media plays no small role in the representation of murder, especially serial killers and their
victims, as spectacle. In order to sell more newspapers or ensnare more listeners or viewers, the
press capitalizes on “the excitation in the opening of private and bodily and psychic interiors” as
murder victims are discovered, the frenzy of the chase is reported, and the serial killer is then
identified and studied (Seltzer 253). Even though the United States of the postwar period was not
experiencing the same cultural stresses as the Weimar Republic, the pathological public sphere
and its presentation of wound culture evolved with changing technologies in order to keep the
world’s dangers in the public eye. It was just that those dangers were no longer in uniform and no
longer engaged in this battle across the ocean.

Postwar Male Violence
Although serial killing has been marketed as overwhelmingly American and a product of the late
twentieth century, the economic, social, and political situations of both the United States and
Germany after the end of World War I created a space in which individuals committed a series of
stranger murders. This interwar period has not previously been a focus of the history of serial
killing, partially because of the lack of contemporary terminology within both the criminal justice
and psychological fields, but also because the figure of Ted Bundy and other “golden age” serial
killers from fifty years later have eclipsed the crimes of the 1920s and 1930s. With Bundy as the
idealized serial killer, the focus has largely been on the ways in which the economic, social, and
political climate of the 1960s led to the development of such serial murderers.
Discussions of the apparent rise of the serial killer in the twentieth century have already addressed
such possible causes and influences as the rise of mass media; changes in class structure; shifts in
population, including moving toward cities and having more access to transportation; and the
increase of free time available for recreational activities. These theories are applicable across the
twentieth century, although the specific circumstances surrounding a particular decade or historical
event should augment them. In this instance, the Great War and its aftermath must be considered,
since multiple cases of serial killing emerged on both continents after the declaration of armistice.
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Consideration must be given to the war experience for men and boys at home both during
and after the war. Although it seems to be a near-universal conclusion that “males may feel
impelled to control women sexually and through violence,” this gender-directed attempt at
maintaining power seems to have increased after the end of the war (Artnfield and Danesi 256).
Men who had previously been allowed and even encouraged to direct their frustrations publicly
toward the enemy in times of war were then denied that outlet after its end. Public displays of
anger and violence that were previously couched as patriotism no longer existed as channels
through which men could vent their personal and private frustrations.
Further, the war effort saw an increased visibility of the gendered struggles that faced men and
women of the early twentieth century. “Historically male-dominated society is marked by the male
aspiration to somehow tame and control that daunting female sexual power,” and the war years
saw an increase of women visibly working within the public sphere (Vronsky Cain 119).
Recruitment posters invited women not only to volunteer within traditionally feminine positions
such as Red Cross nurses, but also to work alongside men in roles that took them to the front lines.
With the threat of such a gendered power shift, the other changes that resulted from the end of the
war meant that men who had once occupied firm positions within society found those positions
either changed or under threat of change. The Great War did not create this threat, but it did
highlight the issues already at hand.
Men in Germany were further affected by the fact that the war ended for them in a loss. The
German “notion of the war effort as one great act of martyrdom was so pervasive that it easily
effaced the reality of agency, turning the German soldier into a man prepared to sacrifice himself,
but also a man who, in defeat, quickly slides into the role of victim” in which he is free to act
without guilt (Tatar 182). The effects of armistice in Germany allowed for not only an artistic
movement in the Weimar Republic in which male artists constantly repeated the theme of
mutilated and segmented female bodies, but also created the space for men to enact that violence
on real others. Although the occurrences of serial killing connected with cannibalism—and an
income from selling such meat on the black market—were dismissed in contemporary reports as
being a response to the economic depression, the fact that these instances were both few and
notable demonstrates that even the threat of starvation is not the sole cause of these murders. There
was something about these specific men that pushed them to resort to homicide, and something
about the culture that allowed these cases to be pushed aside.
In the United States as well as in Germany, men were faced with a great many changes as a result
of the First World War. Media had brought violence into their homes whether or not that violence
was being enacted on their own soil or far away, and the war effort had once again caused shifts
in population and individuals’ roles within society. Maria Tatar argues that, for the German serial
killers who arose within the Weimar Republic, “the Lust in Lustmord had more to do with the
retaliatory pleasures of an aggressor who perceives himself as victim than with sexual desire,” but
it was not only the German man, robbed of his opportunity to be a sacrificial soldier, that responded
with violence (Tatar 182). American men, having been exposed to the idea of war through news
reports and propaganda events, also found themselves with a sudden change in expectation and a
lack of outlet for their aggression. All of these factors must be considered when addressing the
Serialmörder that emerged in the aftermath of World War I, long before Ted Bundy ushered in the
“golden age” of serial killing.
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